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Having been enlightened by the popular creative class thesis, this doctoral 
thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the emerging creative economy. 
Using newly derived panel data from NUTS 2 regions in Europe, the role of creative 
workers is systematically evaluated. This thesis is multi-disciplinary in nature as 
several different theories are combined in order to understand what the knowledge 
economy really requires. The thesis first critically and comprehensively reviews 
previous studies regarding the relationship between city/regional economic 
development and the presence of the creative class. In the second part, the research of 
ICT-related theories is summarised before being matched with the issues from the 
creative class thesis. Three main research directions are listed, including the economic 
function of workers with creative skills, their specialised preferences and the 
influence of educational backgrounds in the labour market. A Growth Accounting 
model is used together with two empirical models for testing the economic impact of 
creative workers, ICT, as well as the interactions of these two variables across NUTS 
2 regions in ten European countries. Three main findings can be summarised: the 
unbalanced development level of the creative economy across the main European 
regions, the complementary relationship between ICT and creative skills in explaining 
output and productivity growth, and finally the difference in the economic function of 
graduates and creative workers. The thesis then develops an empirical model to 
investigate how creative workers are distributed across regions in twelve European 
countries. Together with two different econometric models, the evidence suggests that 





contrast to midsized and smaller regions. However, how well a local government 
performs has a substantial impact on the influx of creative workers among regions of 
all sizes, and the overall quality of political institutions appears to enhance this 
process. This phenomenon is more evident in small-sized regions compared to large-
sized regions. The final strand of the thesis briefly discusses the possible factors that 
could determine the outcome of creative jobs, using the micro-level EU LFS data in 
seven European counties. The findings imply that education background is generally 
consistent with creative job outcomes, but it is difficult to identify a clear boundary 
regarding creative jobs among occupations that require and use higher education. The 
key findings, contributions and research limitations are summarised in a concluding 
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1.1 What really matters for growth?  
 
What factors really do stimulate economic growth? This question has always 
been at the heart of both economics and geographical economics. Despite an ongoing 
desire to resolve this, centuries of studies, based on various perspectives, have 
produced many complementary or competing theories. Earlier studies merely focused 
on the role played by firms and industries. Marshall (1930) advocated that 
agglomerations or clusters of firms and industries would achieve considerable 
advantages in terms of lower labour costs, fewer potential risks or a greater likelihood 
of shared knowledge bases and markets. Economists started to investigate and 
catalogue the possible factors lying behind such agglomerations and clusters. 
Classic location theory emphasises transportation costs and other trade-offs 
made by large industries or firms. For example, Weber (1909) formulated a least cost 
theory of industrial location, which attempted to explain and predict the uneven 
distribution of industries at the macro level. In common with other similar theories 
(e.g. Ohlin, 1933; Christaller, 1933), the argument is that firms and industries are 
always seeking minimum transport and labour costs. In the age of Fordism, the role of 
firms, or specifically large firms, became even more important as the dominant unit 
for regional economic development. Many attempts have been made to try to explain 
the location decisions made by multinational enterprises and later on the location 
choices of their branch plants. For example, Vernon (1966) proposed a classical 




model that explained industrial location based on the product lifecycle theory: firms 
would decentralise production through branch plants when production processes had 
been standardised. However, these studies did not examine the role of occupations or 
other types of skills as most jobs were standardised and were only seen as a cost to be 
minimised. 
Changes occurred with a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. 
As a consequence, non-standardised production resulted in the rise of the knowledge 
intensive economy and labour divisions seemed to become more important than ever. 
For example, Bell (1973) depicted a new class structure based on managers, scientists, 
administrators and engineers, which according to his point view, is the creative force 
for regional economic development. Andersson (1985) further proposed a concept of 
a “C-society” based on creativity, communication, culture and knowledge.  
A very influential body of literature was structured around the human capital 
theory, drawing on the pioneering work of Becker (1964) on the role of human capital 
in economic growth. Human capital is embodied within individuals, who in turn 
produce economic value or increase productivity in economic transactions (Faggian, 
2005). For example, Mincer (1997) suggested that the wage level is an equation of 
hours worked to skills and education ‒ in competitive markets, wage levels should be 
proportionate to the level of human capital stock for individuals.  
The positive relationship between human capital and growth has been 
confirmed by various literatures at the national level (Barro, 1990; Barro and Jong-
Wha, 1993; Simon, 1998). Some studies argue that it may be difficult to explain 
national growth by human capital because of institutional effects (Glaeser et al., 2004). 
At the sub-level, cities with more skills appear to have stronger power in explaining 




economic growth in comparison to those less skilled cities. For example, Acemoglu 
and Dell (2010) examined subnational data from both North and South America to 
distinguish the roles of education and institutions in accounting for economic 
development, finding that half of the intra-country variation in levels of income was 
explained by education. 
An alternative approach linking people’s skills to economic growth is via 
entrepreneurship. The discussion of creative entrepreneurship’s impact on economic 
growth can be traced back to the early 20th century. Schumpeter (1934, 1980) defined 
an entrepreneur as a person who is willing and able to convert a new idea or invention 
into a successful innovation, and as he advocated, entrepreneurship employs “a gale 
of creative destruction” that partly or entirely replaces inferior innovations across 
industries or countries and creates new products or introduces new business models. 
Therefore, entrepreneurship is related to the dynamics of an industry and to long-term 
economic growth.  
The routinised innovation process from giant firms will not replace individual 
innovators or entrepreneurial partners’ positions; independent entrepreneurial 
inventors are more likely to provide revolutionary breakthroughs and contribute 
significantly to further economic growth (Baumol, 2002). Furthermore, 
entrepreneurship concentrates on the creation of economic activities; it is, to a certain 
extent, asserted to be a good proxy in explaining the contribution of human 
knowledge and the ability to generate economic growth, particularly in urban regions 
(Glaeser, 2009). In empirical tests, the measure of such entrepreneurial activities is 
multifaceted, such as by share of midsized or small-sized firms (Chinitz, 1961), the 
self-employment rate (Glaeser, 2010) or by numbers of newly formed firms (Kirchoff 
et al., 2002).  




At the same time, growth in the availability of microeconomic data led to a 
further wave of discussion regarding the skills themselves. Corrado et al. (2006) 
defined three subsets of intangible assets that are deemed to be important sources of 
output and productivity growth: in addition to digitised information (ICT) and 
innovative property (R&D), economic competencies are largely determined by 
knowledge capital. With respect to this, Piekkola (2009) measured specific intangible 
skills such as management-marketing skills, research and development (R&D) skills 
and information and communication technology (hereafter referred to as ICT) skills. 
In contrast, Jones and Chiripanhura (2010) distinguished economic competencies by 
individual human capital and collective human capital; the latter is considered to be 
more consistent with the notion of intangible assets and has strong explanatory power 
regarding variations in economic performance among OECD (i.e. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. There are also many other 
measures of intangible skills within the workplace, for example by workplace 
practices (Black and Lynch, 2005) or organisational factors (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007).  
Finally, another line of argument highlights creativity, which is mainly 
referred to within the notion of creative cities/regions (e.g. Florida, 2002, 2008; 
Landry, 2000, 2007; Glaeser, 2011). Related literature, in a broad sense, focuses on 
the contribution of different creative skills as a whole in generating economic growth 
in cities and regions. Florida (2002) defined a set of occupations as “the creative 
class”, including science, engineering, arts, culture, entertainment and the knowledge-
based professions of management, finance, law, healthcare and education. In this case, 
creativity is defined as comprehensive creativeness, involving different forms not 
only of the creativity of discovering technological inventions, but also of the “soft 




creativity of marking interaction in the city flow” (Landry, 2007, p.1). Thus the 
discussion of skills is further linked to the nature of places and their cultural ecology. 
 
1.2 Why place matters: the power of the city and the mega-region 
 
If industrial production was organised around firms and industries, then the 
creative population would be embodied in cities. Cities have been a location of 
innovation as creativity is often sparked by the collision of ideas from different 
disciplines and cultures. The role of cities has received policy markers’ attention since 
the 1960s. Jacobs (1961) was among the first scholars to suggest the importance of 
innovation to economic growth. As she claimed, innovation does not come from firms 
or factories, but cities which contain skills and talents.  
However, major changes have emerged through the process of globalisation 
within the economic landscape. As the volume of international trade and capital 
mobility has rapidly expanded across different countries, globalisation has gradually 
undermined the previously strong position of national-level economic institutions 
(Ascani et al., 2012). As a result, the world has become increasingly borderless, with 
national borders being less likely to determine the location of economic activities. 
Capital flows to where the return is great and people go to where better opportunities 
lie.  
At the same time, many cities that Jacobs once thought of as central cities 
surrounded by small villages and towns have grown into mega-regions. The mega-city 
is not only defined by its high population and the large number of inhabitants, it is 




also a new economic system that results from the outward growth of many urban 
societies within it. Globalisation exposes modern cities to worldwide competition and 
when economic activities are globalised, the bigger and more competitive mega-
regions replace cities and become the new engines of the global economy (Florida, 
2008, p.59). 
Some recent studies suggest that technological improvements shorten the 
distance between places and people. The world is more likely to be “flat” enabling 
production to be dispersed and people to live everywhere (Friedman, 2005); however, 
the reality is that the share of the world’s population who live in urban areas 
dramatically increased from 30 percent in the 1980s to around 50 percent today 
(Florida, 2008 , p.19).  
Population may be not the only indicator to show that the world is “spiky”. 
Based on satellite data from NOAA, Florida et al. (2007) used the level of light 
emissions as an indicator to map global economic activities and compared these 
findings to a map of the global GDP levels. As these two maps largely overlapped, the 
results suggest that our world is shaped around a couple of dozen mega-regions such 
as the Boston-New York-Washington D.C corridor, Amsterdam-Antwerp-Brussels or 
the Greater London region; however, population density or energy usage levels cannot 
be equated with economic growth. Many of the world’s mega-cities remain less 
developed, such as Mexico City, and are substantially different from those successful 
ones that have high innovation capacities. 
In conclusion, the changing nature of the economic landscape has 
progressively increased the importance of regions in shaping growth trajectories. 
Together with the rise of the knowledge economy, we encounter several new 




difficulties. On one hand, the knowledge-based economy still appears to be sensitive 
to location. Fordist industries always choose a place where labour and land rent are 
cheap, and later products can be sent to destinations for consumption. Knowledge 
production, which is, however, related to service goods too, requires 
contemporaneous contact from both producers and consumers (Florida and Mellander, 
2012). On the other hand, skilled workers do not only contribute to production, but 
also acts as consumers in cities and regions. Therefore, the new nature of the global 
economy forces us to rethink how to generate growth, focusing on how we can bring 
the right people to the right place rather than focusing on skills alone.  
 
1.3 Motivations: the creative class thesis and the European regions 
 
To sum up, in the past urban economists focused on firms and industries as the 
important area for analysis, but in recent decades there has been an increasing 
concentration on skills. The skills revolution changed the nature of the global 
economy, meaning that the role of human capital, occupations or skills, has begun to 
receive much attention. The notions of creative cities and the creative class thesis 
have already become very influential (see Figure 1.1), leading us to rethink the 
formation of an economic system. They are new concepts, measuring a combination 
of supply and demand driven labour rather than the more conventional human capital, 
and they appear to be solutions that might bring about further economic growth. 
Numerous studies had found fault with the logic or empirical claims of 
Florida’s changing prognosis in the North American context in his creative class 
thesis. Such on-going and intensive debates exerted profound influence on the 




theoretical development in the domain of urban and regional studies, marking the 
beginning of a widening stream of academic work on the concept of creativity. 
Figure 1.1: Annual number of citations of the term “the creative class” and 
“creative cities” by Google Scholar, 1990-2013 
     
 
The praise and censure of this theory will be systematically evaluated in more 
detail in the literature review. Here, the motivations of this thesis are briefly 
demonstrated and the reason why Europe is the primary research target given. Firstly, 
the majority of studies in Europe duplicated the original theoretical framework 
proposed by Florida. Also, existing studies for regions in a country or limited 
countries cannot fully reflect the real function of the creative economy for the whole 
of Europe. As national borders have become less relevant to economic activities and 
an increasing number of regions rather than individual cities have turned into new 
engines for economic growth, Europe’s economic geography has become similar to 
that of the world. With the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the European 
Union (EU), political boundaries between many European countries have become less 
important. Despite the remaining heterogeneity in culture, religion, language or 

















economically connected. When we look at Europe today, it looks more like an 
integrated economy composed of connected regions or cities. In other words, the new 
European economy in the 21st century is made up of many important regions or mega-
regions that house the bulk of innovation and production (Florida, 2008, p.53).  
Secondly, current studies cannot substantially answer the question of how the 
so-called creative workers contribute to growth. Empirical evidence may support the 
fact that having more skilled workers co-exists with having higher levels of GDP and 
productivity or higher employment growth in high-tech industries. However, 
knowledge, skills and talents are organised around economic systems, and output is 
determined by a complex interaction between different factors. The powerful synergy 
of the creative class agglomeration may not be associated with the regional economic 
growth. Instead, the quite different creative activities in regions could be related to 
each other, potentially resulting in instability and chaos (Cole, 2012).  
Therefore, this thesis attempts to connect the concept of creativity to other 
desiderata of economic growth, particularly for example, technology. A series of 
factors could relate to people’s talent within the economic system; however, the 
impact of technology is the most straightforward one as a large body of literature has 
already discussed the interactive relationship between specific skills and technology. 
One consensus view is that the increased demand for skilled labour is linked to 
technological progress (Machin and Van Reenen, 2007). Some empirical studies show 
this pattern, such as a declining trend regarding the number of medium skilled 
workers relative to high and low-skilled ones (Autor et al.,2006; Goos and Manning, 
2007). 




A possible explanation of this trend is that ICT complements human capital 
(Autor et al., 1998) and also investment in highly qualified employees with ICT skills 
is a very important condition for the full exploitation of ICT potential (Van Reenen et 
al., 2010). Nevertheless, academic work on this topic, as with the study of the creative 
class in Europe, is only at the primary stage. As Boselli (2010) proposed, ICT policies 
in the future should converge with other policy objectives such as investment in 
human capital. Therefore, it is quite intriguing to look at this through a high degree of 
coordination among different institutions, to see how creative workers, in terms of 
different definitions, could interact with technology in the theoretical context.  
Finally, Florida’s theory is a grand thesis. According to his “creative compact” 
(Florida, 2013, p.383-398), we should supposedly accept several important principles 
in order to march forward to the Creative Age, such as innovation expansion, 
education system reform and promotion of rich amenities. However, many of these 
propositions, although they have been frequently mentioned, are not empirically 
tested. At several points, Florida only suggested a vague direction concerning the 
future development path of his creative economy. Is the concept of the creative class 
closely associated with economic and social realities? With this question in mind, this 
thesis aims to put Europe into context to explore these unknown domains, particularly 
for example, the preferences of the creative class and its relationship with the 
education system. This perspective, to a great extent, integrates the hot topics of the 
creative class thesis with various practical effects regarding regional development.    
In conclusion, the study of economic development needs to incorporate 
observations at the regional level. The role of a place in economic systems cannot be 
simply overlooked in the European context. This dissertation is based on existing 
urban growth theories, such as the creative class thesis. However, it also disagrees 




with this thesis as it has an exclusive focus on the agglomeration of one or more 
specific talents in a place. This thesis is motivated in a broad sense by trying to 
understand the complex functions of the newly emerged economic systems of the 21st 
century. 
 









2.1 Creativity  
 
As the creative class theory is fundamental to this study, the six aspects of 
criticism are reviewed. The introduction summarised the reasons why this research is 
important; the theoretical framework will not be constrained by Florida’s model but 
instead a comprehensive production function approach is adopted. 
 
2.1.1 Introduction: what is creativity? 
 
According to Scott (2014), creativity is a very difficult word to define as the 
meaning has frequently been changed by its presumed connection with possessing a 
great mind and an indefinable genius for the sciences and arts. Nevertheless, there is a 
generally accepted framework where creativity can be situated between two concrete 
polarities: one being psychological or internal and the other being sociological or 
external. With regard to the psychological or internal polarity, creativity could denote 
outstanding mental capacity and personal talent for a subject, and while some people 
are gifted others are not. Taking a sociological or external stance, creativity can be 
embodied in concrete social contexts that shape its character in various ways.   
Creativity, in the sociological and economic context, may not be a privilege 
possessed by a few selected people with superior talents who rarely make mistakes. 




Igniting a creative spark could be a step-by-step interconnected process. This includes 
initial learning, being creative to produce new ideas and a final translation of these 
new ideas to concrete economic outcomes. Therefore, creativity is modelled by the 
knowledge and skills of individuals. Amin and Robert (2008) observed that 
“communities of practice” are driving forces in skills and knowledge generation 
across various working environments. In other words, individuals may inevitably be 
constrained by certain factors in their daily environment. They internalise these 
factors through a further mental process and then reflect back with socially 
conditioned creative efforts. In the meantime, dense and disruptive communication 
networks will favour individuals in acquiring a vast range of information and produce 
greater creative efforts. Taking all these points may lead to one simple fact, that 
creativity is a social phenomenon. Once again, when defining creativity Scott (2014, 
p.569) states “It is in the guise of overlapping physical and social infrastructures and 
is with dense, polarized and multifaceted transactions”. 
Even though Florida has similar thoughts when defining creativity, a greater 
emphasis is placed on its economic value. Florida added that creativity is not 
automatically sustained for a long period of time, but requires constant investment in 
the economic and social forms that feed creative impulse (Florida, 2013, p.23). 
Creative ideas are economic goods, which can be used on a repeated basis. When used 
frequently this may lead to growth in values – which is an increasing returns to scale. 
Unlike physical goods, such as materials which may be depleted, individuals with 
creative thinking naturally may lead to novel production and useful products. 
Therefore, it is no longer important who owns patents or physical capital, but is about 
how to explore the creative efforts of individuals based on specific economic-social 
forms.  




In conclusion, creativity cannot simply be treated as a sovereign emanation 
from the minds of individuals, but can also be modelled by the complex interweaving 
of social life, urban amenities and production. In this respect, the purpose of this study 
is clarified, only focusing on one moment of creativity (external and sociological), 
whilst exploring its role in the context of social-economic development. This is a 
meaningful and robust theoretical framework, which will not fall into a protracted 
debate regarding its definition. 
 
2.1.2 The rise of the creative class 
 
This section reviews how Florida developed the creative class thesis and asks 
why the so-called creative class or the creative economy is important for us and how 
the creative class thesis is different from previous theories, such as human capital. 
Florida provided plausible explanations. He particularly emphasised the relationship 
between the share of the creative class and employment growth, as well as the factors 
linked to establishing a sound environment to attract creative workers.  
Florida’s first realisation of the creative power was in the age of high Fordism. 
He was taught a lesson about the possible consequences of management – promoting 
or squashing creativity – from his father’s working career in the eyeglass-frame 
business. The factory was originally well operated by experienced workers and self-
made managers. However, newly recruited graduates who had considerable 
knowledge but little real-life experience introduced complicated plans which 
inevitably failed in practice and brought the whole production to a halt (Florida, 2013, 
p.64). Furthermore, following a similar observation from a case study conducted in 




American and Japanese factories in the 1980s and 1990s, Florida (2013, p.34) 
emphasised the importance of creative skills. Modern factories no longer only 
required basic skills such as tightening screws or machining a hem; even entry-level 
jobs entail problem-solving, quality control or screen-monitoring. Such a complex 
production process involves not only physical labour but also intellect and creativity. 
Therefore, workers within a modern economy are coming to be valued according to 
their contributions to the continuous improvement of products, rather than their 
performances on routinized tasks. 
The theoretical underpinning of the creative class thesis was further 
complemented by a survey conducted by Florida and his colleagues from 2001 to 
2002. Together they constructed a questionnaire survey of information and 
technology (IT) workers across the U.S., which attempted to answer the following 
question: “what really matters to your work?”(Florida, 2013, p.69-71). The sample 
selection was not randomly distributed but the sample size was relatively large: 
20,000 in total of which approximately 11,000 identified themselves as staff and 
9,000 as management. Even though not all of the creative class which Florida defined 
later was included, IT workers were certainly part of the conventionally defined 
creative workers. Unsurprisingly, the results indicated that monetary incentive is 
indeed important but IT workers were more likely to choose challenge, responsibility, 
flexibility, peer recognition and location as the primary elements in making them 
satisfied and happy.  
Florida acknowledged that he was not the first one to raise the notion that the 
modern industrial economy had produced new classes. For example, Fussell (1983) 
taxonomised many of the attributes that Florida assigned to the creative class, and 
conceptualised a growing group of the population in the post-industrial society as 




independent-minded “X” people, who are more likely to devote themselves to “art”, 
“writing” and “creative work”. However, he emphasised that the creative class is 
fundamentally different from these existing class definitions; it is rooted in the 
changed economic circumstances. The way that connects creative workers together is 
not only its values and attributes, but also the place it occupies in the economic 
structure. Therefore, membership to the creative class also follows from an 
individual’s economic functions. Florida (2013, p.38) suggested that “their social 
identities, cultural preferences, lifestyles, values and consumptions all flow from this.”  
In line with his own studies and other regional development theories, Florida 
believed we had already reached a “new age”, the era of the creative economy. 
Everything has changed, not only workers but also their workplace, working style, 
lifestyle, timesheet and how they define themselves. Creative workers are less likely 
to be free agents and they are reluctant to conform to traditional norms and 
institutional directives (Florida, 2013, p.56). In this post-materialist society, creative 
workers work harder and play harder with more flexible working hours. However, 
they would not define themselves as hedonistic bobos (bourgeoisie-bohemians), who 
have maverick lifestyles but are less adaptable in the modern workplace (Brook, 
2000). They are simply seeing themselves as “creative people with creative values, 
working in increasingly creative workplaces, living essentially creative lifestyles and 
enjoying multidimensional experiences.” (Florida, 2013, p.180) 
Florida certainly agreed that skilled and talented people are the driving force 
for city growth and regional growth. However, what people actually do and their 
creative occupations are claimed to be a better measure of people’s skills than 
educational attainment and other proxies because they capture utilised abilities rather 




than potential. In the first edition of The Rise of the Creative Class, Florida (2002) 
classified occupations into the service class, the working class and the creative class. 
He further divided the creative class into two components. The first 
component, which he defined as the super creative core, includes “scientists, 
engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, 
designers and architects, as well as the thought leadership of the modern society: 
notification writers, editors, cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts and 
other opinion makers” (Florida, 2013, p.38). This is the group of the creative class 
with the highest order of creative work as they produce new forms and designs that 
are transferable and widely-applicable. The second component is creative 
professionals who work in knowledge and technology-intensive industries such as 
“high-tech, financial services, the legal and health care professions” (Florida, 2013, 
p.39). Although these people are not directly involved in the process of creating new 
forms or designs, they engage in creative problem solving, based on complex bodies 
of knowledge to solve particular problems. 
In particular, bohemians, comprising poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, 
actors, designers and architects, are asserted to be quite an important force for the 
growth of the creative economy too. The bohemian group is the symbol of the 
creative class as they represent “the geography of cool” and interweave all of the 
other social and economic factors in economic systems. Mass marketing does not 
compromise their artistic integrity and they are not only producing values of open-
mindedness and self-expression, but also signalling low barriers to entry for other 
talent and human capital across racial and ethnic lines (Florida, 2013, p.245).  




Florida (2013, p.188) suggested that creative workers need to gather into 
creative cities. It may be deemed true that thanks to technical progress and 
competition in telecommunications, distance is no longer an issue for us in the 
modern world as our world indeed becomes flatter. Nevertheless, we have to question 
if place really is no longer an important aspect for city and regional growth? It 
appears that many mega-regions drive the world economy such as the Boston-
Washington corridor in the United States of America (U.S.) or the Amsterdam-
Brussels-Antwerp metropolis in Europe. Such a rapid expansion of cities and urban 
regions challenges the hypothesis of a flat world. As Jacobs (1961) suggested a long 
time ago, new types of work and ways of doing things drove economic expansion; 
however, the city is the motor force behind innovation. In this respect, geography still 
matters and is an even more important consideration for the creative class   
Furthermore, what creative workers appear to want is quite different from our 
parents’ or grandparents’ preferences. Rather than preferring traditional physical 
attractions, creative workers look for quality amenities, openness, diversity and 
anything else that could be helpful to identify them as creative people. Cities can 
provide a fertile environment for them as they are containers and mobilisers of 
creativity, attracting creative workers from surrounding areas while also providing 
friendly ecosystems and cultural heterogeneity that supports and stimulates creative 
effort (Florida, 2013, p.201).  
Creative people thus need to be located within creative cities. With this in 
mind, Florida suggested the 3Ts (Talent, Tolerant and Technology) concept for 
regional economic development. He emphasised that the 3Ts explains well why some 
cities or regions failed to grow even though they had deep technological or human 
capital reserves – they had not been open enough and tolerant enough to attract and 




retain top creative workers in the new era of the creative economy (Florida, 2013, 
p.229). The promotion of the 3Ts is the core value of the creative class thesis. Florida 
adopted various indicators to illustrate this concept based on empirical evidence. The 
first T is technology. In the latest version of the rise of the creative class (10th edition), 
he extended the original proxy of technology to not only include the tech-pole index 
(share of workers in high-tech industries), but also patents per capita and average 
annual patent growth. The second T is talent. The original measure accounted for the 
combination of both graduates (i.e. human capital) and the creative class (Florida, 
2002). However, this received a high number of criticisms (for a detailed discussion 
see section 2.1.3). Thereafter, Florida excluded the human capital measure (share of 
college graduates) from the creative class measure (share of creative workers) to 
solely represent talent. The third T is tolerance, which is illustrated by the bohemian-
gay index (share of bohemians and share of a gay population). Florida found a 
connection between the level of bohemian/gay individuals and the level of economic 
growth. The bohemian and gay index was positively correlated to regional wealth 
(house price) in addition to the effect of income change (Florida and Mellander, 2009).  
Axtell and Florida (2006) revealed that the population distribution of U.S. 
cities as well as other advanced industrial countries followed Zpif’s Law1, with only a 
few exceptional cases. While the hierarchical distribution of creative populations also 
matched this law and the population distribution of U.S. cities, this result supported 
the law of “preferential attachment2”, in which skilled and productive people attract 
                                                          
1  “Zipf’s law is a very tight constraint on the class of admissible models of local growth. It says that for 
most countries the size distribution of cities strikingly fits a power law: the number of cities with 
populations greater than S is proportional to 1/S” (Gabaix, 1999, p.739). 
2 In microeconomics, the preferential attachment process is “any of a class of processes, in which 
some forms of credit or wealth, is distributed among a number of individuals or objects according to 
how much they already have, therefore those who are already wealthy receive more than those who 
are not” (Surhone et al., 2010, p.80). 




other skilled and productive people. As the theory suggests, creative people can 
contribute great skills and talents to regional economic development. Creative 
individuals prefer an unconventional lifestyle within a diversified community. 
Therefore, if a place is attractive enough, they will live and work there and thus are 
more likely to attract additional creative individuals, human capital as well as high-
tech based firms and industries, to this place. Finally, more creativity or high-tech 
based jobs will be created and as they grow, they become the locations for still more 
creative agents and firms ‒ a virtuous circle.  
The original creative class thesis was largely based in the U.S. In the global 
context, Florida found a similar tendency in the expansion of a creative economy. 
Although the U.S. has an accumulatively large number of creative workers, its share 
of the creative class in total employment only ranks twenty-seventh in comparison 
with the rest of the world. In contract, Singapore, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Australia, Sweden and Finland are countries that have high shares of creative workers. 
This is generally consistent with other statistics that show that major advanced 
economies have advantages in technology, innovation and wealth. For example, the 
overall creativity index is positively correlated with the overall competitiveness index 
(Florida, 2014).  
Finally, we have to consider what the policy implications could be from the 
creative class thesis. The most important one is that Florida is perceived as wanting 
more “cool” communities in cities and regions. The presence of the creative class 
appears to be a crucial magnet and the supply-side foundation upon which creative 
clusters are built (Peck, 2005). If cities and regions want creative workers to stay, they 
need to embrace selected amenities to please creative populations (especially young 
creative workers) and balance their new lifestyles. As a result, we essentially need 




more authentic historical buildings; walkable streets; many cafes, shops and museums; 
more arts and live music venues; more indigenous street culture; and other types of 
self-promotion (Florida and Mellander, 2012). However, spurring creativity should 
not be to the detriment of the remaining working population who toil in low-skilled 
and low-wage jobs. Therefore, Florida did not omit to mention the promotion of 
developing full human potential and creative capacities for every single worker; for 
example, increasing wages and subsidies for service and manufacturing workers, 
building more efficient education systems that not only focus on test scores but also 
on more active learning or encouraging innovation beyond technology and R&D to 
also include investment in arts, culture and all forms of innovation and creativity 




This section evaluates the creative class thesis by summarising it into six 
aspects. Based on the current literature, most arguments mainly focus on the issues of 
causality, applicability, the definition of the creative class as well as policy 
implementation. This criticism is linked with the research question and is the reason 
why the concept of the creative class was adopted but its impact analysed in 
association with other factors in a different way. 
 
Class, values and assumptions 
Since the creative class thesis was put forward in 2002, it has received both 
praise and censure. Florida proposed a new perspective for us to rethink the 




contribution of people’s skills to economic growth in parallel with existing economic 
development theories. Nevertheless, its philosophical underpinning, methodology and 
related policy implementations have received a high number of criticisms.  
Firstly, the philosophy that underpins the creative class thesis is questionable. 
This theory does not involve the use of the Marxian model of class analysis, since it 
still defines a particular group of people as a “class”. Although Florida always 
advocated the collective values and actions of the creative class, such as the 
unconventional lifestyles and their common functions in the emerged creative 
economy, it is not evident that the creative class has a unique position in relation to 
production and that it is conscious of itself. What are the values of the creative class? 
Florida’s work lacks plausible explanations; rather, these values are pre-assumed 
through how the creative class makes its consumer preferences (or social and 
economic impacts) felt, but not in which way they may do this (Pratt, 2008). As a 
result, the classification of the creative class thesis could be reduced to taxonomy, and 
we simply jump to accept that cultural assets, such as diversity and tolerance, favour 
the creative class’s presence without any consideration regarding its complex nature 
in different social forms. 
Secondly, many empirical studies draw attention to the causal relationship 
between economic growth and the creative class. It seems that Florida did not 
establish an assumption that makes the causality he proposed robust. His simple 
regression model only indicates a sense of static correlations (Boschma and Fritsch, 
2009). Employment growth could be both the cause and effect of the share of the 
creative class in total employment, while the other indicators strongly correlate with 
one another and may mark biases that translate poorly in the public realm (Chapple et 
al., 2004). It is possible that what Florida suggested might only be a series of artificial 




indexes that reflect the creative amenities and economic situations in cities or regions 
(Montgomery, 2005). If this is the case, these factors of “creative capital” have little 
explanatory power and are disconnected from economic reality. For example, the U.S. 
economy far outpaced most of the heavily taxed countries that sit at the top of 
Florida’s tolerance index, such as Denmark and Sweden, producing new jobs at twice 
the rate (Malanga, 2005). 
Thirdly, the other important assumption of “migration dynamics” was also 
criticised. Partridge and Rickman (1999) indicated that the relationship between job 
growth and the number of inhabitants is bi-directional. Recent research has supported 
this point of view demonstrating the fact that the creative class in Sweden move to 
places where jobs can be found but not to their bohemian neighbours (Hansen and 
Niedomysl, 2007, 2009). Manshaden et al. (2004) examined the role of creative 
industries producing luxury goods and services in the Netherlands. He pointed out 
that creative activities are often involved in this process, so their presence will grow 
in such environments. This means that creative activities will follow economic growth 
rather than cause it. Musterd (2006) conducted a European study which also found 
that the creative class does not avoid cities with a high level of social segregation or 
lack of tolerance and open amenities. Finally, Scott (2006, 2010) suggested that to a 
certain extent creative individuals do prefer to move to a place with many amenities, 
but they are more likely to be motived by greater job opportunities, especially for 
those who have already invested in developing human capital.  
In summary, Florida might have only picked up some suggestive correlations 
of the relationship between diversity/openness and growth of high-tech/overall 
employment to confirm his theory. However, as shown earlier, later studies revealed 
that this highly complex picture cannot simply be reduced to a set of assumptions 




(Marcuse, 2003; Clifton, 2008; Markusen, 2006; Borén and Young, 2013; Reese, 
2012). In fact, the complexities of the on-going debate over the function of milieu or 
the creative class itself are much too great to be summarised, with the exception of 
one consensus, that Florida’s model cannot properly explain how the production 
system of regions/cities and the corresponding stocks of creative capital are frequently 
specialised (Storper and Scott, 2009; Scott, 2014). If this point of view is true, it 
implies that even creative cities/regions are still dependent for their growth on their 
internal productive arrangement. 
 
The creative class and education 
Unique characteristics of the creative class concept as Florida asserted are also 
critically evaluated. Early criticism comes from Glaeser (2005); when using the same 
database, human capital (i.e. the share of graduates) illustrates similar results to the 
creative class measure and human capital is in fact the better proxy of knowledge 
relevant to employment and GDP growth. If the effects of the creative class can 
outperform human capital, then a positive coefficient should be observed with 
economic health indicators when both variables are included. However, results from 
this study rejected this hypothesis. Therefore, it is difficult to gain an understanding of 
the relationships between the creative class and education, and their impacts on 
economic growth as they frequently overlap with one another.  
Many studies also illustrated similar results. Hansen and Niedomysl (2007) 
identified a highly correlated relationship between graduates and creative workers in 
Sweden. Rausch and Negrey (2006) found that the share of the creative class failed to 
explain changes in gross metropolitan product (GMP) when the education variable 




was simultaneously involved. Mallender (2009) further investigated the Swedish 
occupation structure (classified as the creative class, the service class, the 
manufacturing blue-collar and the fishing-farming category), combined with a human 
capital measure (educational attainment: low/high) in order to explore whether the 
creative class is the same group as the highly educated individuals. The results cited a 
considerable overlap, although not complete, between these two measures. 
At the same time, several studies attempted to compare the impact of higher 
education with the impact of the creative class. In specific contexts, education and 
other forms of skill development appear to be more important than amenities to 
economic growth. Based on the datasets from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA), Donegan et al. (2008) claimed that traditional measures 
(e.g. the share of graduates) outperform Florida’s 3Ts (e.g. the share of creative class 
or the location of bohemians) in explaining economic growth (e.g. job change or 
income change) in 167 American metropolitan areas. However, spending more on 
schools is not likely to be a direct answer to growth. Public policies should be 
particularly designed to improve the efficiency of the education system and increase 
graduation rates in order to achieve long-term growth (Reese and Ye, 2011). Faggian 
et al. (2011) portrayed a complex picture concerning the relationship in the U.S., 
based on the creative class, human capital and entrepreneurial activities. They believe 
that the creative class thesis based political implements should be replaced by 
fostering highly educated workers and the formation of new firms.   
In essence, the broad definition of the creative class not only involves 
occupations that require higher education, but also other technical occupations that 
have decision-making responsibilities. For this reason, this high level of aggregation 
causes low construct validity (McGranahan and Wojan, 2007). Should those workers 




with “little creative thinking” be simply dropped? In the case of bohemian graduates 
in the United Kingdom (U.K.), Comunian et al. (2010) explained that doing so could 
reduce heterogeneity among occupations. However, this attempt could also lead to 
misleading results in the empirical analysis, as the creative class as a whole may 
indeed play a crucial role in local and national economic development. 
To conclude, the controversy over how to define the creative class and human 
capital is still on-going. The main problem is that such a strong overlap between 
creative workers and graduates, although it has been well discussed in past literature, 
has not been thoroughly tested based on empirical analysis. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to ascertain which effects on economic performance are caused by education and 
which effects are caused by creativity (Boschma and Fritsch, 2009). These 
overlapping factors may lead to econometric issues; the inclusion of both graduates 
and creative workers results in multicollinearity. The exclusion of sub-groups leads to 
omitted variable bias. Either way, human capital effects are inadequately estimated 
(Marrocu and Paci, 2012). Finally, creative individuals, as the fundamental cause of 
the development, are only a small part of the creative economy arguments (Sands and 
Reese, 2013). Either using the concept of the creative class or graduates is in fact only 
a practical issue that relates to the measure of economic performance. To date, the 
current debate has not been substantially extended to the role of the education system 
when shaping new creative workers in the labour market.  
 
Creative subgroups and the creative industry 
Florida’s (2002) classification of creative occupations conceptualised a 
suggestive methodology to measure creativity. However, this idea that “creativity is a 




powerful unifying influence, aligning creative efforts and consumer preferences of 
very different creative workers” is questionable (Wojan et al., 2007, p.4). Florida 
(2002) included a wide range of occupations in the creative class, such as university 
professors, musicians, artists and scientists, where potentially productive interactions 
are believed to occur across different creative occupations (Stolarick and Florida, 
2006). However, these creative sub-groups were found to be conceptually different 
based on the Frist Principle Component Analysis in Canada. This indicated that 
Florida’s occupation classification may be deemed as inappropriate (Reese et al., 
2010). A definition too broad will result in practical problems, as it is difficult to 
obtain data based on the level of individuals (Stam et al., 2008). More importantly, 
the role of bohemians, as the key element in the creative class thesis, appears to be 
ambiguous. An in-depth case study constructed by Markusen in Minnesota (2006) 
added that its role in the urban economy is either progressive or problematic. The 
attractiveness of cities concerning artists is not a result of a response to amenities, but 
is instead determined by investment decisions that are made by local governments in 
artistic organisations. Therefore, to define that it has a common cause with other 
creative occupations, such as scientists, engineers or managers, is not plausible. 
With this in mind, it may be suggested that breaking down the creative class 
into less heterogeneous sub-groups may be ideal when understanding the dynamic 
process of the knowledge-based economy (Beckstead et al., 2008). Beyond the 
simplistic evaluation of the whole creative class, many studies have tried to explore 
the characteristic variations within creative occupations from different perspectives. 
Asheim and Hansen (2009) divided creative occupations into three groups: analytical 
occupations i.e. those more scientific climate related, synthetical occupations i.e. 
those more business climate related and symbolic occupations i.e. those more artistic 




climate related. Asheim et al. (2007) observed the possible differences in preference 
within the creative class, claiming that suburban areas and smaller cities are more 
likely to attract engineering based creative occupations rather than those who work in 
advertising. Krätke (2010) attempted to distinguish creative occupations in terms of 
their economic functions. He found in Germany that only scientific, technological and 
artistic creative workers had positive impacts on regional economic performance in 
the realm of creative innovation-related development paths, unlike the dealer class 
(e.g. occupations in financial services), the political class (e.g. senior officers in 
government) and the management class (e.g. general managers). 
Other scholars have supported the concept of the creative industry, rather than 
the concept of the creative class. The theoretical aim of this industry based approach 
is similar to the occupation based approach, as both are trying to explore and 
understand the linkage between creative talents and economic growth. However, the 
definition of the creative industry is considered to be more concise and is more likely 
to reflect the innovation process of firms, which further effects economic growth 
(Caves, 2000). There have been several definitions of the creative industries. 
Generally they can be defined as “those industries which use individual creativity, 
skill and talent, creating potential social and economic wealth as well as job 
opportunity through generation of intellectual property” (DCMS, 2001). UNCTAD 
(2010) classified the creative industries into six main categories: (1) advertising and 
marketing; (2) architecture design and visual arts; (3) film, TV, radio and photography; 
(4) music and performing arts; (5) publishing; and (6) software, computer games and 
electronic publishing.  
A computation of index for cultural activities may miss its natural complexity. 
Florida’s creativity index reduces the interpretations of the cultural economy to a 




numerical scale and single “recipe”. As Massey (2002, p.646) puts it, “the complex 
articulation of intellectual responsibility with political engagement is a far more 
difficult, multifaceted and dedicate manner.” However, this normative type of model 
could be useful, as the cultural economy may be representative of an amalgam of 
activities that can be defined as a group with common characteristics (i.e. various 
individuals who produce generally similar creative efforts). According to Gibson and 
Kong (2005, p.557), “the multivalence of the cultural economy requires a balance 
between agendas, focuses on generalization of macroscale trends and interscalar 
processes.” 
Further studies tend to compare the role of the creative industry with the 
function of the creative class. Stam et al. (2008) used the same method as Florida 
suggested, showing that the location of creative industries is strongly correlated with 
employment growth, while the measure of the creative class generally outperformed 
the creative industry. Higgs et al. (2007) adopted a “trident approach” when 
describing the Australian creative economy, as it is a combined measure that overlaps 
both creative occupations and creative industries. Nevertheless, their definition of the 
creative industry is also not exempt from criticism. Pratt (2008) argued that such a 
definition (as well as Florida’s creative class concept) places a large emphasis on 
monetary value, but not on cultural value. This makes the classification and study of 
the creative industries/economy deviate from its original role and mission. Also, it is a 
grave mistake to characterise creativity only in terms of individualistic values and not 
social values. A large focus on occupations simply overlooks the necessarily 
embedded relationships with industries, production and consumption, and 
individualises the complex and hybrid phenomenon in the whole production chain. 




Therefore, the concept of a cultural industry is more adequate when capturing such 
dynamics. 
Overall, these discussions put forward a critical deconstruction or 
reconstruction of the concept of creative cities. It is difficult to interpret the findings 
of these studies in a consistent way, given the obvious differences in the definitions of 
the creative class, econometric models, institutional settings and control variables. 
However, no matter how creativity is measured, “what is clear is that the range of 
potentialities of creativity cannot be achieved in every place at each time.” (Pratt, 
2010, p.19) With this in mind, understanding the dynamics of creativity and its effects 
on mobility is crucial for further studies. In addition, inspired by a series of studies on 
creative/cultural industries, attention should also be turned to the role of creativity in 
various social and economic forms: a new consideration of the ways in which 
creativity could contribute to economic growth (Borén and Young, 2013).  
 
A hierarchical discrimination    
Florida (2002) argued that with the exception of a few dismal cities at the 
bottom of the creative index list, most larger American cities do have a chance to 
become creative powerhouses. Even for the small-sized city regions, they can at least 
have “a shot” if they correctly implement local development strategies based on the 
essentials of the creative class thesis (Florida, 2002). Since creative people prefer to 
concentrate in urban regions rather than peripheral areas, it is still necessary for those 
small-sized regions to enhance creative competiveness in a similar way to the larger 
cities (Florida, 2003a).  




This normative and specifically northern economic knowledge based theory 
appears to be framed as “global”, but has been questioned by many later studies (e.g. 
Gibson and Klocker, 2004). Many empirical tests failed to capture this proposed role 
of the creative class and its relationship with economic growth in smaller urban and 
rural areas. Many non-metropolitan regions have also experienced stable economic 
growth over the last 20 years even without using Florida’s remedy. Nelson (2004) 
found that the cultural capital and the ratio of students within a population showed a 
stronger correlation than Florida’s 3Ts, which represented employment growth in 
small Canadian cities. Reese et al. (2010) also argued that none of Florida’s indicators 
were significantly correlated with economic growth, as they only showed static 
economic health in the medium-sized Canadian cities. Stam et al. (2008) found that 
the correlation between the share of employees who work in creative industries and 
employment growth was insignificant when the biggest metropolitan area in the 
Netherlands (Amsterdam) is removed from the regression. Ström and Nelson (2009) 
argued that Florida’s suggestion will obviously mislead development strategies for 
comparatively small cities and regions. Rather than developing infrastructures and 
amenities to attract creative people, those regions and cities should primarily focus on 
building social, communication and transportation networks to metropolitan areas, 
and position themselves as affordable and family-oriented alternative places to live.  
Florida’s policy framework cannot be commonly applied within different 
American metropolitan areas. Some of the creative cities in the creative index list 
were observed as acquiring low job growth rates from 1993 to 2003 in comparison 
with the least creative cities (Malanga, 2004). From another perspective, the creative 
industry based approach was used to analyse the characteristics of the major America 
creative cities (Kolenda and Liu, 2012). The results indicated significant regional 




variations across the larger American cities. Matching growth of creative employees 
and their relative share of all jobs, the broadly defined metropolitan area has been 
further decomposed into three categories. The first category contains creative flight 
cities, where the share and numbers of creative jobs declined, then the second 
category and the third category include creative sprawl cities and creative engine 
cities, where numbers of creative jobs increased but the share decreased, and where 
both the number and the share of creative jobs increased. They pointed out that it is 
very important to consider cities’ unique advantages first on a city-by-city basis 
before settling upon specific strategies to attract creative workers. 
This discussion leads to one point, that such a population based hierarchy of 
creativity does exist. The reasons for this phenomenon could be summarised 
according to three aspects: the choice of indicators, the use of synthetic indicators and 
the reliance of the model on cities with “critical mass” (Lewis and Donald, 2010). In 
the Northern American context, which may also be applicable to other economies, the 
choice of indicators ultimately prevents small cities and regions from becoming 
successful. For example, the adaptation of the high-tech pole index3 in the creative 
class thesis only reflects the degree to which the city specialises in high-tech industry 
agglomeration with a large share of relative employment, thus automatically 
favouring a few of the biggest cities. While many indicators in Florida’s thesis 
outperformed traditional ones at the level of direct investment or demographical 
change, it has to be mentioned as many of these that agglomerate with several factors 
(such as a foreign-born population plus bohemians and a gay population or a first 
principle component of both human capital and the creative class to represent a 
general level of “creativity”) are only synthetically designed in favour of some 
                                                          
3 This index shows local employment in technology-intensive manufacturing and service sectors 
(Clifton, 2008). 




particular types of studies. Therefore, these variables with combined effects naturally 
outperform unitary variables.   
In conclusion, the majority of studies still rely on basic analytical models. In 
the case of either the simple pairwise correlation test or the OLS regression, the 
different sizes/scales of analysis units and the effect of time trend cannot be controlled 
for. It may be argued that Florida’s creativity indexes or the whole creative class 
thesis is just synthetically made and may only reflect the facts of static economic 
situations, in particular regions with “critical mass”, but it is too farfetched to make 
such a conclusion now, given the constraints in databases and analytical techniques.   
 
Old wine in a new bottle? 
Even though certain cities already have a high creativity index list, the 
majority of cities can hope to turn themselves around if they move in the right 
direction. Florida’s index table constitutes a new wave of competition in generating 
creative advantage among American cities. Furthermore, Florida cannot wait longer to 
apply his theory globally. Florida and Tinagli (2004) insisted on creating a map of the 
geography of the European creative economy and, less surprisingly, with similar and 
alluring recommendations: what is important to economic growth is only partly 
related to trade or the flow of physical capital, but is mainly about the flow of talent. 
The U.S still remains the leader in technological development, and continuously 
benefits from its long-standing ability to attract creative talent from around the world. 
In comparison, some European countries are successful too (e.g. Sweden, Finland and 
Demark) while some are still attempting to be (e.g. the U.K.). European economies 
are one step behind the U.S. in attracting creative talent but this advantage seems to 




be shifting from the U.S. Thus, a great opportunity is presented to European policy 
makers: if they are able to attract creative talent, they will be able to enjoy the 
economic benefits of creativity.   
However, Peck (2005) criticised this promotion strategy as being old wine in a 
new bottle. Improving local amenities, building more cultural facilities or even having 
more “hippie” neighbours are all similar to the old-fashioned entrepreneurism or 
consumption-oriented urban development strategies for capital accumulation in the 
late 1980s, such as a series of competitions for mobile public and private investment 
among American cities.  
The accelerating retreat of the Fordist economy lies in the simple fact that the 
traditional manufacturing activities had declined in developed economies. Rather than 
continuing to agglomerate in the industrial cities, industries moved away to look for 
cheaper labour sources and properties. The problem was that the former 
manufacturing workers became unemployed and these cities were again experiencing 
a dramatic re-adjustment of economic structure (Sassen, 2001, p.22-25). Currently, 
one of the influential arguments is that the comparative advantage cities have is their 
experience. In the book The Experience Economy (Pine and Gilmore, 1999), the 
discussion about urban/regional economic growth was extended to the promotion of 
creativity and consumption. With very limited socially political options, more and 
more policy makers have begun to embrace this framework. As Harvey (1989, p.7) 
puts it, they started to simply “use investment and economic development with the 
speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a 
particular territory as its immediate political and economic goal.”  




In order to attain a competitive position, one of the feasible options for a city 
region is to emphasise the improvement of consumption, since consumers have more 
money to spend and have greater opportunity to be discriminating. In this respect, the 
competition to attract consumer spending becomes frenetic and improving quality of 
life becomes a routinised process, including turning to post-modernist styles of 
architecture and urban design, more convention and shopping centres, marinas, exotic 
eating places and entertainment venues (Harvey,1989, p.9). However, none of these 
methods substantially increase the aggregate amount of investment, only the rate of 
capital circulation.  
Peck implies this rapid adoption of urban creative strategies is an enduring 
legacy of entrepreneurial urbanism. Many cities and regions have tried almost 
everything in the last two decades to retain economic growth, thus there is no harm in 
embracing this new strategy. It was possible to map it onto the existing policy 
framework as a complementary plan because it is modest and not revolutionary, as 
well as being inexpensive to implement (Sands and Reese, 2008). The creative class 
thesis fits in perfectly with this fast policy market and pleases those successors of 
urban neoliberalism and entrepreneurialism.  
It appears that Florida and his followers advocate pursuing the endless creative 
advantage. Cultural artefacts are then repackaged as competitive assets and are only 
evaluated by their economic values. Some gentrifying urban areas were subjectively 
selected as examples for preferable forms of creative action, hinting that places can be 
a part of the creative economy and must act now. With respect to this, Peck (2005, 
p.768) concluded: “with incredible material pay-offs, the cult of urban creativity is 
therefore revealed in its true colours, as a form of soft law/lore for a hypercompetitive 
age”. 




Social restrictions, gentrifications and regressive policies 
Another line of argument draws attention to the side effects of these creativity-
engendering urban development policies, namely, the chain reaction from social 
restrictions. In the classical Fordist society, the whole workforce is divided into white 
collar and blue collar types, which is not very subtle but is a well-accepted concept to 
represent different functions and roles in production. This division of the labour force 
was projected out into intra-urban spaces where neighbourhood distribution 
corresponding to this pattern can be observed. According to Florida (2002, 2005, 
2008, 2013) or other urbanism advocators (e.g. Landry, 2000; Glaeser, 2011), the 
creative cities theories brought us to a new stage where the traditional labour force 
division is being overridden by a new dimension; on one hand, the creative 
class/human capital and the low-wage services/low-skilled underclass on the other.  
No matter how these human capital assets are defined, these urban 
development theories became extremely popular were to a great extent applied in 
practice in many countries, leading to a significant rearrangement of urban geography 
within neighbourhoods. According to Scott (2006, 2014), the top half of the urban 
labour force is valorised as a privileged group that has the most important technical 
knowledge, analytical skills and social-cultural know-how to facilitate economic 
development. In contrast, the rest of the workers are only given a supporting role, as 
they are deemed to directly and indirectly provide basic services to meet the demand 
of its upper echelon (e.g. the creative class/high-skilled workers). However, the 
cultural skills of the service underclass are simply overlooked.  
Bolton and Boyd (2003) argued that the traditional skill paradigms fail to 
provide an accurate understanding of the skills required in service occupations. For a 




long time proxies of skills such as educational attainment or formal education were 
treated as skills themselves, thus making a comprehensive discussion about the 
necessary skills in service occupations difficult. In fact, many of the service 
occupations have their unique values, which cannot be replaced by technology or 
easily outsourced since they require service work, emotional labour or caring labour 
that the worker personally performs (Gatta et al., 2009). For example, interactive 
service work can be successfully completed depending not only on routines and 
scripts but also additional skills. A waiter in a restaurant needs to welcome customers, 
place orders using computers, bring food and collect used plates as efficiently as 
possible at any given time in order to avoid unnecessary trips to the kitchen and 
provide customer services. Such a process is far from simple, routinised work; it 
integrates emotional, cognitive, technical and management skills, performed at high 
speed with various levels of complexity and autonomy within or across different work 
settings.  
As a result, the undervaluation of those socially marginal working groups has, 
to a great extent, influenced the direction of the urban development agenda over the 
last decade. Supported by overzealous city councils or urban development planners, 
the boost for the creative economy seems to deviate from the original goal, becoming 
a harbinger of gentrification. This phenomenon may be a feature of the post-industrial 
economy, as more knowledge-intensive workers in financial, media or entertainment 
sectors gradually replaced the original manufacturing employment. However in many 
cases, it also reflects the rapid expansion of a new economy. With the renovation of 
local property and the increase in cultural facilities, the incursion of the bourgeois 
only leads to more severe social-spatial segmentations around cities. In the meantime, 




the booming nature of the creative economy seems to have little impact on social 
inclusion and income redistribution (Scott, 2014).  
Such a negative impact of gentrification has been exposed in various contexts 
such as in the cities of Cape Town (Booyens, 2012), Berlin (Jakob, 2010), New York 
(Intergaard, 2004), Shanghai (Zheng, 2010) and to some extent Beijing (Ren and Sun, 
2012). It is ironic that the development of creative sectors has been stunted largely 
due to the gentrification process in “creative quarters” in these cities. On one hand, 
the creative economy advocates the concept of tolerance and diversity, but on the 
other hand, the majority of the local population is frequently excluded from these 
developments. Ultimately, the whole plan becomes farcical, which only benefits the 
already profitable local property market (Jakob, 2010). 
Creativity occurs when interdependent processes of learning, creativity and 
innovation are situated in a concrete social relationship. However, many existing 
research fails to properly catch this point and leads to regressive policy 
recommendations. Scott (2014) proposed the concept of cultural-cognitive capitalism, 
adding that it is only an epiphenomenon that creativity emerges out of complex social 
and physical infrastructures. As he further noticed, what matters to prosperity and 
growth is still the intensifying interplay between culture, cognition and economy. 
Therefore, the challenging task for urban economists is how to harness and regulate 
urban realities in the interest of a progressive future. 
  




2.1.4 Florida and supporter’s counterattacks  
 
In a bid to confront criticism and challenges, Florida related some notable 
studies from the decade following the initialisation of his theory in 2002, to defend his 
position. In the latest edition of The Rise of the Creative Class, Florida upgraded most 
of the indicators that he used in 2002. He showed that during the period of economic 
crisis, the creative class enjoyed a significant growth compared to the working class 
and the agricultural class in the U.S. In the American case, the creative class grew by 
2.8 million workers in the period 2001-2010. The working class shrunk over the same 
period from 32.2 million to 26 million. The creative class was inevitably impacted by 
the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010, decreasing by 700,000 workers; however, 
this figure is still less than half that for the working class (Florida, 2013, p.50). In one 
recent study, Stolarick and Currid-Halket (2013) added that the regional 
unemployment rate is negatively associated with the size of the creative class in 
American regions, while graduates have a similar relationship with unemployment but 
to a lesser extent. In other words, the creative class faces less risk of unemployment 
during a recession period.  
One of the most vocal criticisms is from Edward Glaeser (2005). As 
mentioned earlier, he used the same dataset as Florida’s colleague Stolarick and then 
concluded that big multicollinearity problems meant that the creative class measure 
suffered when the human capital measure is included at the same time. Florida (2011) 
explained there is an inevitable overlap between human capital and the creative class, 
but these two measures have different perspectives regarding economic and social 
progress – the measure of the creative class relates to what people do while the 
measure of graduates (human capital) relates to what people’s potential is. He referred 




to the data from the American Statistics Bureau, saying that 59.3 percent of the 
creative class in the U.S. have a college degree or above, while 72.2 percent of human 
capital is in the creative class (Florida, 2013, p.40). Even if the specific group of 
creative workers who all have university degrees are considered, the analysis angle of 
the creative class is still quite different from that of human capital. However, whether 
creativity or human capital would contribute more to skill formation for a worker is 
unclear (Marrocu and Paci, 2012).   
Florida argues that Glaeser should talk to other education experts about how 
the traditional education scheme hinders creativity because Glaeser misunderstood the 
functions of the creative class. Other independent studies also support the creative 
class measure, for example McGranahan and Wojan (2007), based on simultaneous 
equations, re-evaluated the American regional data in recent years. Their findings 
verified the significant contribution from the creative class to regional economic 
growth, an effect which is even more powerful than human capital and is independent. 
A similar conclusion was also obtained by Marlets and Van Woerkens (2004) in the 
Netherlands; it indicated that the creative class is a better predictor of a city’s growth 
than traditional educational attainment. Florida finally notes that he never disagreed 
with the role of people’s skills in regional economic growth and that human capital 
theory is not competing with the creative class concept. They can be complementary 
and make contributions in different channels. In this case, the presence of human 
capital is positively correlated with income growth, while the increasing share of the 
creative class is more likely to be associated with improvement in labour productivity 
(Florida et al., 2008).  
Other critics questioned the possible connection between the existence of the 
creative class and regional growth. Malanga (2004) in her famous article The Curse of 




the Creative Class, stated that it looked like Florida’s top ten cities in the U.S. were 
suffering growth stagnation while some of those cities that he defined as being the 
least creative continued to look like economic powerhouses, expanding 60 percent 
faster. Correspondingly, Florida (2004) further refined the sample of American cities 
to include only those with a population above one million. In a comparison of the top 
11 most creative cities and the 11 least creative cities, the most creative cities 
generated at least three times as many jobs as those with the lowest creativity index 
ranks. Also, the leading cities added 100 billion dollars to the wage bill, which is five 
times more than the lowest ranked cities. “Which city would you like to put your 
money on?” Florida asked. Would it be Las Vegas, which enjoyed rapid population 
and job growth, or the top creative centre of San Francisco? The fact shows that Las 
Vegas was seriously hit by the economic crisis in 2008, experiencing one of the worst 
house price crises and a very high unemployment rate; however, the situation in San 
Francisco was not as bad in comparison (Florida, 2013, p.258).  
Florida said that it could be very misleading to take population growth as the 
primary indicator to measure economic growth. In fact, population growth is quite 
different from economic growth. A region with a very high expansion rate is not 
equivalent to a “wealth builder”. Real economic growth is not population growth but 
improvement of productivity. In later research (Florida, 2011), Florida analysed the 
correlation between productivity measured by economic output per capita and 
population growth in 350 U.S. cities in the period 2001-2010. The results indicated 
that there is no association between these two variables. 
Responding to criticism about his basic assumption that “jobs follow people” 
as well as the causality among regional growth, the creative class and other indicators, 
Florida explained that such a proverbial chicken-and-egg problem is a false 




dichotomy. Skills and skilled people are mobile factors of production. They flow from 
one place to another. Therefore, the primary focus of his study is to identify what 
factors could shape this flow and the level of divergence across regions. For instance, 
in his article In the black box of regional economic development (Florida et al., 2008), 
he adopted the structural equation modelling (SEM) technique to capture both the 
direct and indirect effects of the creative class to regional economic growth. 
However, Florida cannot provide substantial explanations to dispel the doubts 
related to social inequality, peripheral development or how his concept could be 
effectively applied to the global context. Even his own research has to accept the fact 
that there is a positive relationship between creative class agglomeration and the 
social polarisation in the U.S. (Catalytix and Richard Florida Creativity Group, 2003). 
Florida’s later interpretation of the features of the creative economy indirectly gives 
answers: firstly, the more creative and innovative a country’s economy is, the more of 
an economic edge it enjoys; secondly, the typical U.S. model shows a high level of 
socio-economic inequality, which is a somewhat unique case. This phenomenon was 
mainly caused by poverty concentration in the past and not to improvement of 
technology and changes in the skills required (Florida, 2013, p.279). Finally, other 
economies have different features compared to the U.S. It seems that the U.S., along 
with the U.K., Singapore, New Zealand and Australia, has a problem with social 
inequality during the creativity-engendering process while the northern European 
countries do not. Based on a pairwise correlation test between his synthetic creative 
index and the index of income inequality for the main European countries, Florida 
(2014) can only draw a reluctant conclusion: “the Scandinavian case potentially 
points a way towards the more broadly shared prosperity, one that can draw full 




creative development for every human being while causing far less severe economic-
social divides”.  
In conclusion, the academic work on the topic of creative cities has been 
expanded to a very detailed level using more sophisticated analytical models. The 
follow-up studies, however, are mired in the dichotomy between policy – supportive 
literature celebrating the advocacy of creativity and critical literature rejecting the 
roles of creative occupations in the context of urban development (Borén and Young, 
2013). It seems that the current academic critiques draw too much attention to the 
dangers of the ways in which creativity is currently interpreted and adopted by urban 
policy makers, but this debate overlooks one substantial research question: how 
creativity could be used in productive ways. Unfortunately, only a few theoretical 
suggestions can be seen with little empirical evidence supporting these stances. 
 
2.1.5 What are the implications for studies in the future? 
 
In line with the above discussions, the following aspects are summarised as 
the remaining issues for the research. First and foremost, there is still a lack of 
evidence to support the series of causal relationships that Florida put forward. This 
dilemma is not simply caused by the natural deficiencies of the creative class thesis; it 
is of high probability due to the limited applications of advanced analytical models. 
For instance, the majority of current research only relies on the cross-sectional 
frameworks and many practical issues, such as endogeneity or the long-run effect, are 
not taken into consideration empirically. 




Secondly, it is undeniable that the definition of the creative class as including 
a range of different occupations is a vague concept to represent features that a 
particular sub-population may have in common; however, the advocacy of excessive 
subdivision is also challenged. In-depth breakdowns of a list of occupations may 
result in many practical issues when applying them to survey data. Given too detailed 
decomposition, very limited observations may inaccurately estimate relative shares or 
levels, so meaningful results may be difficult to obtain.  
Thirdly, the current debate over the role of creativity in the urban/regional 
economy systems has not been extended to empirical applications. Although many 
scholars drew attention to its embedded relationship with other factors in the 
production system or the matter of social inclusion, current empirical analysis does 
not relate to any economic theories and is not further linked to urban realities. Also, it 
is not clear what the role of the education system is in producing creative workers 
whose skills are supposedly commensurate with the needs of the creative economy. 
Finally, the creative class thesis is primarily based on North American 
practices. In Europe or other emerging economies, different institutional settings, 
methodologies and research perspectives impede us in drawing conclusions in a 
consistent way. In association with the above three unresolved issues, the study of the 
creative economy in Europe seems to be only at the primary stage. With respect to 
this, the discussion will now move to a detailed evaluation of the roles of ICT in the 
economic system, in an attempt to give reasons why ICT policies can be coordinated 
with the creative class thesis to give a better understanding of sustainable economic 
development. 
 






In this section, the ICT-related theories are mainly introduced from two 
perspectives: (1) why ICT is also important (its impact on economic or productivity 
growth); (2) why its coordination with the creative class is plausible and feasible (its 
complementary role to skilled workers). The review of literature in this section echoes 
the previous discussion of the creative economy in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Introduction: what is ICT? 
 
As a complementary theory to economic growth, this section will mainly look 
into the contribution of ICT to productivity growth and its interactive effects with 
people’s skills. Later, ICT will be related to the creative class thesis. The definition of 
ICT is also difficult, although a greater consensus now exists on how it should be 
measured than is the case for creativity. The term ICT initially appeared for research 
purposes in the 1980s and then became a more popular research field in the late 1990s. 
Generally speaking, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) can be 
defined in various ways based on different applications. For example, the World Bank 
defined it as “the set of activities which facilitate by electronic means the processing, 
transmission and display of information” (Rodriguez and Wilson, 2000, p.5), or 
“various set of goods, applications or services used for producing and transmitting 
information, including telecoms, TV and radio broadcasting, hardware and software 
and electronic media” (Marcelle, 2000). ICT also may  




…reshape, reorganize and fundamentally restructure working methods, and 
ultimately the sectors in which they are used and they offer generic 
advantages of efficiency gains, information-sharing, communication and 
faster knowledge accumulation, dissemination and application, in support of 
the specific purposes for which they are used. (UNCTAD, 2002, p.3)  
Therefore the application of ICT can be seen as a complementary way to improve 
economic efficiency.   
The impacts of ICT were evaluated in various research fields such as IT 
development, education, commercial science or economics. Using national accounts, 
ICT capital stock or ICT capital service flows are widely accepted as a benchmark for 
analysing its possible impacts in the field of economics. According to the report from 
the United Nations (2002), the diffusion of ICT and growth in the OECD countries 
has been notable since the mid-1990s. After 1995, the growth rate of ICT capital per 
worker entered double digits in the G7 nations (Jorgensen, 2005). This upward growth 
trend can be also captured in other less industrialised European countries and newly 
emerging economies in Asia. For instance, the contribution from ICT investment in 
China is significantly increasing, with 0.17 percent in total output growth before 1995 
and 0.63 percent afterwards (Jorgensen and Vu, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Growth accounting: from Solow’s paradox to ICT-driven productivity growth  
 
The economic impacts of ICT have been systematically examined by a 
growing body of literature. Many of the early studies found no or a negative impact of 
ICT on productivity (Baily, 1986; Roach, 1989; Panko, 1991), a situation which leads 




to a temporary conclusion that “computers were everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics” (Solow, 1987). According to Bertschek and Kaiser (2003), the reasons for 
such a paradox can be summarised as follows. Firstly, most of these studies only 
focused on labour productivity but not multifactor productivity and were mainly 
based on private databases. Secondly, the measure based on productivity statistics 
failed to capture high returns to ICT capital. Finally, the impact of ICT takes time to 
emerge; a diffusion of technology is always slow. Firms often take a long time to 
absorb technology and combine it with other complementary changes in production 
methods, such as employee training or organisational change.  
Shortly afterwards, the positive role of ICT for economic development came 
to the fore in the U.S. in the mid-1990s. The economic growth resurgence in the U.S. 
after the mid-1990s received considerable press attention, particularly compared to 
the first half of that decade. Sceptics, such as Gordon (1999; 2000), argued that this 
success only reflected a series of favourable but temporary shocks, while other studies 
took a keen interest in the diffusion of ICT. The dramatic price decrease in computers, 
semiconductors and communication equipment in the U.S. significantly stimulated the 
demand and usage of ICT from both firms and households. 
The transformation in the structural change of the U.S. economy is obvious. In 
the period 1959-1973, the contribution of computer and related services was less than 
0.1 percentage point in total output growth in the U.S. Since 1973, prices of 
computers dropped at a historically unprecedented rate so that intensive use was more 
realistic for households and firms. After 1995, the decline in prices for computers and 
other software and communication equipment accelerated and correspondingly, its 
contribution to output jumped to 0.46 percentage point in total output growth 
(Jorgensen and Stiroh, 2000, p.126). Despite different methodologies, databases and 




research perspectives, many studies of ICT reached a similar conclusion (Oliner, 1993; 
Oliner and Daniel, 1994) that exceptionally rapid technological progress in ICT had a 
significant impact throughout the U.S. economy and also contributed to Total Factors 
Productivity (TFP) improvement. Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) further added that 
faster and low-priced computers with semiconductors also improved labour 
productivity elsewhere during the capital deepening process as firms and households 
used them more frequently. Nevertheless, a further refinement of ICT measure was 
necessary, especially in connection to constant-quality price, industrial and across 
country analysis. Although productivity growth in ICT production in the U.S. after the 
mid-1990s is responsible for a sizeable part of the overall productivity growth, the 
industry-level productivity growth from IT sector production was not identified.   
Based on continuous data improvement in terms of an internationally 
harmonised price index and an improved constant-quality price of ICT capital, the 
follow-up studies were no longer constrained to the U.S. and had been extended to a 
global context. Research findings reveal that not only in the U.S. but also in other 
developed countries, both high investment in ICT after 1995 and productivity growth 
in the IT-producing industry accounted for a large portion of economic growth in the 
late 1990s (Gust and Marquez, 2004; Jorgenson, 2005).  
Similar results can be also obtained for a particular country or group of 
countries at different levels. For example, Oulton (2002) adopted Jorgensen’s Growth 
Accounting method to evaluate the whole U.K. economy in the period 1979-1998. He 
found that the contribution of ICT to GDP growth increased from 13.5 percent (i.e. 
contribution points of ICT divided by total output growth rate) in the period 1979-
1989 to 20.7 percent in the period 1989-1998. Biscourp et al. (2002) used company 
based data, aggregated at industry-level in France, to complement the insufficient 




evidence regarding the ICT contribution from a microeconomic approach. Their 
findings are also clear: the use of ICT and ICT production made a substantial 
contribution to value added output growth, showing a 0.7 percentage point on average 
in the period 1987-1998 out of total GDP growth of 2.6 percentage points.  
However, on average the slowdown of productivity in Europe contradicts the 
situation in American since 1995. Van Ark et al. (2003) found the decrease in TFP 
growth occurred in all sectors as well as services, while the particular services sectors 
with a high level of ICT application still kept increasing their TFP. This finding 
suggests that the investment in ICT may not be the only reason explaining the 
differences of TFP between Europe and the U.S. In follow-up studies, Inklaar et al. 
(2008) and Van Ark et al. (2008) used the EU KLEMS data, showing similar patterns 
as the slowdown of productivity in European countries is largely due to the slower 
growth of TFP in market services. Thus, Europe needs to find new mechanisms to 
stimulate service innovations for a greater TFP growth, such as development of 
human resources, more efficient change of organisational structure or high investment 
in other intangible assets (Timmer et al., 2010). 
In conclusion, the resurgence of productivity in the U.S. since the mid-1990s 
draws our attention to the role of ICT. Mainly based on the growth accounting 
approaches, the contribution from ICT capital deepening to labour productivity 
growth is globally evident, but it seems that such a relationship between technology 
and productivity is not that straightforward. In many cases, increasing investment in 
ICT is not the major source of productivity growth. Therefore, many studies shifted 
attention to the importance of the complementary investments, such as improvements 
in organisational structure, human resources or other intangible assets development, 
as these perspectives could be meaningful in understanding such a discrepancy.  




Moreover, there are many well-known issues regarding the growth accounting 
approach. According to Boselli (2010) and Fernald and Neiman (2010), it describes 
but it does not explain; in fact, analysis based on this technique does not obtain the 
causal relationships between different factors in the production system. Also, 
assumptions such as constant returns to scale or constant wage rate of labour and 
rental rate of capital is argued to be too strong. Finally, the externalities of ICT, which 
are possibly hidden in the TFP, cannot be measured by this theoretical framework. 
 
2.2.3 Econometric analysis: a future discussion outside the production of ICT 
goods 
 
In response to the above discussions, econometric analysis is an alternative 
approach to growth accounting and has been more frequently applied in recent 
empirical analysis. Given that many of the measurements of TFP acceleration 
occurred outside of the production of ICT goods (Basu et al., 2004), another stream of 
studies started to focus on its possible GPT (General Purpose Technology)-like 
features; if this hypothesis holds, ICT investment in one sector should cast positive 
spillovers into other sectors, but with some time lags. 
On one hand, such a hypothesis can hardly hold. Acharya and Basu (2010) 
constructed a comprehensive dataset for 16 OECD countries, involving 16 industries 
over a period of 32 years. They found evidence of intangible capital accumulation but 
no evidence of positive spillovers from ICT. In the context of the European Union, 
Van Reenen et al. (2010) identified a spillover effect of ICT in terms of technology 
adoption. It implied that “neighbourhood” firms could induce more ICT adoption 




through the learning process or network effects, but the direct externalities that lead 
the market to under-supply ICT are not clearly captured. Moshiri and Simpson (2011) 
adopted the multi-level model to analyse firm-level data in Canada. Their results 
indicated that the usage of computers has significant influence on productivity 
improvement at the firm level but again, spillover effects are not significant.  
On the other hand, a whole stream of literature confirmed the existence of 
spillovers to ICT. Van Leeuwen and Van der Wie (2003) provided a contrasting 
conclusion against the growth accounting approach. They said that in the case of the 
Netherlands, the spillovers of ICT were an important source of TFP growth. 
Severgnini (2010), based on the data of manufacturing firms in Italy, found positive 
externalities of ICT and that the most productive firms are the recipients of ICT 
spillovers. Rincon et al. (2012) further added that based on firm-level data in the U.S., 
the intra-industry ICT spillovers are contemporaneously negative to productivity 
growth; however, these spillovers become positive after a five-year lag and the inter-
industry ICT spillover is significant both in the short and the long run. Basu and 
Fernald (2007) also confirmed the lagged spillover of ICT. Based on BLS data on 
capital by industry, those industries with high ICT capital growth in the 1980s or early 
1990s did not have contemporaneous TFP growth but instead had a lagged one in the 
late 1990s.  
In conclusion, although the crucial role of ICT in the formation of the new 
technology based economy can be identified, problems from an aggregated dataset, 
such as model misspecification, incorrect measure or other econometric issues, result 
in quite inconsistent conclusions (Van Reenen et al., 2010). In general, ICT spillovers 
are insignificant and unstable across time and countries at aggregate levels. Again, 
according to Boselli (2010), one of the plausible explanations is that firm-level data 




can reflect the reality of the increase in market share of more productive firms. Even 
if two firms invest in the same level of ICT capital, their productivity growth could be 
different depending on their capacity to introduce complementary organisational 
changes. Eventually, lagging firms will either leave the market or catch-up with 
leaders due to market competition. In contrast, analysis at the industry level inevitably 
integrates both lagging and leading firms so the contribution of ICT could be 
underestimated.  
Further research is still necessary to understand these controversies. While 
labour inputs at this stage are still treated as homogenous, considering the differences 
in occupations and levels of qualification will bring more complexity to 
understanding the productivity potentials of ICT. 
 
2.2.4 ICT: job polarisation and complementary investments 
 
While many studies focus on the effects of ICT on labour market structure 
changes and associated productivity gains to ICT use, the idea of skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC) has been used to understand the employment shift 
towards more educated and skilled workers. SBTC was initially described as a growth 
in demand for high-skilled workers and a decrease in demand for low-skilled workers. 
However recent studies show a different pattern where demand for both high-skilled 
and low-skilled workers increased and only demand for medium-skilled workers 
decreased in the different contexts such as the U.S. (Autor et al., 2006) or the U.K. 
(Goos and Manning, 2007). 




The reasons for such job polarisation in the developed countries can be 
summarised in three aspects. Firstly, it is led by the trend of globalisation, and in 
particular, the offshoring of services is an important source of employment structure 
change (Crin`o, 2010). Secondly, job polarisation could be related to income 
inequality. For example, Mazzolari and Ragusa (2007) found that at the city level, a 
higher share of high-skilled workers is associated with a higher fraction of low-skilled 
workers in non-tradable time-intensive services. This finding suggests strong 
spillovers from high-skill consumption to the low-skilled labour market in the U.S. 
since 1980. Finally, and most relevant to ICT use, is the use of technology, which is 
becoming more intense in non-routinised tasks concentrated in high-paid and low-
paid service jobs, at the expense of routinised tasks concentrated in middle-skilled 
based jobs (Goos et al., 2009). 
In an influential paper, Autor et al. (1998) proposed an interesting research 
question. Although the relationship between ICT and skilled workers is well-
documented, what is it that computers do, or what is it that people do with computers? 
Correspondingly, an experiment was designed to compare the routine tasks and non-
routine tasks of workers in industries that had previously been labour-intensive but 
had adopted ICT wholesale since the quantity-adjusted price of ICT was decreased. 
With a theoretical dedication based on a revised production function model, a 
marginal worker reallocates their labour input from routine to non-routine tasks and 
the increase in demand in routine tasks is only met by an influx of computer capital. 
Although the supply of routine tasks decreases, inflow of computer capital 
compensates for this and consequently there is a net increase in the intensity of 
routine tasks input in production.  




The following empirical tests in this study proved this theoretical 
demonstration. It revealed that since the 1970s, the labour input of routine or manual 
tasks was declining while the labour input of non-routine tasks rose in the U.S., and 
changes in the employment structure favoured non-routine tasks to routine tasks. 
Therefore, ICT is, to a certain extent, complementary to non-routine tasks but a 
substitute for routine tasks. Many of the routine tasks were traditionally undertaken by 
low-skilled workers while many of the non-routine tasks involved highly-skilled ones, 
such as financial institute managers or university professionals. However, for many of 
the middle-skilled workers, such as bank clerks, who also participate in routine tasks, 
the difference is that demand for these occupations appears to be replaceable during 
the computerisation process. In comparison, low-skilled workers are hardly 
influenced by technological progress, for example taxi drivers or manufacturing 
workers.  
The hypothesis of SBTC was also tested by other studies from different 
perspectives. Michaels et al. (2010) generated data not only for the U.S. but also for 
Japan and nine European countries over 25 years. They found that industries with 
high growth in ICT also had high demands for higher education, but a fall in demand 
for middle education. O’Mahony et al. (2008) focused on whether the SBTC is 
transitory or permanent over time. In the case of the U.K., the U.S. and France when 
comparing different skill categories in the 1980s and 1990s, they found, at least in the 
U.S., that the demand for highly-skilled workers caused by ICT growth is slowing 
down. This is consistent with the transitory interpretation of the technological 
progress process.  
Most studies do not substantially link ICT use with the increasing demand in 
skilled labour when explaining output growth or productivity, while some recent 




contributions have been looking at this issue. Murphy and Traistaru-Siedschlag (2007) 
used a dataset of 20 OECD countries over the period 1980-2002. By a system of 
simultaneous equations, they found that countries with higher human capital 
stock/improvement experienced a faster growth in ICT-producing manufacturing and 
ICT-using services. Forth and Mason (2006) used survey data in the U.K., which 
shows that a shortage of ICT skills indirectly and negatively impacts firms’ 
performance, namely the level of ICT adoption and utilisation. Van Reenen et al. 
(2010) ran a series of regressions in different perspectives, showing that 
complementary intangible assets significantly impact the effect of ICT, such as 
management practices, firm decentralisation and stock of highly qualified employees. 
Finally, Hempell and Zwick (2008) measured the linkage between firm performance 
and ICT use. They found that ICT applications facilitate the organisational flexibility 
and then this increasing flexibility stimulates the innovation capacity of a firm. 
In conclusion, the discrepancy between ICT investment and productivity/ 
output growth leads to a further wave of discussions of ICT down to the micro level. 
With the evident phenomenon of SBTC, the increasing complexity of ICT 
applications increased the necessity for complementary assets. Recent studies had 
already paid attention to this topic and believed that policy interventions in human 
capital development will increase the return on ICT investment. Nevertheless, 
findings at the micro level vary significantly depending on the econometric model, 
model specifications and sample selections used. How could we better connect the 
findings at the macro level and at the micro level? Finally, the job polarisation 
literature needs to be connected to the creative class thesis. Creative workers by 
definition are undertaking the most non-routine tasks and so computers cannot act as a 




substitute. However, the current debate over ICT policies has not coordinated these 
two policy areas, thus demonstrating the need for further research.   
 
2.2.5 What are the implications for further studies? 
 
The following aspects are summarised as the remaining issues requiring 
further study into ICT. Firstly, over the last two decades, ICT has been one of the 
important sources for output and productivity growth. However, various analyses 
based on country, industry and firm levels showed largely different findings in their 
contributions. Is ICT-driven productivity/GVA growth temporary or permanent? 
Secondly, the growth accounting approach showed us that since 2004, ICT 
productivity/GVA growth slowed down in many contexts. Is this mainly caused by 
the limited capacity of current models in measuring intangible assets such as human 
capital, management or organisational practices? How can we efficiently develop the 
potential of ICT?  
Finally, firm-level estimations generally suggest greater impacts of ICT on 
output/productivity growth, whereas discussions at the micro level only tell us part of 
the story. How can we better connect evidence at both the macro and the micro level 
to discover possible channels which the application of ICT could more efficiently 
impact on aggregate economic growth? Therefore, referring back to the suggestion at 
the beginning of this thesis, to capture the externalities and complementarities 
between ICT policies and other policy areas, more evidence is needed which may 
require going beyond the scope of the current debate.  
 






From different perspectives, the thesis incorporates the hot topics regarding 
the creative class arguments, trying to answer that (1) what the creative class can do 
(2) what the creative class likes and (3) where the creative class comes from. 
Following this theoretical framework, the thesis analyses these three research 
questions in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively and the related hypotheses have been 
constructed as below. 
 
2.3.1 Theoretical framework  
 
These challenges are addressed head-on, helping to shift the dialogues from 
the narrow focus on competitive advantages and economic growth to a broader focus 
on urban/regional realities. Figure 2.1 shows the evident potential linkages between 
the creative class thesis and ICT-related theories. The notion of the creative economy 
requires a more robust theoretical framework, while the role of ICT has to be 
understood beyond the scope of current studies. 
The structural framework for this thesis generally includes two broad aspects, 
which are related to the specific roles of the creative class in production (i.e. what can 
they do?) on one hand and its specialised consumption preferences (i.e. what do they 
like?) on the other. With regard to production, the crucial problems for the creative 
class are A (1) how to identify the causal relationship with economic growth and A (6) 
how to empirically evaluate its embedded relationship with other factors in a 




production system. These issues are to a certain degree responsive to the main issues 
of ICT-related studies such as B (2) how to efficiently develop the potential of ICT 
and B (5) the current ICT policies which require complementary policies. With regard 
to consumption, the specific issues are A (2) how to identify the relationship between 
the location of the creative class and amenities and A (7) the criticism for social 
restriction. The rest of the problems can be allocated on both sides, including A (3), A 
(4), A (5) and A (8). Finally, A (5) is particularly discussed in Chapter 6, concerning 
the research question “where the creative class comes from”. 
In conclusion, a flexible theoretical framework was developed, coordinating 
different theories that systematically evaluate the functions of the creative economy. It 
is expected that such integration will help to understand the substantial role of 
creative workers in an economic system and form a better understanding of creativity. 
This will in turn enhance our knowledge about the potential of ICT. From another 
perspective, the separation of production and consumption leads to a particular focus 
on the behaviours of creative workers; Florida’s hypotheses are difficult to be 
combined together into one analysis. 
 
2.3.2 Chapter 4: what can the creative class do? 
 
In order to empirically test the theoretical framework, with regard to 
production, the production function theory is used, based on both growth accounting 
and econometric exercises. The essential reason is fourfold. Firstly, the production 
function approach provides a theoretical base to link creative labour inputs, ICT  




Figure 2.1: The theoretical framework                                    
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capital services and their interactive effects within the production process. Secondly, 
the measure of labour input is more accurate according to Florida’s definition of 
creative workers as people who dedicate a high proportion of their working hours on 
creativity-oriented works. This may be observed as the most direct technique used to 
measure the contribution of creative workers from the production side; the debate 
over the issues of synthetic variables will not be a distraction here (e.g. the application 
of creativity index which combines several unitary variables). Thirdly, either the 
growth accounting approach or panel econometric analysis is a flexible approach. 
This allows a combined evaluation of both the creative class and other human capital 
sub-categories. Finally, econometric analysis is, to a great extent, complementary to 
the discrepancy in measuring inputs contributions based on the growth accounting 
method. Therefore, it is expected that comparison between these two models will 
produce robust findings about the creative economy. 
“Gains in Total Factors Productivity (TFP), reflecting more efficient use of 
inputs, have long been recognised as an important source of improvements in income 
and welfare (The World Bank, 2000, p.1)”. Therefore, a parallel empirical model was 
also derived that accounts for the impacts of the creative class, other human capital 
sub-categories as well as ICT on TFP growth. The regional TFP level in this thesis is 
obtained from the growth accounting calculation at the first stage. Then, this 
dependent variable was regressed by the regional share of skilled workers, ICT capital 
services per worker, their interactive term and other control variables. Even though 
there is no universal standard to measure or interpret TFP, as differences in 
assumptions can result in different estimates of TFP growth, a robust theoretical 
framework that links ICT and creative economic theories together will still be 
explored within this thesis. 




European regions are used as the unit of analysis regarding the increasing 
awareness of aggregated economies at a local level. A micro-level study may be more 
accurate in accounting for specific effects of input factors, while it largely overlooks 
the complex pattern of interactions between a number of components acting together 
according to common norms, practices and historical inheritance (Ascani et al., 2012). 
In this respect, firm-level or industry-level analysis has its own advantages but it only 
portrays a partial picture of what is actually going on.  
Finally, the empirical applications respond to the arguments about the 
definition of creative workers, thus each empirical model also involves the evaluation 
of different sub-categories of skilled workers. The main focus is on (1) the 
difference/similarity between the creative class and graduates (human capital) and (2) 
the difference between the creative core and creative professionals. Based on the 
above, the following hypotheses have been constructed as: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Examining main European regions, the level of change of creative 
labour services (expressed by hours worked) exhibits a positive and significant impact 
on the level of change in regional economic output (GVA). 
Hypothesis 4.2: Examining main European regions, the level of change of ICT 
capital services is complementary to the level of change in creative labour services or 
vice versa in measuring the level of change in output. Also this effect is more 
significant than graduates and other measures of skilled workers. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Examining main European regions, the level of change of labour 
services in terms of creative graduates, non-graduate creatives and non-creative 
workers will have different impacts on the level of change in regional GVA. A similar 
pattern can be also captured in measuring the level change of TFP.  




2.3.3 Chapter 5: what does the creative class like? 
 
As stated earlier, the analysis regarding consumption also involves the 
breakdown of skilled workers at the regional level in Europe. Given the increasing 
awareness of the importance for the complex interweaving of social life, social 
inclusion and even urban democracy, these concepts are distinguished from Florida’s 
people climate and are grouped as the factors to represent the business climate. When 
measuring this, not only are well-known variables generated, such as the social 
provision index and the location of universities, but the regional index of political 
institution quality is also included. Therefore, this empirical analysis is based on the 
consumption of creative workers and is also expanded to other essential aspects of 
economic and social progress.   
The controversies of the creative class consumer preferences can be 
summarised as (1) the unclear relationship between the broad sense of urban 
amenities including both the people climate and the business climate and the 
distribution of creative workers and (2) the unclear region-specific preferences of the 
creative class mirrored by its relatively uneven distribution across different sizes of 
cities/regions. In response, an empirical model is derived in Chapter 5, which is based 
on two different econometric exercises including the fixed effects model and the 
dynamic generalized method of moments model (the dynamic GMM model). The 
dynamic GMM model is expected to account for more urban realities compared to the 
simple OLS regression used in many previous studies. Also, the fixed effects model 
allows us to flexibly analyse the region-specific preferences in different size groups of 
regions. This leads to the formulation of these hypotheses as: 




Hypothesis 5.1: Examining main European regions, the location of migrant workers 
and bohemians has the significant explanatory power to explain the location of 
creative workers and such an effect is even stronger in big regions in comparison to 
small and medium regions. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Examining main European regions, the business climate is also 
important in determining the location of the creative class with the preferences of the 
business climate varying across regions. 
Hypothesis 5.3: Examining main European regions, the sub-categories of creative 
workers also have different preferences.  
 
2.3.4 Chapter 6: where does the creative class come from? 
 
In addition to the main research questions in Chapter 4 and 5, this thesis also 
aims to examine if the current education system is efficient to produce creative 
workers that meet the demand of the rise of the creative economy. Neither Florida nor 
previous research substantially evaluated the role of education in this direction. The 
relatively uneven development level between cities or regions could provide a great 
opportunity to flow talents as Florida suggests. Also, the emergence of creativity is a 
complex social phenomenon, which requires not only qualifications but also on-the-
job experience and re-skilling. However, is the influence of the education system 
really insignificant in the Creative Age? What is the status of new creative workers in 
the European labour market? These questions lead to the last hypothesis of Chapter 6: 




Hypothesis 6.1: Examining seven European countries, the education system has been 
specialised in shaping creative workers, but creative job outcomes cannot be simply 
explained by the attainment of higher education. 
Compared to previous sections, the discussion is no longer based on the 
regional level as limited observations of new workers for each target country prevent 
further breakdown of the dataset. In order to test the hypothesis, the multinomial logit 
model are adopted to examine the impact of higher education and the overall 
education scheme on the probability of getting a creative job in terms of bohemians, 
the creative core and creative professionals. 









3.1 Introduction: definition of the creative class, data availability and 
reliability 
This thesis is different from many previous studies, as many variables in this 
study do not exist in the accessible datasets. Further generation of new variables based 
on different surveys may encounter practical issues and requires extra care to be taken 
regarding data quality. This is why there is particular emphasis on the aspect of data 
management. In Chapter 3, the details of data construction for Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are 
demonstrated as below. 
For purely pragmatic reasons, Florida’s categories must stand in order to 
produce a comparative analysis of the European regions similar to the studies in the 
North American context. Given the significant difference in occupation classification 
standard between the U.S. and Europe, the composition of the creative class is as 
similar as possible to Florida’s construction (2002, 2013). Hence, the definition 
generally followed is of Boschma and Fritsch (2009) and Andersen et al. (2010) for 
this European study. Further details of the creative class are listed in Appendix 3.C. 
While the main argument regarding the definition of the creative class centres 
on whether the dealer class, the economic business class and the political class should 
be included or how the effect of human capital can be separated from the total effect 
of the creative class, few arguments have been raised against the inclusion of artistic, 




scientific and technological workers as creative. In this respect, Florida’s idea to 
distinguish between the creative core and creative professionals is maintained. Also a 
new dimension is derived to measure the creative class together with human capital 
where the graduates and the creative class are divided into three sub-categories: 
creative graduates, creative non-graduates and non-creative workers in model 1 or 
creative graduates, creative non-graduates and graduate non-creative workers in 
model 2. 
The data was obtainable from various sources. This work relies on the EU LFS, 
the EU SES, the EU KLEMS, Eurostat and Cambridge econometrics to obtain the 
required variables. The required data for this study is listed in Appendix 3.A. 3-digit 
ISCO 88 codes and 2-digit NUTS codes are accessible from the EU LFS to estimate 
the creative/non-creative workers by region and educational level. The U.K. is an 
exceptional case because only NUTS 1 codes can be obtained. The detailed data for 
regional capital stock at the NUTS 2 level is not available. In some studies the 
estimated capital investment and its depreciation rate had been used to calculate 
regional capital stock at NUTS 2 level in the EU (Derbyshire et al., 2010); however, 
to obtain enough physical capital investment data by industry and asset type is still 
quite a difficult task and in this thesis, it is impossible to do so in order to separately 
calculate ICT and non-ICT capital services.  
To estimate ICT and non-ICT capital services at the regional level, a scaling 
method was applied based on the assumption that the capital-labour ratio in an 
industry is approximately constant across the different regions in a country. This 
means that the focus is on the regional distribution of industries rather than 




differences in the capital labour ratio within industries located in different regions4. 
However, this assumed regional structure could be inaccurate. Capital-labour ratios 
depend on the relative prices of the inputs and on technical considerations such as 
scale economies and these influences may vary by region. Still, the assumption is all 
that is available to make the ICT distinction by region, and it is reasonable. 
As the different surveys will not have the same reference period and sampled 
population, the sampling and non-sampling errors will vary. This issue may be 
significant when the analysis employs data from a range of sources. The EU LFS 
survey is based upon private households only i.e. all persons living in the households 
surveyed during the reference week. If the EU LFS is linked to other sources, 
variation is inevitable. For instance, the total number of workforce/employment in the 
EU LFS is generally lower than the corresponding figures from the EU KLEMS. This 
is mainly caused by the different sampling methods as well as the sample sources. In 
the EU KLEMS, total workforce is defined as persons engaged in work based on the 
national accounts, and this can be based on firm census data and other independent 
statistics, such as social security counts, as well as the LFS. Compared to the EU LFS 
which is generated from person survey only, such sources might lead to different 
definitions of employment. Nevertheless, this difference in the number of the total 
workforce/employees is not significant5 in most of the selected countries (shown in 
Appendix 3.D). Therefore the figures provided by the EU LFS are believed to be 
reliable. 
                                                          
4 In other words, only the number of employees in each industry matters in relative calculation of 
ICT/non-ICT capital services, given a fixed capital-labour ratio across regions in a country. Therefore 
an industry with a higher level of workforce will have higher values of ICT/non-ICT capital services 
compared to the same industry in another region and indicate the pattern of the geographical 
distribution of labour. 
5 We made a comparison of employees and total workforce numbers from both the EU LFS and the EU 
KLEMS in Austria, Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. 




Estimation of working hours is more complicated and indirect. Existing 
databases such as the EU KLEMS, various methods and sources are employed to 
estimate the total working hours across the different EU countries. For instance, the 
U.K. data used sources from the UK LFS survey. Data for Italy used sources from the 
national census and ISTAT. Adaptation of the multiple sources and methods will 
make results more accurate due to the different data quality in the targeted countries. 
The EU LFS is designed to target the person’s working status, but census and national 
statistics focus on surveys or the registries of firms/enterprises. The harmonised data 
collection technique in the EU LFS can minimise the sampling/non-sampling errors. 
This approach, however, will lead to a difference of results when comparison is made 
with the EU KLEMS. This study used the variable “The Actual Working Hours in the 
Reference Week” (variable “HWACTUAL”) to estimate total working hours in the 
reference year because this variable also includes working hours of paid and unpaid 
overtime. An assumption was made that the average working hours in a week can be 
representative for an average week during the survey year. Then the yearly working 
hours would be close to reality if the “HWACTUAL” is multiplied by 52, which is the 
total average number of working weeks in a year6. In Appendix 3.E, the results show 
that in Austria, Italy, Germany, France, and the U.K., a difference in the total working 
hours between the EU LFS and the EU KLEMS does exist and such a gap is large in 
some particular countries such as Italy and the U.K., but is not quite significant in 
France or Germany. In general, it indicates that the total working hours estimated 
from the EU LFS are comparatively accurate7.  
                                                          
6 365/7=52.143≈52. 
7 We took figures from the EU KLEMS as the benchmark to evaluate the reliability of the estimation 
technique, given it is based on national accounts and is a well-accepted database.  




Information on real wages is confidential in the EU LFS. The income variable 
“INCDECIL” only indirectly provides a value range of wages in terms of deciles as a 
result of privacy protection measures. The EU SILC 8  has very detailed income 
information from 2004, including gross/net cash earnings and gross/net incomes. 
However, the sample size of the EU SILC is a problem. Since the principle of 
minimum effective sample size can be met, there are only 130,750 and 282,900 real 
observations from household respondents across the main EU countries. This 
drawback could result in a very serious bias when trying to estimate real average 
wage/annual income for either the total workforce or creative workers. An alternative 
option is the EU SES database. Compared to the EU SILC, its micro database 
includes approximately 7.9 million observations under Council Regulation 530/1999 
and Commission Regulation 1916/2000. Such a big sample size makes the estimation 
of average wage/annual income much more accurate. However, this survey was 
conducted with an interval of four years and only had two waves in total. So there are 
only waves from 2002 and 2006 as a reference. The EU SES also has incomplete 
regional classifications. For instance, most of the variables are only available at 
NUTS 1 level and the classification of German regions does not follow the NUTS 
standard9. In response, it was assumed that regions at NUTS 2 level in a country share 
the same labour market with its aggregated regions at NUTS 1 level. Therefore, 
annual earning in a region will be similar at NUTS 2 level in comparison to its own 
NUTS 1 level. 
The labour market across NUTS 2 regions indeed has different features but 
such a difference will not be very significant, given most of the targeted regions in 
this study are territorially small. The number of the creative/non-creative workers by 
                                                          
8 The European Union statistics on income and living conditions 
9 For estimated annual earnings in German regions, see Appendix 3.F.  




region was obtained from the variable “REGIONW” in the EU LFS. Annual earnings 
per worker were collected from the EU SES at NUTS 1 level (variable “A11”) for 
most of the targeted countries and then applied to the relevant NUTS 2 level. 
Germany is an exceptional case that requires further manipulation, given regional 
classification is more aggregated than NUTS 1 in the EU SES. Finally, only two 
waves of the EU SES data are accessible; therefore, wages for intervening years are 
interpolated. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that as self-employed people do not receive a 
regular payment from an employer, the EU SES excludes these workers in firms with 
less than ten employees. Variables from the EU SILC also only contain cash/non-cash 
income for employees. Therefore, the income for self-employed creative workers is 
quite difficult to measure and it was assumed that it is equal to the income of creative 
employees in each occupation category.  
 
3.2 Chapter 4: estimates for labour and capital services inputs at the 
regional level 
 
This section focuses on how to define creative workers and how to realistically 
estimate the labour and capital service flows at the regional level. Due to practical 
issues, such as lack of data and data inconsistency between private surveys and the 
EU KLEMS, further estimation techniques are necessary as is explained below.  
 
 




Estimates for ICT/non-ICT capital service flows at the regional level 
The challenge in measuring capital services for growth accounting is related to 
the nature of the capital services; the quantity of capital services is normally not 
observable in practice. Therefore, the empirical researcher has to rely on theoretical 
assumptions to approximate the capital services. The most well-known approach was 
developed by Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967). The crucial assumption in this theory is that the flows of capital 
services are proportional to the stocks at individual asset level (Erumban, 2008). In 
other words, if it is assumed that the proportionality between capital stock and capital 
services for each asset type, the proportionality factor varies across different asset 
types and over time depending on their marginal productivities. Therefore, at the 
aggregate level, the capital service flows could reflect this difference in the service 
delivered by different asset types as it is estimated by summing the growth rate for 
each individual asset stock weighed by the relevant marginal productivity (OECD, 
2001).  
The variables of ICT and non-ICT capital services are defined as per hour 
term in the EU KLEMS (i.e. variable “CAPIT_QPH” and “CAPNIT_QPH”). The 
currency unit was also converted to 1995 euros (i.e. European Currency Unit (ECU)) 
using capital compensation and exchange rates for countries outside the euro area (e.g. 
Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic). However, there are no existing estimates 
of investment at the regional level to enable calculation of capital services. Instead 
data on capital by industry by shares of employment in each industry was combined to 
calculate a proxy measure. If the capital-labour ratio by industry is assumed to be 
constant across regions in a country then we can have: 




KICT,j,t = VICT,j,t ∗ Hj,t   (3.1) 
 KNICT,j,t = VNICT,j,t ∗ Hj,t   
   ICTi,t = ∑ KICT,j,t/Lj,t ∗ Li,j,t
j=17
j=1   (3.2) 
    NICTi,t = ∑ KNICT,j,t/Lj,t ∗ Li,j,t
j=17
j=1                        
KICT,j,t, KNICT,j,t and Lj,t are ICT, non-ICT capital services and number of labour by 
industry j at a national level at time t respectively. KICT,j,t is calculated by multiplying 
ICT capital services per hour worked (VICT,j,t ) by the total hours worked (Hj,t ) in 
industry j and similarly for non-ICT.  
Because the capital-labour ratio is constant across regions in a country, for any 
particular region i at time t, the total regional ICTit or NICTit capital services is the 
sum of the arithmetic product of the national capital-labour ratio KICT,j,t/Lj,t  or 
KNICT,j,t/Lj,t and the regional labour input Li,j,t by all industry . There are 17 industries 
in total according to the NACE 1.1 standard, and the EU KLEMS database has 
enough information to calculate the ICT/non-ICT capital-labour ratio at the national 
level since 1975. The remaining problem is that the EU LFS exhibits different time 
series across countries and the regional labour data in countries such as Germany, 
Sweden or the Czech Republic is not consistent over years due to the frequent 
upgrade of NUTS codes. Hence, the regional labour data for the selected 11 countries 
cannot be balanced to the same basic year. However, for most of the targeted 
countries in this study, this problem is not serious.10 
The U.K. in the years 2000, 2005 and 2008 was taken as a set of examples to 
examine if the capital estimation method this study adopted was unbiased. In doing so, 
                                                          
10 The time series is not confined to a basic year, given German data is only available since 2002.   




distribution of the total regional capital services11 would truly reflect reality in a target 
country. As shown in Appendix 3.G, the technique used to estimate regional capital 
services is acceptable as the capital-labour ratio in most regions of the U.K. appears 
plausible. For instance, metropolitan areas are likely to be dominated by services; for 
example, Greater London has a lower capital-labour ratio compared to Scotland, 
which is heavily dependent on capital intensive oil production. The capital-labour 
ratio in the majority of regions is also increasing due to general technological progress.  
 
Estimation of regional labour and capital revenue shares 
As information regarding creative/non-creative labour compensation and 
ICT/non-ICT capital compensation is not obtainable at the regional level, the scaling 
method was again accepted to indirectly estimate revenue shares of both capital and 
labour services. In doing so, a further assumption was made that revenue shares of 
labour and capital services over value added output by industry is constant across 
regions in a country, and similarly compensation shares of creative/non-creative 
labour and ICT/non-ICT capital assets over their total compensation by industry too. 
To account for the differences in economic scale across industries in a region, relative 
revenue and compensation shares of each input by industry on a national level were 
weighted by their labour shares in terms of workforce numbers. The relevant 
equations are given by: 
 VL,j,t = Lj,t/Yj,t   (3.3) 
                                                          
11 The estimation of total capital services is similar to ICT/non-ICT capital services. Total capital 
services per hour equals the sum of ICT and non-ICT capital services, weighted by the relevant capital 
compensation shares.  




 VL,i,t = ∑ VL,j,t ∗ SL,i,j,ti=17j=1  (3.4) 
 VK,i,t = 1 −  VL,i,t 
 VCR,i,t =  VL,i,t ∗ WCR,i,t (3.5) 
 VNCR,i,t =  VL,i,t * (1 − WCR,i,t ) 
WICT,i,t = ∑ WICT,j,t ∗ SL,i,j,ti=17j=1  (3.6) 
WNICT,i,t = 1 − WICT,i,t 
 VICT,i,t=  VK,i,t *WICT,i,t (3.7) 
 VNICT,i,t=  VK,i,t *WNICT,i,t 
All necessary information at the national level can be retrieved from the EU 
KLEMS, the EU SES and the EU LFS. Here  VL,j,t is the share of labour compensation 
over value added output by industry j on the national level at time t and Lj,t and Yj,t 
are labour compensation and value of GVA respectively. With a fixed labour 
compensation-output ratio  VL,j,t by industry, share of labour compensation over value 
added output in region i at time t is VL,i,t, which is equal to the sum of the arithmetic 
product of  VL,j,t  and SL,i,j,t. SL,i.j,t is the share of the relevant labour over total number 
of regional labour force by industry. Then revenue share of capital services  VK,i,t is 
equal to 1 −  VL,i,t, under the conditions of the constant return scale and full utilisation. 
In equation 3.5,  WCR,i,t  and 1 − WCR,i,t are shares of labour compensation of 
creative/non-creative workers over total labour compensation, based on the 
calculation from the EU SES. Finally, revenue shares of the creative workers and non-
creative workers by regions at time t are equal to the relative share of total labour 




compensation  VL,i,t  multiplied by separate labour compensation shares WCR,i,t  and 
1 − WCR,i,t  respectively.  
To estimate revenue shares of ICT/non-ICT capital assets, a similar process as 
used for the estimation of the regional share of labour compensation is followed. In 
equation 3.6, WICT,j,t is the compensation share of ICT capital assets by industry at a 
national level at time t. The compensation share of ICT capital assets over total capital 
compensation in region i at time t is WICT,i,t  , which is equal to the sum of the 
arithmetic product of WICT,j,t and the relevant regional labour share SL,i,j,t by industry. 
Therefore, revenue shares of ICT and non-ICT capital assets over value of GVA by 
regions is equal to the total revenue share of capital services VK,i,t  multiplied by 
WICT,i,t and WNICT,i,t  respectively. 
In conclusion, although bias cannot be completely eliminated, the contribution 
of each input can be realistically estimated according to this perspective; the focus 
here is on how industries distribute across regions rather than accounting for the 
difference in the capital-labour ratio for an industry across different regions. One of 
contribution this study is that the levels of creative labour and capital services are 
estimated for the first time in the main European regions.  
 
3.3 Chapter 5: estimates for locational quotients and other relevant 
variables at the regional level.  
 
In Chapter 5, the locational quotient is used to describe the pattern of 
geographical distribution for creative workers across regions in a country. It is 




calculated by dividing the regional share of creative workers by the national share of 
creative workers. The variable description details are listed in Table 3.1.   
Creative population. The composition of the creative class is as similar to 
Florida’s (2002, 2013) as possible, given variations in occupational definitions 
between the U.S. and Europe. In addition to the traditional measures for the creative 
core and creative professionals, new definitions were constructed (as in the last 
chapter) for creative graduates and creative non-graduates. These were intended to 
capture the overall impact of both the creative class and human capital (i.e. graduates).  
Tolerance. Given that data for the gay and lesbian population is not obtainable 
in the European context, this factor is measured by the locational quotient of 
“bohemians”. These are defined as workers performing artistic jobs.   
Openness. To measure “openness”, the labour participation rate of migrants is 
used. A high participation rate of migrants in a region is argued by Florida to be a 
clear sign of attracting highly skilled workers. Here, the locational quotient of migrant 
workers is defined in the usual way as the regional percentage of employees born 
abroad divided by the national percentage.  
The location of universities. For this variable, it is assumed that the number of 
university teachers proxies the quality of local universities. Since a high share of 
creative workers are graduates and many of them are working in actual research and 
in academic jobs, there is a clear link with university location. Again, the locational 
quotient of university teachers is given by the regional percentage relative to the 
national percentage.  




Social provision. Here, Anderson et al.’s (2010) concept of the social 
provision index is followed. The purpose of this index is to account for the effect of 
the social welfare system. It is assumed that a region with more workers in social and 
health care and education industries bring local residents better social welfare. This 
indicator is constructed as the share of workers in social and health care and education 
services over the total population in each region12. 
Quality of regional political institution. Finally, the EQI index13 is introduced 
for regional government quality (Charron et al., 2014). Although a measure of 
political institution quality cannot precisely reflect the nature of the cultural-cognitive 
economy (Scott, 2010; 2014), it is assumed that a “good” local government helps the 
higher-level activities of creative workers and is also essential in providing social 
security for them. 
The EQI index is time-invariant, and so needed to be supplemented by other 
measures of government quality to fit within the panel structure of the data. Hence a 
traditional measure using the share of workers in the public administration 14 is used 
as a proxy for the short-term local government performance. The logic here is 
                                                          
12 The locational quotient of university teachers focuses on the location/quality of local universities, 
while the social provision index describes the pattern regarding the quality of the local social welfare 
system. Although the inclusion of university teachers in both cases results in an overlap, two variables 
are based on different dimensions and a considerable number of employees in the education industry 
are not university teachers, such as pre-primary teachers, primary education, other education and 
educational support activities. With respect to this, the “double-counting” is not regarded as an issue 
in this study. 
13 “The European Quality of Government Index (EQI) is the result of novel survey data on corruption 
and governance at the regional level within the EU, conducted first in 2010 and then again in 2013. 
The data focus on both perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the 
extent to which citizens believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good 
quality” (Charron et al., 2014). 
14 Ideally, the calculation of this variable should be based on the workers who are working for local 
government. However, further breakdown for public administration and defence, and compulsory 
social security is not accessible in the EU LFS. 




analogous to the definition of social provision (Anderson et al., 2010) 15, in that 
variation in employment in public sectors can be taken to have a substantial impact on 
the short-term performance of local government. To address the issue of the time-
invariance of the EQI, an interaction term between the EQI index and the share of 
workers in public administration is included. In this specification, the interactive term 
is interpreted as how the overall quality of a local government influences the 











                                                          
15 Observing with-in variations, it is plausible to assume that more workers in this industry will provide 
more effective supports and services to population in a region as the majority of them are 
government employees according to the definition of NACE1/1.1/2.1. Since the perception about 
impartiality and honesty in a local government could not change dramatically in the short term, the 
change in the number of workers results in the variation of effectiveness.  
16 In this special case, it is necessary to omit the time-invariant variable EQI in the regression as it can 
be assumed as a fixed effect in the error term. For details, see Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and 
Adolph (2014). 




Table 3.1: Definitions of variables in Chapter 5 
 
Variable labels Description 
Dependent variables  
The total creative class Locational quotient of the total creative class – defined as senior government officials, managers, scientists 
and associate professionals in science, health and business administration excluding writers and creative or 
performing artists (bohemians), public service administrative professionals (government employees), 
university teachers and all non-native born workers within this specification (included in openness variable).  
Creative graduates Locational quotient of creative graduates* – defined as the total creative class who have university degrees  
Non-creative graduates Locational quotient of non-creative graduates* – defined as the total creative class who do not have 
university degrees 
The creative core Locational quotient of the creative core – defined as scientists excluding public service administrative 
professionals, university teachers and all non-native born workers within this specification 
Creative professionals Locational quotient of creative professionals – defined as senior government officials, managers and 
associate professionals in science, health and business administration excluding all non-native born workers 
within this specification 
Independent variables  
People climate  
Bohemians (LB) Locational quotient of bohemians – defined as writers and creative or performing artists 
Openness (LO) Locational quotient of migrant labour in labour market* – defined as non-native born workers  
Regional facilities  
Universities (LT) Locational quotient of universities and research institutions – defined as university teachers 
Social provision (S) Share of workers in education and social services industries 
Others  
Overall institution quality (EQI) 
Government performance (L) 
Interactive term (LEQI) 
EQI index 2010* 
Share of workers in public administration industries 
EQI *L 
Notes: 1.* indicates a new measure in comparison to the existing literature. 2. Locational quotients are calculated by dividing shares of target population in each region by 
average national shares.  
Sources: the EU LFS.




3.4 Chapter 6: estimates for new graduates and education 
backgrounds in the European labour market 
 
Compared to previous chapters, the discussion in Chapter 6 is no longer based 
on the regional level as limited observations of new workers for each target country 
prevent further breakdown of the dataset. Ideally the EU LFS survey can cover all of 
the EU countries, but the core variable “hatfield”, which indicates interviewee’s 
education/training background by 14 general subjects, has only been available since 
2003 for limited countries, thus only the U.K., France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark are the research targets. As Table 3.2 shows, this thesis 
proposes the following classification to link different education backgrounds to the 
concept of the creative class.  
1. New bohemian workers: LFS subject codes 200 (humanities, languages and 
arts) and 222 (foreign languages), which are likely to be relevant to creative 
occupations 245 (journalism, art and writing), 347 (work in art, entertainment and 
sports) and 521 (modelling). 
2. New creative core workers: LFS subject codes 100 (teacher training and 
education science), 400 (science, mathematics and computing), 420 (life science), 440 
(physical science), 460 (mathematics and statistics) and 481 (computer science), 
which are likely to be relevant to creative occupation groups 21 (physical, 
mathematical and engineering science professionals), 22 (life science and health 
professionals), 23 (teaching professionals) and 24 (other professionals). 
3. New creative professionals: LFS subject codes 300 (social sciences, 
business and law), 482 (computer use), 500 (engineering, manufacturing and 




construction) and 700 (health and welfare), which are likely to be relevant to creative 
occupations 1 (high level management), 241 (work related to the organisation and 
economy of business), 242 (work with law), 31 (technical work in non-biological 
areas), 32 (technical work in biological areas) and 34 (other associate professionals). 
It is worth mentioning that this alignment is rough as the specific subject 
codes that are accurately related to each creative occupation or small groups of 
creative occupations are unobtainable in the EU LFS. It is especially true when 
measuring new workers who have an education background related to the jobs of 
bohemians or creative professionals. However, meaningful results about the match or 
mismatch between qualifications and occupations are expected as this attempt can still 
capture this pattern in a broad sense.  
With regard to the division between new graduates and non-graduates, the 
integration of education/training backgrounds is another challenge; the focuses of 
education systems vary across target countries. For example, education/training 
background is not specialised by the standardised secondary education in the U.K. (A-
levels), but in the Netherlands, high school education (middelbare school) is a part of 
voortgezet onderwijs (continued education) including three streams, vmbo, havo and 
vwo, and students can only enter a research university with a vwo. Therefore, it is not 
a surprise that almost no observations can be found by education/training background 
at the level of ISCED 3 and 4 in the U.K. (most of the observations are defined as 
“unknown subject 900”), while there is a considerable amount in the case of the 
Netherlands. Given this issue, concern has been expressed that the comparison 
between graduates and non-graduates by education/training background is not 
applicable to the target countries. Even though it is feasible in countries such as the 
Netherlands or Germany, the difference in the focus of secondary education, 




vocational education and tertiary education impedes us in meaningfully interpreting 
results on a comparative basis. Further development of database construction 
regarding this issue is required. For now, however, the econometric models in this 
thesis only focus on general education/training backgrounds as a whole without 
considering further breakdown to the level (type) of educational attainment.  
In order to maximise the sample size, the dataset includes micro-level records 
based on the longest time period for each target country, such as the period 2004-2007 
for the U.K. and Italy and the period 2006-2007 for the Netherlands and France and in 
the period 2003-2007 for Spain and Denmark. The exception is Germany where the 
variable “educfild17” is only available in the year 2003. In addition, the time period 
after 2007 is not included as the economic crisis in Europe, which began in 2008, is 
argued to completely change the pattern of job outcomes for graduates and non-
graduates (Hurley et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the variable “wstat1y (situation with regard to activity one year 
before survey)” is used to define newly graduated students. As the EU LFS derived 
this variable to represent the situation of every interviewee one year before the survey, 
it is plausible to assume that those workers, who were pupils, students or had further 
training and unpaid working experience, can be a cohort of new graduates/non-
graduates according to the previous academic year. This group is further confined by 
the age band of 22 as interviewees at the age above this band are less likely to be 
newly graduated students but instead be workers who already have considerable work 
experience to redevelop skills and knowledge in the workplace. With this adjustment, 
the valid observations/weighted observations for each country based on the available 
                                                          
17 The purpose of this variable is consistent with this study as “the knowledge of the field of the 
highest educational level attained is used in the analysis of the matching between education schemes 
and labour market needs” (The EU LFS explanatory notes, 2012, p.122-213). 




time periods are listed in Table 3.3. Finally, the personal characteristics of individuals 
are also controlled for, such as age (variable “age”), gender (variable “gender”), the 
level of educational attainment (variable “hatlev1d”), part-time/full-time (variable 
“ftpt”), self-employment/employment (variable “stapro”) and ethnicity (variable 
“countryb”).  
Table 3.2: Matching education/training backgrounds to the creative class 
The category of education background in the EU LFS 
Education/training 
background related to 
the creative class 
100 Teacher training and education science The creative core  
200 Humanities, languages and arts Bohemians 
222 Foreign languages Bohemians 
300 Social sciences, business and law Creative professionals  
400 Science, mathematics and computing The creative core 
420 Life science (including biology and environmental 
science) 
The creative core 
440 Physical science  The creative core 
460 Mathematics and statistics The creative core 
481 Computer science The creative core 
482 Computer use Creative professionals 
500 Engineering, manufacturing and construction Creative professionals* 
600 Agriculture and veterinary Other subjects 
700 Health and welfare Creative professionals* 
800 Services Other subjects 
900 Unknown Other subjects 
 
Table 3.3: Sample size in Chapter 6 
Country Actual Weighted Time period 
The U.K. 1,566 2,831,653 2004-2007 
France 6,209 877,314 2006-2007 
Spain 2,662 859,135 2003-2004,2006-2007 
Italy 9,625 1,138,187 2004-2007 
The Netherlands 5,101 834,041 2006-2007 
Denmark 3,105 400,029 2003-2007 
Germany 793 204,786 2003 
 
 





Appendix 3. A: Data sources  
Variables Label Description Primary source 
Gross value added GVA Millions of euro, 1995 price,1995-2007 
Eurostat/Cambridge 
Econometrics 
Labour input L Hours worked for total labour input, millions EU LFS 
Creative labour 
services CR 
Hours worked for the total creative 





Hours worked for the non-creative 
class by educational levels, 
millions 
EU LFS 
ICT capital services ICT 
Regional ICT capital services, 





Regional ICT capital services, 




Hours worked for workers who 





Gross annual earning, national 
currency at current price EU SES 
Value shares of 
CR,NCR,ICT,NICT 
over output 
N/A Regional income shares of relevant inputs   Own calculation 
ICT/non-ICT capital 




Euro/national currency, reference 
year 1995 EU KLEMS 












Appendix 3. B: Data structure  
Code Country NUTS Time series Region 
AT Austria 2 1998-2007 9 
BE Belgium 2 1996-2007 11 
CZ Czech Republic 2 1997-2007 8 
DE Germany 2 2002-2007 33 
ES Spain 2 1995-2007 17 
FI Finland 2 1999-2007 5 
FR France 2 1995-2007 22 
HU Hungary 2 1997-2007 7 
IT Italy 2 1995-2007 19 
UK UK 1 1999-2007 12 
SE Sweden 2 1999-2006 8 
Note: Due to data inconsistency, Brandenburg (D40), Koblenz (DB1), Trier (DB2) and Rheinhessen-
Pfalz (DB3) are removed from the German regions. Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta (ES63) and Ciudad 
Autónoma de Melilla (ES64) are removed from the Spanish regions. Provincia Autonoma 

































Appendix 3. C: The definition of creative occupations 
ISCO-88                                                 Description 
Creative professionals 
111 Legislators 
112 Senior government officials 
113 Traditional chiefs and heads of villages 
114 Senior officials of special-interest organisations 
121 Directors and chief executives 
122 Production and operations department managers 
123 Other department managers 
131 General Managers 
223 Nursing and midwifery professionals 
241 Business professionals 
242 Legal professionals 
311 Physical and engineering science technicians 
312 Computer associate professionals 
313 Optical and electronic equipment operators 
314 Ship and aircraft controller and technicians 
315 Safety and quality inspectors 
321 Life science technicians and related associate professionals 
322 Modern health associate professionals (except nursing) 
323 Nursing and midwifery associate professionals 
324 Traditional medicine practitioners and faith healers 
341 Finance and sales associate professionals 
342 Business services agents and trade brokers 
343 Administrative associate professionals 
345 Police inspectors and detectives 
346 Social work associate professionals 
Bohemians 
245 Writers and creative or performing artists 
3131 Photographers and image and sound recording equipment operators 
347 Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals 
521 Fashion and other models 
The creative core 
211 Physicists, chemists and related professionals 
212 Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals 
213 Computing professionals 
214 Architects, engineers and related professionals 
221 Life science professionals 
222 Health professionals (except nursing) 
231 College, university and higher education teaching professionals 
232 Secondary education teaching professionals 
233 Primary and pre-primary education teaching professionals 
234 Special education teaching professionals 
235 Other teaching professionals 
243 Archivists, librarians and related information professionals 
244 Social science and related professionals 
247 Public service administrative professionals 
Note: Occupation 3131 is omitted due to lack of 4-digit ISCO 88 code based variables in the EU LFS 
 




Appendix 3. D: The comparison of total workforce/employees between the EU 
LFS and the EU KLEMS  
Country Year 
Total workforce Employee 




2004 3,703,669 3,957,656 1.07 3,265,879 3,314,405 1.01 
2005 3,769,986 3,957,656 1.06 3,316,966 3,349,816 1.01 
2006 3,869,857 4,008,028 1.05 3,396,596 3,405,230 1.00 
2007 3,931,556 4,074,854 1.06 3,450,087 3,477,119 1.01 
2008 3,994,195 4,151,269 1.06 ** ** ** 
2009 3,989,923 4,240,265 1.06 ** ** ** 
Germany 
2004 33,928,685 39,034,000 1.15 31,779,028 34,658,000 1.09 
2005 363,29,793 38,976,000 1.07 32,720,202 34,480,000 1.05 
2006 37,163,198 39,192,000 1.05 33,460,260 34,684,000 1.04 
2007 37,985,680 39,857,000 1.05 34,245,780 35,288,000 1.03 
2008 38,586,928 40,348,000 1.05 ** ** ** 
2009 38,599,797 40,370,000 1.05 ** ** ** 
Italy 
2004 21,838,438 24,149,900 1.11 16,117,280 18,029,315 1.12 
2005 22,142,048 24,255,500 1.10 16,533,604 18,359,673 1.11 
2006 22,563,389 24,874,500 1.10 16,914,762 18,796,422 1.11 
2007 22,800,429 25,187,600 1.10 17,167,038 19,115,237 1.11 
2008 23,002,010 25,255,800 1.10 ** ** ** 
2009 22,662,279 24,840,000 1.10 ** ** ** 
France 
2004 24,505,409 26,175,516 1.07 22,099,420 22,768,400 1.03 
2005 24,705,526 26,348,691 1.07 22,237,152 22,870,968 1.03 
2006 24,871,785 26,633,504 1.07 22,290,828 23,084,993 1.04 
2007 25,367,738 27,005,559 1.06 22,768,756 23,401,509 1.03 
2008 25,725,279 27,137,272 1.05 ** ** ** 
2009 25,544,320 26,782,692 1.05 ** ** ** 
The UK 
2004 28,126,052 30,913,000 1.10 24,689,090 25,178,051 1.02 
2005 28,405,399 31,326,000 1.10 24,989,492 25,468,194 1.02 
2006 28,669,561 31,662,000 1.10 25,158,918 25,640,849 1.02 
2007 28,836,028 31,890,000 1.11 25,279,052 25,749,142 1.02 
2008 29,084,373 31,993,000 1.10 ** ** ** 
2009 28,589,974 31,434,000 1.10 ** ** ** 
Notes:  
1. Example in Austria, Italy, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
2. ** the employee data is only available to make comparison before 2007. 










Appendix 3. E: The comparison of yearly working hours between the EU LFS 
and the EU KLEMS 
Yearly working hours Yearly working hours 
Country Year EU LFS 
EU 






2004 6691 6,783 1.01 
Germany 
2004 61692 56,062 0.91 
2005 6670 6,795 1.02 2005 63205 55,775 0.88 
2006 6855 6,818 0.99 2006 64882 55,808 0.86 
2007 6964 6,920 0.99 2007 65485 56,679 0.87 
2008 7029 6,987 0.99 2008 66036 57,362 0.87 
2009 6721 6,754 1.00 2009 64065 55,826 0.87 
Netherlands 
2004 11139 11,489 1.03 
Italy 
2004 38451 44,293 1.15 
2005 11178 11,496 1.03 2005 39156 44,370 1.13 
2006 11493 11,679 1.02 2006 40495 45,143 1.11 
2007 11682 11,950 1.02 2007 40495 45,143 1.11 
2008 11784 12,155 1.03 2008 41056 45,751 1.11 
2009 11687 11,999 1.03 2009 41036 45,532 1.11 
France 
2004 39278 39,280 1.00 
The UK 
2004 45534 51,961 1.14 
2005 40170 39,393 1.00 2005 46151 52,402 1.14 
2006 40539 39,225 1.00 2006 46452 52,909 1.14 
2007 41201 40,095 0.96 2007 46772 53,312 1.14 
2008 41872 40,479 0.97 2008 46619 52,812 1.13 
2009 40783 39,431 1.09 2009 45630 51,701 1.13 
Notes:  
1. Unit: million. 

















Appendix 3. F: Matching data from the EU SES to the NUTS standard for the 
German regions 
Region NUTS at level 2 Regional classification in the EU SES 
Stuttgart DE11 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Karlsruhe DE12 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Freiburg DE13 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Tübingen DE14 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Oberbayern DE21 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Niederbayern DE22 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Oberplatz DE23 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Oberfranken DE24 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Mittelfranken DE25 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Unterfranken DE26 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Schwaben DE27 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 
Berlin DE30 Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg,Lower 
Saxony, Bremen, Berlin 
Bremen DE50 Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg,Lower 
Saxony, Bremen, Berlin 
Hamburg DE60 Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg,Lower 
Saxony, Bremen, Berlin 
Darmstadt DE71 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Gieβen DE72 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Kassel DE73 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
DE80 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Braunschweig DE91 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Hannover DE92 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Lüneburg DE93 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Weser-Ems DE94 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Düsseldorf DEA1 North Rhine-Westphalia 
Köln DEA2 North Rhine-Westphalia 
Münster DEA3 North Rhine-Westphalia 
Detmold DEA4 North Rhine-Westphalia 
Arnsberg DEA5 North Rhine-Westphalia 
Saarland DEC0 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Chemnitz DED1 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Dresden DED2 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Leipzig DED3 Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate,Saarland 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
DEF0 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 










Appendix 3. G: Regional capital services estimation and capital/labour ratio in 











2000 North East England 1044.05 6356.95 6.08 
2000 North West England 2986.91 14748.27 4.93 
2000 Yorkshire and the Humber 2228.61 11689.89 5.24 
2000 East Midlands 1967.65 11340.31 5.76 
2000 West Midlands 2367.56 12034.85 5.08 
2000 East of England 2617.11 12795.03 4.88 
2000 Greater London 3386.62 15371.70 4.53 
2000 South East England 3980.98 19993.67 5.02 
2000 South West England 2329.29 11742.36 5.04 
2000 Wales 1212.91 6288.71 5.18 
2000 Scotland 2282.36 15907.76 6.96 
2000 Northern Ireland 672.55 3740.88 5.56 
2005 North East England 1109.51 6982.17 6.29 
2005 North West England 3152.22 16979.89 5.38 
2005 Yorkshire and the Humber 2371.28 13547.95 5.71 
2005 East Midlands 2098.74 13168.87 6.27 
2005 West Midlands 2482.43 14787.30 5.95 
2005 East of England 2734.25 15846.33 5.79 
2005 Greater London 3501.51 18356.44 5.24 
2005 South East England 4068.96 23027.12 5.65 
2005 South West England 2451.32 15058.08 6.14 
2005 Wales 1307.40 7649.97 5.85 
2005 Scotland 2420.68 20758.04 8.57 
2005 Northern Ireland 723.93 4187.47 5.78 
2008 North East England 1141.51 6592.34 5.77 
2008 North West England 3123.27 17040.58 5.45 
2008 Yorkshire and the Humber 2430.35 13400.06 5.51 
2008 East Midlands 2144.52 12758.52 5.94 
2008 West Midlands 2452.74 13627.22 5.55 
2008 East of England 2795.17 15405.77 5.51 
2008 Greater London 3719.64 21264.55 5.71 
2008 South East England 4185.15 22278.59 5.32 
2008 South West England 2537.39 13836.76 5.45 
2008 Wales 1326.26 7166.57 5.40 
2008 Scotland 2499.29 21689.41 8.67 
2008 Northern Ireland 757.52 3986.59 5.26 
 
 





CHAPTER 4  
 
HOW CAN CREATIVE WORKERS CONTRIBUTE TO 




This chapter focuses on hypotheses 4.1-4.3 which seek to investigate several 
hypothesised relationships among output growth, the creative class and ICT. This is 
carried out at the regional level in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the U.K., 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden and Finland. The reason is twofold; first, the 
selected regions from the above countries are representative of the regions in Europe, 
including many advanced and less developed economies (Florida, 2008). Second, the 
data for these countries is comparatively complete and precise in the accessible 
datasets. The regional classification is defined by Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics (NUTS) at level 218, which is a geocode standard for referencing the 
subdivisions of countries in the EU. The time series in this study varies, given the 
issue of missing data and inconsistency. For example, the time series in France, Italy 
or Spain cover 1995-2007 but the time span is shorter in the U.K. and Sweden i.e. 
1999-2007 and 1999-2006 respectively. Finally, the various datasets that were used in 
this study to generate variables at the regional level were the EU LFS19, the EU SES20, 
                                                          
18 In the U.K., data is only available at NUTS 1 level from the EU LFS.  
19 EU Labour Force Survey Database 
20 European Structure of Earnings Survey 




the EU KLEMS21 , the Cambridge Econometrics and Eurostat22. The details of data 
availability have been listed in Appendix 3.A.  
In brief, the findings based on a production model are partly consistent with 
the creative class thesis as the presence of the creative class significantly contributes 
to output growth in either growth accounting or regression exercises. This is a similar 
case for ICT capital services. In comparison, the non-creative population and non-ICT 
capital services are less likely to be influential forces when explaining the regional 
growth. The multi-dimensional measure for the contribution of the creative population 
is believed to be more comprehensive than Florida’s creativity index, which, from a 
different perspective, reveals an uneven creative performance in the main European 
regions. 
Econometric analysis also suggests that the overall impact of creative workers 
has a significantly positive role in the growth in regional output in the long term. In 
addition, the accumulation of ICT capital is a good channel to increase creative 
worker’s contribution to GVA growth. However, the larger coefficient size for both 
creative workers and ICTs indicates an underestimation of the effects for ICT capital 
accumulation and creative labour service flows as described by pre-assumed revenue 
shares based on the strict neo-classical assumptions.  
The results suggest that creative workers perform more efficiently in regions 
with a higher level of ICT capital services, but also the creative class exhibits different 
functions in comparison to human capital (i.e graduates). The empirical evidence 
                                                          
21 The EU KLEMS project ran from 2003 until 2008. It was funded by the European Commission, 
Research Directorate General as part of the 6th Framework Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support 
and Anticipating Scientific and Technological Needs". 
22 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide 
the European Union with statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and 
regions. 




further supports that these two theories should not contradict each other, as graduates 
who work in non-creative professions contribute less than those who work in creative 
jobs to the level change in either GVA or total factors productivity (TFP). 
 
4.2 Models  
 
This section illustrates the principle of the Growth Accounting method and the 
setup of the panel regressions. It is worth mentioning the difference between these 
two approaches: the growth accounting approach pre-assumes the factor shares and 
allows for different production function across regions over time, while in the 
econometric analysis it is assumed that common production characteristics in an 
aggregate regional production function in order to estimate inputs elasticity. However, 
as shown below, this difference in setup does not result in inconsistent conclusions. 
 
4.2.1 The Growth Accounting method: a regional level approach 
 
To assess the contribution of various inputs to aggregate economic growth, the 
growth accounting framework is applied. This methodology was first set out by Solow 
(1956), refined by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and then put in a more input-output 
framework by Jorgensen et al. (1987). It is based on production possibility frontiers 
where output growth is a function of capital, labour and intermediate inputs, and 
technology. This study further approximates an aggregate value added production 
function at the regional level, which provides real value added output Yi,t (GVA) as a 
function of capital (Ki,t), labour (Li,t) and technology(Ai,t) inputs for region i at time t. 




Yi,t = gi,t�Ki,t, Li,t, Ai,t�    (4.1) 
Under the assumptions of profit-maximising behaviour and competitive 
markets, such that input factors are paid their marginal product and constant returns to 
scale, there is information on how much capital, labour and technological changes 
each contribute to growth in GVA. Using the translog functional form, common in 
such analyses, the basic model can be defined as follows:  






Y  (4.2) 
In equation 4.2,  ∆lnYi,t  ,∆lnKi,t ,  lnLi,t, ∆lnA′i,t
Y  are the logarithmic growth 
rates of value added output 23, capital input24, labour input25 and value added TFP 
respectively in region i at time t, and the v�s are relative revenue shares in value added. 
In each region i, income shares of labour (vL,i,tY ) and capital ( vK,i,tY ) in equation 4.2 are 
the share of labour compensation over total value added output and the share of 
capital rentals over value added output respectively. In practice, continuous 
observations from datasets are difficult to obtain; therefore, an average of relative 
weights over period t and t-1 is taken. Then in equation 4.3,  v�L,i,tY  ,  v�K,i,tY   represents 
the average shares of labour services (Li) and capital services (Ki) for region i over 
period t and t-1.  
v�L,i,tY = 0.5 ∗ (v�L,i,tY + v�L,i,t−1Y ) 
v�K,i,tY = 0.5 ∗ �v�K,i,tY + v�K,i,t−1Y � (4.3) 
                                                          
23 Value added in 1995 prices. 
24 Aggregated capital service flows are derived as the growth of capital stocks by asset type, weighted 
by relative capital compensation share. Again 1995 is the basic year. 
25 Labour service flows are measured by the growth of total hours worked for different types of labour 
services. The division by type depends on the setup of the research as will be explained later.  




Under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and full factor utilisation, 
the value of outputs is equal to the value produced by all inputs. 
To account for the differences in marginal productivity by educational 
attainments, aggregate labour input Lit is defined as the Tornqvist volume index26 of 




= w�H,i,tL ∆lnHH,i,t + w�M,i,tL ∆lnHM,i,t + w�L,i,tL ∆lnHL,i,t(4.4) 
Equation 4.4 illustrates that the growth of total hours worked is decomposed into three 
levels by educational attainment. Therefore  ∆lnHH,i,t, ∆lnHM,i,t and ∆lnHL,i,t represent 
the logarithmic growth rates of labour services for high-skilled (H), medium-skilled 
(M) and low-skilled (L) workers respectively and are weighted by their relative wage 
bill shares (w�H,i,tL , w�M,i,tL , w�L,i,tL  ), averaged over periods t and t-1. It is assumed that 
wages are equal to marginal products, so this process ensures that labour inputs with a 
higher price also have a larger influence in the input index. In respect, subtracting 
composition adjusted labour (ΔlnLi,t = ∑ w�j,i,tLj ∆lnHj,i,t  ) by growth of total hours 
worked (∆lnHi,t )will produce labour composition (∆lnLCi,t), which is a reflection of 




∆lnHj,i,t = ∆lnLCi,t + ∆lnHi,t (4.5) 
                                                          
26 Aggregate input is unobservable and it is commonly expressed as a translog function of its 
individual components. Then the corresponding index is the Tornqvist volume index. The method 
from Timmer et al., (2010) is followed, using this index to measure all aggregation of quantities in the 
models. This approach is a discrete time approximation, which uses annual moving weights based on 
averages of adjacent points in time.    




∆lnYi,t = v�K,i,tY ∆lnKi,t +
���������
Capital Input




In addition to educational attainment, another dimension of labour type is 
defined to incorporate creative workers, such that 
∆lnLi,t = w�CR,i,tL ∆lnCRi,t + w�NCR,i,tL ∆lnNCRi,t (4.7) 
with w�CR,i,tL  and w�NCR,i,tL , the period-average compensation shares of creative/non-
creative labour in total labour compensation.  
Next, the labour division by educational attainments is mapped onto the labour 
division by occupation. Here the calculations of composition adjusted labour input 
and labour composition are the same as equation 4.4. However, this should be carried 
out for both the creative and the non-creative labour services shown in equation 4.8 
below. bj,i,tCR  , bj,i,tNCR and ej,i,tCR , ej,i,tNCR are average annual incomes and number of workers 
respectively for both the creative workers (CR) and non-creative workers (NCR) by 
educational level j in region i. Therefore, the average wage bill shares of the creative 
(w�j,i,tCR) and the non-creative workers ( w�j,i,tNCR) are based on their periodic values (wj,i,tCR , 
 wj,i,tNCR)over period t and t-1.wj,i,tCR  or  wj,i,tNCR  is the ratio of labour compensation at 
educational level j for either the creative workers or the non-creative workers over 
total labour compensation of the creative workers or the non-creative workers by all 
educational levels  (see equation 4.9). 
∆lnLCi,tCR + ∆lnHi,tCR  = �w�j,i,tCR
j
∆lnHj,i,tCR     
∆lnLCi,tNCR + ∆lnHi,tNCR = �w�j,i,tNCR
j
∆lnHj,i,tNCR  (4.8) 





















   , w�j,i,tNCR=0.5*(w�j,i,tNCR + w�j,i,t−1NCR )     (4.9) 
Similarly, to analyse the individual effects of ICT and non-ICT capital, asset 
types are allocated into two groups based on the Tornqvist index: ICT and non-ICT 
assets, such that 
∆lnKi,t = w�ICT,i,tK ∆lnICTi,t + w�NICT,i,tK ∆lnNICTi,t (4.10) 
with w�ICT,i,tK  and w�NICT,i,tK , the period-average compensation shares of ICT/non-ICT 
assets in total capital cost27. Finally, respective value shares for each input in total 
value added output can be computed as  v�ICT,i,tY = v�K,i,tY ∗ w�ICT,i,tK  , v�NICT,i,tY = v�K,i,tY ∗
w�NICT,i,tK  ,  v�CR,i,tY = v�L,i,tY ∗ w�CR,i,tL  and  v�NCR,i,tY = v�L,i,tY ∗ w�NCR,i,tL . Based on this setup, 
total GVA growth by regions at time t in equation 4.2 can be further decomposed into 
growths of ICT, non-ICT capital services (∆lnICTi,t ,∆lnNICTi,t) as well as growths of 
adjusted creative /non-creative labour services ( ∆lnLCi,tCR + ∆lnHi,tCR,∆lnLCi,tNCR +
∆lnHi,tNCR)  and the contribution of value added TFP (∆lnA′i,t
Y ), weighted by their 
relative revenue shares (v�ICT,i,tY ,v�NICT,i,tY , v�CR,i,tY  and  v�NCR,i,tY ).  
Using the above formulas, a full decomposition of growth in value added 
output into five elements was developed as follows: 
                                                          
27 Following the standard from the OECD manual (OECD, 2001), capital compensation is defined as the 
user cost. Therefore, for a particular type of asset, its rental fee is  𝑝𝑘,𝑡𝐾 = 𝑝𝑘,𝑡−1𝐼 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘𝑝𝑘,𝑡𝐼 − (𝑝𝑘,𝑡𝐼 −
𝑃𝑘,𝑡−1𝐼 ) with 𝑖𝑡 representing the nominal return, 𝛿𝑡 the depreciation rate of asset type and investment 
price of asset type k. This rental price 𝑝𝑘,𝑡𝐾  reflects the price at the equilibrium point where the 
investor is indifferent between buying and renting capital good for a one-year lease in the rental 
market. 











+ v�CR,i,tY (∆lnLCi,tCR + ∆lnHi,tCR)����������������
Creative Labour Input
+ v�NCR,i,tY (∆lnLCi,tNCR + ∆lnHi,tNCR������������������
Non−Creative Labour Input
) + ∆lnA′i,t
Y   (4.11) 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning the following points for the Growth 
Accounting method regarding this study. Firstly, the contribution of capital by flows 
rather than stocks is measured (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Jorgenson and Griliches, 
1967). This is because either gross or net capital stock is an inconsistent dimension in 
measuring changes of growth value added flows in a model that includes labour 
service flows. Also the measure of capital stock cannot reflect the productive 
efficiency of capital assets as the gross capital stock values all assets as new, implying 
that they are all productive at the same level (OECD, 2001).  
Secondly, the neo-classic economic assumptions are somewhat controversial. 
Particularly under the assumption of full utilisation, this thesis assumes an aggregate 
behaviour for representative competitive firms and does not attempt to account for the 
variation in the rate of capital/labour utilisation across different firms. However, this 
is not always a precise representation of reality; a model-based approach can still 
provide a consistent theoretical framework, which facilities the exploration of 
complex economic and social issues. 
Finally, the application of the Growth Accounting method in relation to the 
regional level derives new practical problems. Therefore, the estimation of labour 
service flows and capital service flows at the regional level requires further techniques 
and assumptions as has been explained in Chapter 3. 
 




4.2.2 Econometric model 
 
Two regression models are used when explaining the changes of both output 
and TFP levels. The first model is derived from the classical Douglas-Cobb 
production function and the second one is empirically based.  
 
Model 1: the impact of the creative class and ICT on output level change 
Before discussing model specification, to formulate a European regional 
production function requires a further assumption in addition to standard neo-classical 
economic assumptions. Referring to McCann’s example (2013, p.247-248), let’s 
assume that there are two regions in an economy A and B: the marginal product of 
capital in region A is lower than the marginal product of capital in region B, 
meanwhile the marginal product of labour in region A is higher than the marginal 
product of labour in region B. Under the assumption of a competitive market, 
production factors are paid according to their productivities and marginal profit of 
capital in region A is lower than region B and wages in region A are higher than 
region B.  
If these production factors are allowed to flow, the difference in capital-labour 
ratio between these two regions encourages labour migration from region B to A. 
Furthermore, capital will also be transferred from region A to B and this interregional 
factor reallocation will not stop until there is no difference in regional capital-labour 
ratios. Ultimately, the capital-labour ratios in both regions will be the same in the long 
term.  




The example above demonstrated the one sector neo-classical model. This is 
crucial in this thesis to the theoretical framework used for the analysis based on the 
aggregate regional production function, as it implies that all regions will converge 
towards to the same production function with the same capital-labour ratio in the long 
term. In other words, if a production function can be modelled in one region, then it is 
possible to model the production function for all regions in a similar economic system.   
When examining European regions, the separate national economies have 
been progressively integrated over the past half-century. This integration has involved 
the reduction of cross-border tariffs and the removal of restrictions for factor 
migration. Such a process was accelerated with unprecedented speed when the 
common EU passport system was introduced in the 1990s, which allows labour 
migration to freely flow across all EU nations for the purpose of employment. 
Therefore, this institutional arrangement should allow the one-sector reallocations of 
factors across the EU, as well as some potential capital creation effects (MaCann, 
2013, p.251). 
Based on the assumption of the one sector interregional factor allocation, all 
regions can be put together to estimate an aggregate production function at the 
regional level. To estimate the relative long-run coefficients, variations of each input 
across regions but not across times are focused on. This is because of the high 
variability of factors choices across time in different regions, reflecting forces that are 
most probably not linked to technology28 (Ascari and Cosmo, 2005; Marrocu et al., 
2010). Instead, technology should not be too volatile during the short time frame of 
                                                          
28 Strictly following the setup of the production function theory, an isoquant can be estimated by 
either observing the cross-sectional variation of capital-labour ratio for different economic agents at a 
time point or by the relative positions of these economic agents within the following time periods. 
The move of an isoquant solely indicates technological progress/regress. 




this study. For example, the longest time period is only 12 years in France, Spain, 
Belgium and Italy. It is also important to note that Germany only has five years of 
recorded observations.  
There have been several well-known techniques that are used to estimate 
coefficients in the long-run production function such as the dynamic GMM model, or 
the Panel dynamic OLS model (PDOLS). However, they may be deemed as 
inappropriate in this case as the dataset is based on an unbalanced panel structure over 
the limited time period. Instead, it is more appropriate to use a simple LSDV model 
(i.e. the country FE model). Therefore, the average coefficients for a long-run 
European regional production function based on a pooled set of 143 regions 
(observations) over the whole time period are estimated.  
Model 1 is specified as the tradtional log-linearised production funtion to 
separate impacts of the creative/non-creative labour services, ICT/non-ICT capital 
services and the interactive effect of creative workers and ICT on the level of GVA 
for the period 1995-2007 for the pooled dataset of 143 European regions, such that 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1(𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝜏𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  (4.12)                                                                                                                    
 
where  Yi,t is used as the deflated value of GVA based on the year 199529. CRi,t  , 
NCRi,t  ICTi,t and NICTi,t are the number of hours worked by the creative/non-creative 
workers and the values of ICT/non-ICT capital services (at the 1995 price level) 
respectively for i region (i=143) in the period t.  
                                                          
29 The GVA deflators are collected from Eurostat and the basic data of GVA is collected from the 
Cambridge Econometrics. 




A TSLS (Two Stage Least Square) model is used to estimate this regional 
production function with common production chracteristics. For possible endogeneity 
concerning input factors in the growth process, the instrumental variables are 
represented by one-period lagged ICT and non-ICT capital regressors and creative 
labour regressor and the interactive term (for testing endogeneity, see section 4.3.3). 
Dummy variables concerning time (𝛿𝑡) and country (𝜏𝑗) are included to account for 
common macroeconomic shocks for all regions and country-specific effects in any 
period t30. The interactive effect between creative labour services and ICT capital 
services is measured by the interactive term CRi,t ∗ ICTi,t. For an alternative measure, 
the relative hours worked by creative graduates (GCRi,t) replace variables CRi,t  in 
equation 4.12 in order to evaluate the impacts of creative sub-categories. 
In conclusion, the econometric model from a different perspetive evaluates the 
impact of both the creative class and ICT capital services on output level change in 
the long run. In comparison with the Growth Accounting method, this thesis estimates 
the elasticities of labour and capital inputs rather than just pre-assuming them. 
However, such an aggregate estimation of elasiticities masks a large amount of 
heterogeneity in traditional input production effectiveness across sectors, which could 
be related to the existence of spillover effects.  
 
Model 2: the impact of the creative class, human capital and ICT on TFP level 
change 
An empirical model was derived to account for the influence of skills on the 
level of TFP at the regional level. The level of TFP is calculated by indexing the 
                                                          
30 The nature of the creative class thesis determines that controlling for sectoral heterogeneity is 
inappropriate when using region as a unit of analysis. In that case, both the research objective and the 
analytical angle in the regression will be completely changed.  




contribution of TFP to GVA growth from the growth accounting calculation in section 
4.2.1. As the TFP level is derived as a residual,  variables of the labour service inputs 
from model 1 are replaced by relative shares31 over total employment, also capital 
variables are transformed in per worker term, such that 
 
 𝐼𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑤𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝑆𝑤𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑖𝐼𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (4.13)         
                                                                                                                      
In equation 4.13, variables of skilled workers are expressed as per worker term 
and are log-transformed. Skilled workers are measured in terms of graduate creative, 
non-graduate creative and graduate non-creative workers, which allows the impacts of 
the creative class and human capital to be intergated. Due to the different nature 
concerning model 2, other important factors that could impact TFP change are also 
taken into consideration. As the fixed effects model elimiates the issue of 
unobservable endogeneity (i.e. 𝜏𝑖), the exlusion of time-invariant variables such as 
typology or specfic institutional effects will not bias the results.  
The first control variable is high-tech physical capital, which represents a 
significant aspect of technology that is essential to enhance productivity in local 
economic systems. Such a positive impact has been well-documented as mentioned in 
the literature review. This study used the density of ICT capital services as an 
indicator. 
The second variable is R&D expenditure. In accordance with the traditional 
knowledge capital model that asserts the importance of intangible capital, such as the 
                                                          
31 For the sake of consistency, the impact of the creative class, graduates and their non-overlapping 
sub-categories are still tested. 




number of patents (Griliches, 1979), R&D expenditure is claimed to play an important 
role in explaining productivity difference between industries and firms (Doraszelski 
and Jaumandreu, 2013) or at the regional level (Albert and Maudos, 2006). The R&D 
expenditure by region over the years was collected from Eurostat and was then 
expressed in per worker term. 
The third variable is diversity, as in one of the Ts that Florida originally 
advocated (Florida, 2002). Unlike previous studies, this thesis used the share of 
migrant workers over total employment rather than the share of the foreign-born 
population over total population, as it may be a better indicator that reflects how open 
a region is to absorb and integrate people of different cultures into the regional labour 
market.  
Another important factor in the local economic system is the structure of 
inhabited settlements; this allows the capture of the role of agglomeration economy. 
This study also includes regional population density for controlling the “catch-all” 
effects such as land prices or wage levels. 
Finally, the relationship between ICT and the creative class or graduates is 
measured by the interactive term between the share of skilled workers and relative 
ICT capital density. This is designed to measure if skilled workers could enhance their 
contribution to productivity through the application of ICT or vice versa.  
 
4.3 Results and analysis  
 
This section first describes the average growth rates from the creative class 
and the distribution of ICT capital services in the eleven European countries. Then, 




analysis of the results is carried out separately based on the Growth Accounting 
method and panel econometric model. 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
In this study, the level of ICT capital and creative labour services are two very 
important indicators to reflect the development level in a European economy. An 
initial descriptive analysis thus allows us to understand how these possible sources of 
growth performed in the past decade and how relative performance varied across 
regions and countries. Here, the performance of the creative class was presented by 
average growth rate based on the available time series for targeted countries. ICT 
capital services were measured by value of ICT capital services per worker by regions 
in each country. 
 
Growth rate of creative workers 
According to Florida’s classification of workforce, the total workforce can be 
separated into three categories: the creative class, the service class and the working 
class 32 . The employment growth rates for these working groups were taken on 
average based on the available time series from the EU LFS. 
Table 4.1 shows that the performance of the various classes is different. The 
growth rate of the creative class is higher in the majority of the countries compared to 
the service class, the working class and the total employment. In Spain, Austria, 
                                                          
32 The working class that Florida mentioned is production workers. Agriculture workers were not 
included in this study due to the fact that the relative share of total employment is very small in a 
country. 




Belgium and France, the average growth rates are 5.57, 3.44, 3.00 and 2.95 percent 
respectively. Other countries such as the U.K., Sweden, the Czech Republic and 
Germany cannot be consistently compared as only the shorter time periods are 
available, but significant growth of the creative class was still observed. In the 
meantime, the growth of the service class across most of the countries is lower than 
the creative class. A positive growth rate in the working class was captured in hardly 
any of the countries with the exception of Spain. However, Italy and Spain are 
exceptional cases. The growth of the creative class in Italy was lower than the service 
class in the given period as the economic system in Italy may have been reliant on 
contributions from service-intensive industries such as tourism. In Spain, growth rates 
of all classes are significant and positive. This may be due to the strong catch-up 
effect.  
The creative class was inevitably influenced by the economic recession 
beginning in 2007, with a downward-sloping trend in growth rate in most of the 
countries33. However, it was impacted less; its growth rate slowed down but was still 
positive. It is interesting to see that in developed European countries such as Austria, 
the U.K., France or Germany, both the creative class and the service class were 
heavily impacted and the service class had even slower growth, while in the less 
developed countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy, the service class 
exhibited a complementary role to the total employment growth. Italy is again the 
extreme case, showing a -3.27 growth in the creative class and 3.70 growth in the 
service class. Such a complementary effect was not quite so helpful in reversing the 
negative growth of total employment in the recession period. It may only be a simple 
reflection of the fact that workers were more likely to move to jobs with low entry 
                                                          
33 The measure of employment growth in this study is different from the calculation of unemployment 
rates based on national accounts.    




requirements in these countries. 
Furthermore, a comparison was made across the targeted countries in terms of 
the average values of ICT/NICT capital services and the average hours worked by 
creative/non-creative workers. All the average values were calculated based on the 
available time period, as the time series is not consistent for different countries in the 
EU LFS database. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the average value of ICT capital 
services and the average total hours worked by creative workers are less than those of 
NICT capital services and non-creative workers in all of the target countries. It is 
realistic to see that the larger main European economies such as Germany, the U.K., 
France, Italy and Spain, have much higher absolute values of capital services and total 
hours worked compared to the other smaller countries; however, the value gap 
between ICT and non-ICT capital services is quite different. Particularly in the U.K. 
and Finland, this difference is small, while it is large in Italy, France and Spain. For 
the total hours worked by creative/non-creative workers, the U.K. again has the 
smallest gap between these two working groups, followed by Finland and Belgium. 
In summary, the creative class was associated with a higher average growth 
rate compared to the other classes in most of the targeted countries. It indicates a very 
positive development trajectory for the creative class in the past decade. It was also 
observed that the economic structure is quite different across countries, as the gap 
between different types of labour and capital service inputs vary significantly. This 
finding potentially suggests a future direction beyond this study and is consistent with 
the existing literature: the great potential of the creative class but also a possible 
heterogeneity across the European countries (Maroccu and Paci, 2012). 
 
 




The density of ICT capital services in European regions 
For the first time, this study estimated the level of ICT/non-ICT capital 
services at the regional level in the main European regions. Thus this section will 
demonstrate the growth tendency of ICT capital services in the past decade and how it 
is distributed across regions. This descripive analysis will confirm the importance of 
ICT capital services and explain why ICT capital input is an interesting aspect to this 
study.  
The average growth rates of ICT capital and non-ICT capital services were 
taken from the avaliable periods and then ranked accordingly in descending order. 
The ranking list is not exhaustive because there is insufficient space for a detailed 
description. In this study, the economic recession period is not included becauce the 
EU KLEMS stopped providing the figures for ICT/non-ICT capital services per hour 
after 2007. Hence the average growth rate of ICT and non-ICT capital services is 
defined to represent ICT and non-ICT capital service accumulation in the normal 
period ,excluding the recession period from 2008. 
Appendix 4.A evidently shows that the growth of ICT capital services was 
rapid at a double-digit rate, in comparison with non-ICT capital services in most of 
the regions. The highest growth rates of the ICT capital services are mainly captured 
in Belgium and Austria. For example, Prov. Brabant Wallon (21.05 percent), Prov. 
Vlaams-Brabant (18.08 percent), Prov. Limburg (BE) (17.36 percent), Prov. Namur 
(17.28 percent) and Prov. Luxembourg (BE) (18.00 percent) are the top five on the list. 
While most of the regions in Spain and Italy have slower growth, the growth rate is 
still kept above 10 percentage points (e.g. 10.57 percent in Lombardia or 14.10 
percent in Comunidad de Madrid). A similar conclusion can be also obtained in the 
selected eastern European countries. Most of the Czech and Hungarian regions also 




have high growth rates. (e.g. Eszak-Magyarorszag (16.76 percent) or Praha (14.14 
percent)). In comparison, regional growth of non-ICT capital services is much lower 
than ICT capital sevices, since in most of the regions non-ICT capital service growth 
is also significantly positive. 
Such a rapid growth of ICT capital services cannot be observed in the U.K., 
Germany and Sweden, which in contrast experienced comparatively lower growth 
levels. In many of the German, British and Swedish regions, the growth rate of the 
ICT capita was less than 10 percentage points, such as Stuttgart (7.73 percent) and 
Kassel (6.92 percent) in Germany, London (9.40 percent) in the U.K. and Stockholm 
(6.04 percent), Sydsverige (6.10 percent) or Västsverige (7.53 percent) in Sweden. 
If the above results are put into practice, a well-defined cluster of the historical 
high-performing regions can be portrayed. The comparatively lower ICT capital 
services growth rate in Sweden and Finland could demostrate that the level of ICT 
usage had already begun at a high starting point within the innovation and technology 
cluster. This knowledge-intensive based cluster can be further witnessed within most 
of the German regions, many of the French regions, in addition to most of the U.K. 
regions and some of Spanish regions. Particularly, Austria and Belgium are the high 
ICT-usage countries, where the average growth rate of ICT capital services is above 
15 percentage points across all regions. Furthermore, the less developed economies 
such as the Cezch Republic and Hungary also experience a high growth rate but this is 
probably explained by the catch-up effect.  
However, growth rate is only an indicator to reflect regional performance of 
ICT capital accumulation levels. The value of ICT capital services per worker for 
each region is now discussed and summarised to reflect the distribution pattern of ICT 
usage. Regional ICT capital services per worker is equal to the value of ICT capital  








Total employment Creative class Service class Working class 
Overall Recession Overall Recession Overall Recession Overall Recession 
Austria 0.78 0.80 3.44 1.94 1.31 1.40 -2.23 -2.35 
Belgium 1.43 1.02 3.00 2.47 1.01 0.76 -0.47 -0.57 
Czech R. -0.31 -0.85 1.58 0.41 -1.19 0.82 -0.93 -2.99 
Germany 0.78 0.90 1.53 1.34 1.13 0.24 -0.57 -0.04 
Spain 3.41 -2.91 5.57 0.02 3.32 -1.90 1.47 -8.74 
Finland 1.29 -0.89 1.96 0.16 1.47 -1.02 0.35 -2.57 
France 1.24 0.07 2.95 1.80 0.99 0.22 -0.55 -3.21 
Hungary 0.92 -1.19 1.57 0.02 1.49 0.74 -0.10 -3.90 
Italy 1.27 -0.10 1.49 -3.27 1.99 3.70 -0.03 -1.68 
Sweden 1.08 -0.08 2.54 2.14 0.45 -2.10 -0.41 -1.71 
The U.K. 0.69 -0.44 1.57 0.36 0.96 -0.10 -2.17 -4.44 
Notes:  
1.Time period for Germany is 2002-2010, time period for the Czech Republic is 1998-2010, time period for Finland, Hungary and Sweden is 1997-2010, due to lack 
of data from the EU LFS.  
2. Time period of economic recession is 2008-2010. All figures are expressed in percentage point/ points. 
Source: The European Labour Force Survey. 




Figure 4.1: The average values of ICT/NICT capital services and the average total hours worked by creative/non-creative workers  
  
Notes:  
1. The average values were calculated based on the available time period in different countries. The calculation of ICT/non-ICT capital services takes 1995 as the reference 
year.  
2. The unit of capital services: million euros. The unit of labour services: million hours. 


























services divided by the number of relative regional workers by region, and the year 
2007 is taken as the reference year. Appendix 3.B shows the existence of a 
Scandinavian innovation and technology cluster of ICT capital-intensive regions 
located in Sweden34 and Finland represented by Stockholm (5863.26) in Sweden and  
Etelä-Suomi (5742.04) and Åland (5769.97) in Finland . 
Furthermore, most of the regions in the traditional developed European 
metropolitan regions also have very high rankings, led by Rég. Bruxelles (14176.6) in 
Belgium and Wien (8991.82) in Austria, followed by Hamburg (7931.94) and Bremen 
(7393.39) in Germany and South East (U.K.) (5904.74) or Greater London (5752.34) 
in the U.K. In comparison, most of the regions in Spain, France and Italy have lower 
ICT capital services per worker values. Comunidad de Madrid, Île de France and 
Lombardia, the most populated and representative regions in Spain, France and Italy, 
only have per worker values of 4522.94, 3731.12 and 3548.90 respectively. Finally, it 
is not surprising to see that ICT capital services per worker is very low (below 2500 
euros per worker) in most of the regions in Hungary and the Czech Republic, despite 
relative growth rates being high in the past. This result is reflective of the fact that the 
gap in ICT capital services diffusion is still significant compared to western Europe, 
since there has been good progress in promoting knowledge and an ICT capital 
intensive economy in eastern European regions. 
In conclusion, the findings reveal that the demand in ICT capital services is 
growing much faster than non-ICT. This trend appears to be true in most of the 
regions in this study. It potentially portrays quite an overlapped cluster of the 
knowledge and innovation intensive economies, mainly located in the Nordic counties, 
in many regions of the U.K., Austria, Belgium and Germany, some of the regions in  
                                                          
34 The 2007 NUTS code in Sweden is taken as the standard. 















       




France, Italy and Spain but rarely in the eastern European counties (see Figure 4.2). 
Such a phenomenon naturally raises the question: does the rapid increase in demand 
of ICT capital services cause economic growth? For the first time, this thesis proposes 
this question with a regional scope. In association with the outstanding performance 
from the creative class, it is interesting to see how they could seperately contribute to 
economic growth and how they could be related each other. 
 
4.3.2 Growth accounting analysis 
 
The economic system in the European regions 
Appendix 4.C illustrates the contributions from both labour and capital inputs 
as well as TFP across regions in the ten countries. This is a clear way of examining 
how the creative labour service flows, ICT capital service flows as well as other input 
flows contribute to the total value added output flows. The length of the different 
coloured bars represent the level of contribution in a region from the creative (dark 
blue)/non-creative (red) labour services, ICT (green)/non-ICT capital services (orange) 
and TFP (light green).  
The details of the growth accounting decomposition are listed in Appendix 
4.D. A region in France is used as an example to demonstrate how to interpret the 
results. In the region of Île de France, the largest and most populated region in France, 
the average growth rate of the growth value added is 2.30 percentage points in the 
period 1995-2007. Creative labour service flows are responsible for 0.80 percentage 
points and the non-creative class only has a negative contribution -0.20. The factor 
share of ICT capital services is small, but ICT capital service flows are responsible for 




0.30 percentage points of the total output growth rate compared to 0.40 from non-ICT 
capital service flows. The undistributed percentage points are the contribution of the 
value added TFP. In this case, the large and positive figure of the TFP indicates that 
this region received significant benefit from technological progress and technological 
efficiency improvement, as the contribution of TFP is 1.01 percentage points35. In 
addition, the contributions of the creative/non-creative labour services and ICT/non-
ICT capital services were computed and analysed for the rest of the 142 regions. 
Referring to the technique that estimated the income share over total output for 
ICT capital services, shares of ICT capital services only change slightly across regions 
and over time in a country. If the neo-classical economic assumptions are followed, 
the pre-assumed value share for ICT capital is much smaller compared to non-ICT 
capital and other labour input categories. When comparing the results across regions 
in different countries, the mean values of the value share of ICT capital services and 
the percentage that it contributes to GVA growth across regions and over time for 
each country were calculated36. Similarly, this calculation was also performed on the 
rest of the input factors and the findings were summarised as follows. 
ICT capital services  
At the regional level, Table 4.2 indicates that the highest average shares of 
ICT capital are seen, not surprisingly, in the intensive ICT-using economies such as 
Germany (0.067), the U.K. (0.052) or Finland (0.070) while it is considerably lower in 
Spain (0.024), Italy (0.027) and France (0.032). However, with the various high 
                                                          
35 The sum of the averaged contribution points for each input could not precisely equal to the 
averaged output growth rate. 
36 This method may be deemed appropriate as it is difficult to summarise common characteristics 
regarding the nature of economic systems when every region is taken as the unit of measurement. 
For example, for a group of regions where the contribution of ICT is high, the contribution of NICT 
could be either low or high, which is also the situation for CR and NCR. 




growth rates, the contribution of ICT capital service flows on regional economic 
growth varies. Within the German regions, the growth of ICT capital services on 
average accounts was 36.45 percent of the total GVA growth, followed by Belgium 
(24.18 percent), Italy (19.50 percent) and the U.K. (18.96 percent). For Sweden, the 
Czech Republic and Spain, relative percentages are low, indicating the figures of 
10.52 percent, 13.27 percent and 9.49 percent respectively. 
Creative labour services  
The contribution of the creative class appears to be significant but quite 
heterogeneous in many of the European regions. On average, its positive role is 
especially obvious in the U.K. (30.96 percent), Belgium (34.92 percent), Italy (51.77 
percent) and France (47.49 percent) where such a contribution from the creative 
labour services is higher than the non-creative labour services in the majority of 
regions. The exception, Spain, shows that both the creative labour (44.08 percent) and 
non-creative labour services (59.52 percent) explain a larger share of GVA growth 
than capital accumulation. However this is not the case in the Nordic countries. 
Results in Sweden and Finland indicate a different economic system in Scandinavia as 
technological progress and efficiency appear to be the main sources of regional GVA 
growth. In comparison, the significant contribution of the creative class can be 
captured in some regions, but such an effort from the particular labour type to output 
growth is small, only showing the figures of 10.36 percent and 9.12 percent 
respectively. 
In the less developed European economies, the impact of the creative class is 
also limited. In Hungary, the average contribution of the creative class (17.56 percent) 
is not very different from the contribution of the non-creative class (17.01 percent). 




All regions in the Czech Republic, illustrate that the catch-up technological progress 
is the driving force of regional economic growth in recent years; therefore, the 
contribution from labour services is smaller. The contribution of creative labour 
services only explains 6.84 percent of total GVA growth and for non-creative labour 
services, the value is even negative (-15.40 percent).  
Non-creative labour and non-ICT capital services 
Despite the significant contributions from ICT capital and creative labour 
services, the influence of the traditional inputs i.e. non-ICT capital and non-creative 
labour services is still fundamental in many of the countries. Particularly, the non-ICT 
capital accumulation explains a large share of GVA growth in Germany (50.42 
percent), Italy (42.50 percent), Spain (30.05 percent) and the Czech Republic (30.55 
percent). While in the U.K. and Finland, the share is relatively small, only accounting 
for 8.47 percent and 1.77 percent of GVA growth on average. It is difficult to state 
that high share of growth from non-ICT capital services is a sign of a traditional 
manufacturing based economy and vice versa. However, these findings at least reveal 
that there are great differences in regional economic structure across countries; labour 
contributions are important in some countries and it is capital accumulation or 
technological progress in all the others. The estimation of non-ICT capital’s 
contribution is generally consistent with existing literature at the national level. For 
example, it is on average 0 percent in Finland, 33 percent in Spain, 60 percent in Italy 
and 14 percent in the U.K. in the period 1995-2004 (Timmer et al., 2003). 
Observing the impact of non-creative labour services, it is only significant in 
the countries which heavily rely on labour contribution. Not surprisingly, the growth 
of non-creative labour services explains the biggest share of GVA growth in Spain 




(59.52 percent), followed by Italy (20.35 percent), the U.K. (20.12 percent) and 
Hungary (17.01 percent). Within countries with a higher contribution from capital 
accumulation, it does not contribute as much to output growth such as the Czech 
Republic (-15.40 percent), Germany (-4.94 percent), Sweden (-8.41 percent) and 
Finland (0.08 percent). In comparison, its contribution is much lower than the 
contribution from creative labour services with the exception of Spain, where the 
difference in the contribution from both creative and non-creative labour services is 
not significant.  
Total factors productivity (TFP) 
The decomposition of GVA growth in this thesis demonstrates a universal 
TFP improvement. Such an effect on output growth is very strong in the Nordic 
context, such as in Finland (72.06 percent) and Sweden (65.16 percent). In less 
developed economies, the very significant technological catch-up effect is also 
observed. Particularly in the Czech Republic, the growth of TFP explains 65.16 
percent of GVA growth. For western European economies, the figure is 21.50 percent 
in the U.K. and 15.97 percent in Belgium. However, it might seem improbable, as 
under strict neo-classical assumptions, the negative contributions in Spain (-43.13 
percent), Italy (-34.11 percent) and France (-4.04 percent) indicate technological 
regress. 
In fact, measured TFP growth, as a residual measure, includes a range of other 
effects at regional level. Firstly, in addition to technological innovation, it also 
includes the effects of organisational change. Successful reorganisation within firms 
or industries will lead to higher TFP growth. However, in the short term, TFP might 
decrease as resources are diverted to the reorganisation process (Hulten, 2010). 




Secondly, the TFP measure calculation is based on deviations from the neo-classical 
assumption that marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that either ICT investments or the influx of creative labour in a region have 
been driven more by herd behaviour than by economic fundamentals (O’Mahony and 
Vecchi, 2005). Therefore, seeking creative competitiveness, as Florida advocated, or 
in the run up to the dotcom bubble, the marginal costs of creative labour and ICTs 
may be higher than their marginal revenues. In other words, the effects of ICT 
investments and creative labour services are overestimated while the impact of TFP is 
underestimated. Thirdly, TFP measures at the regional level “not only account for the 
impact of TFP but also include the average effects of market share reallocation 
across firms in different industries” (Timmer et al., 2010, p.88). As the estimation of 
ICT capital services and creative labour services is the sum of relative values from 
each industry within each region, TFP growth for a particular industry in a region may 
be high through a shake-out of least productive firms, while some other regions may 
have a low TFP growth due to this reallocation mechanism. Therefore, on average, the 
total TFP growth at the regional level shows a different perspective to existing 
literature at the industry or firm level.  
Based on the above discussion, the TFP estimation in this study can be defined 
as a combination of technological progress and efficiency changes. As described in 
the case of Spain and Italy, technological innovation should positively contribute to 
economic growth, reducing but not eliminating the very strong negative effect of 
technological inefficiency on TFP growth. In other words, regional economies in 
these countries possibly experienced technological efficiency regress, suggesting that 
technological efficiency trade-off with rapid economic growth. Accordingly, the 
lower TFP contribution to GVA growth in Germany and France than had been found 




in previous studies at the national level may also confirm this perspective, as the 
regional level analysis accounts for the considerable effects of organisational changes 
on average. 
In conclusion, based on the strict neo-classical economic assumptions, the 
Growth Accounting method portrays a complex picture concerning the impact of the 
creative class and ICT as their effects are generally significant, but the level of 
contribution depends on the nature of the regional economic structure. Firstly, the 
effect of ICT capital accumulation on GVA growth is greatly consistent with the 
existing literature. Secondly, in regions where capital or technological innovation and 
efficiency account for a large share of GVA growth, the relative contribution of 
creative labour services is not readily obvious as described, while it does explain a 
large share of growth elsewhere, where the labour contribution most matters. 
Therefore, it is difficult to discuss the quality of the creative economy at this stage, 
but the relative effects from creative labour services are evident in most of the regions. 
 





Table 4.2: The average income shares of each input and the relative contributions to GVA in % at the regional level 
Country 
ICT capital Creative labour Non-ICT capital Non-creative labour TFP 
Value share % to GVA growth Value share 
% to GVA 
growth Value share 
% to GVA 
growth Value share 
% to GVA 
growth 
% to GVA 
growth 
Belgium 0.038 24.176% 0.375 34.917% 0.368 26.217% 0.219 -1.276% 15.966% 
Czech R. 0.042 13.274% 0.329 6.836% 0.322 30.547% 0.354 -15.402% 64.745% 
Germany 0.067 36.446% 0.239 16.002% 0.346 50.421% 0.349 -4.939% 2.071% 
Finland 0.070 16.985% 0.378 9.118% 0.175 1.765% 0.427 0.077% 72.055% 
France 0.032 14.106% 0.295 47.491% 0.214 29.214% 0.460 13.226% -4.037% 
Spain 0.024 9.485% 0.244 44.080% 0.203 30.048% 0.530 59.518% -43.130% 
Italy 0.027 19.498% 0.288 51.765% 0.227 42.495% 0.458 20.346% -34.106% 
The U.K. 0.052 18.956% 0.450 30.957% 0.140 8.468% 0.358 20.124% 21.495% 
Hungary 0.041 19.115% 0.280 17.560% 0.315 20.852% 0.364 17.005% 25.469% 
Sweden 0.046 10.520% 0.372 10.361% 0.167 22.368% 0.414 -8.413% 65.164% 




Preliminary statistical analysis 
Thus far, the contributions from the creative labour and ICT capital services 
appear significant in many European regions. However, such analysis only describes 
the static performance of each input. It may be clear how much creative labour and 
ICT capital services contributed to different levels of output growth by region but the 
relative causality remains less so. The econometric analysis concerning how these 
inputs are causal in relation to output change will be outlined in section 3.4.3. This 
section focuses on a research question regarding what happens if a region with high 
growth from the creative class/ICT capital services associates with high growth in 
value added output. 
A simple pairwise correlation test was applied, as the estimation of input 
elasticity was no longer the purpose of the statistical analysis but rather what 
relationship any two inputs or any one input with an output could positively co-exist. 
With this in mind, the average values of growth rates for creative labour services, ICT 
capital services and GVA were taken and the correlations between them plotted in a 
two-way scatterplot. Figure 4.3 shows us meaningful results, as a region with higher 
growth from the creative class or ICT is more likely to associate with higher value 
added output growth. Also, there is a positive correlation between the growth of 
creative labour services and ICT capital accumulation. 
In conclusion, the preliminary statistical analysis indicated that economic 
prosperity is possibly related to the high contribution of the creative labour and ICT 
capital services. This finding further cites a significant heterogeneity regarding the 
performance of the creative class and ICT capital services across regions within




European countries. The particular type of workforce or capital services could all 
increase due to macroeconomic shocks, but how it contributes to an economy may be 
quite different. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the contribution level of ICT 
capital services is positively correlated with creative labour services. This may 
suggest a possibly positive relationship between these two. However, it is not clear 
what will be impacted and in which way, so a further analysis is necessary. 
 
The long-term growth trajectory of each input factor 
In this section, the growth pattern of each input comes to the fore, particularly 
the creative labour and ICT capital services. The average contribution points of ICTi 
to GVA were defined as ICTi,t and  ICTi,t+1 in the period 1 and 2 (roughly t= period 
1995-2001 and t+1= period 2002-2007), then the difference in contribution point over 
these two periods (∆ICTi =  ICTi,t+1 −  ICTi,t) may be indicative of a growth trajectory 
for ICT in region i. Similarly, this calculation was performed on non-ICT capital 
(∆NICT), creative workers (∆CR), non-creative workers (∆NCR) and TFP (∆TFP). 
As can be seen in Appendix 4.E, ∆ICTi have negative values in most of the 
regions in the advanced economies. This finding may be deemed realistic, as the 
accelerator effect of weakening GDP growth and the impact of the equity price falls 
on the cost of finance led to a decreasing rate of ICT investment growth post-2000 
(McMahon et al., 2005). However, the difference between  ICTi,t+1  and  ICTi,t in 
Hungary is not significant. This may indicate the fact that those less developed 
European countries are still at the stage of “catch-up”. In contrast, the positive value 
of ∆ICTi  is seen in Sweden, which may be due to the continuous application and 
investment in technology-intensive capital.  





Figure 4.3: Correlation test 
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In addition, it is interesting to observe that ∆CRi is positive in many advanced 
European economies too. This may confirm that a continuous effort had been given to 
promote the creative economy in many European countries, but such a performance 
remains quite heterogeneous. In the U.K., France, the Czech Republic and Sweden, 
the contribution of creative labour services is very important and such an effect is 
even being continuously amplified. 
Spain also illustrated a similar tendency even through this was not the case for 
many regions. For less developed European countries, such as Hungary (Italy may be 
the case too), the primary task appears to be related to how it can retain the creative 
class in their countries as ∆CRi is negative in all of the regions. Moreover, the growth 
pattern from the other inputs also cannot be ignored. In many countries, with the 
exception of Sweden and Belgium, ∆NICTi is positive in many regions. The U.K. and 
Italy also demonstrate that the contribution of non-creative workers was growing. 
Finally, the number of regions where there is either a positive or negative contribution 
change for each input is summarised, as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: The contribution change of each input in the two equal periods 
 
∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
P N P N P N P N P N 
BE 6 5 7 4 0 11 3 8 4 7 
FR 11 11 5 17 2 20 13 9 12 10 
HU 0 7 0 7 1 6 6 1 6 1 
ES 7 10 1 16 0 17 5 12 16 1 
IT 3 16 11 8 0 19 16 3 6 13 
SE 6 2 5 3 7 1 1 7 3 5 
CZ 8 0 7 1 0 8 4 4 5 3 
UK 9 3 8 4 0 12 5 7 3 9 
Note: P=positive contribution change, N=negative contribution change.  
In conclusion,  the growth accounting analysis revealed that there is not a 
polarised role of the so-called creative class for regional economic development in the 




main European regions. The economic performance depends on the economic system, 
labour market mechanism, technological progress as well as many other factors, but 
not just a simple agglomeration of one or two input factors. The average contributions 
from the creative labour and ICT capital services are significant across regions. In 
particular, the presence of the creative class has become another source of growth in 
recent years. However, the prophecy of the future prosperity of the creative economy, 
as Florida predicted ten years ago, remains unfulfilled. In many Italian and Spanish 
regions, the contribution of creative labour service flows is low. Labour inputs even 
no longer matter but technology, research and high-tech intensive capital investment 
in many Nordic regions. In the long term, promotion of the creative economy also 
exhibits heterogeneity as the increasing contribution of the creative class can only be 
observed in some advanced European economies such as the U.K. or France. 
 
4.3.3 Econometric analysis  
 
The impact of creative workers and ICT on output growth 
The Growth Accounting method provides an evaluation of the possible effects 
of creative labour and ICT capital services to output growth. However, it describes the 
issue rather than explaining it. In this section, econometric models are included, which 
try to directly estimate the elasticities of both creative labour and ICT capital inputs to 
value added output in terms of level changes. Expectations predict that econometric 
models are complementary to the growth accounting estimation, which further 
provides evidence about the relationship between creative workers and ICT.  




However, it is worth noting that adding interaction variables may dramatically 
change the interpretation of all of the coefficients. If there was no interaction term, the 
coefficients of the creative class and ICT capital services would be 𝛼1  and 𝛽1 
(referring to equation 4.12), which represent the unique effect of the creative class and 
ICT capital services on value added growth respectively. Since the interaction term 
indicates that the effects of the creative class and ICT capital services are different for 
different values of ICT capital and creative labour services, the unique value of the 
creative class is not limited to 𝛼1 but also depends on the values of  𝛾1 (the coefficient 
of the interactive term) and ICT capital. Therefore, the total effect for the creative 
class is 𝛼1+𝛾1 ∗ ICT and for ICT capital is 𝛽1 + 𝛾1 ∗ CR. Accordingly, 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 only 
represent the unique effects of the creative class and ICT capital on value added 
output when the value of ICT or CR is equal to 0. 
Table 4.4 illustrates that average values based on the available time periods 
for different countries were taken as the reference point. The summary statistics 
indicate a very significant level of regional heterogeneity. For example, the logged 
hours worked by creative workers has the highest value at 8.21 in the French 
metropolitan region Île de France compared to only 1.97 in the Finish region Åland.  
In Table 4.5, all variables are based on the regional level and were logged. As 
can be seen in model I, the pooled-OLS model did not produce any meaningful results. 
This could be for many reasons and one has been illustrated earlier: the very large 
heterogeneity across regions, countries and years will bias results.  
However, a region FE model may not be an adequate technique for this study 
either, even though it is well-accepted as an approach to eliminate endogeneity from 
unobserved and unobservable effects. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the high 




variation in factor choices by economic agents over time in different regions is not 
most probably linked to technology but some exogenous factors (e.g. natural calamity, 
strike, policy intervention, etc.). Therefore, the additional measurement error 
problems could emerge from relying on time-variation (Griliches and Mairesse, 1997). 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics 
Based on avaliable time periods and143 European NUTS regions 
Variable Definition Mean Max Min Sd 
GVA Gross value added 10.20 12.75 6.62 1.09 
ICT ICT capital services 7.46 9.52 4.29 1.06 
NICT Non-ICT capital services 8.63 10.92 5.12 0.94 
CR Hours worked by the total creative workers 5.68 8.21 1.97 0.99 
NCR Hours worked by the total non-creative workers 6.48 8.42 2.66 0.88 
GCR Hours worked by the creative graduates 5.03 7.73 1.25 1.04 
NGCR Hours worked by the creative non-graduates 4.86 7.25 1.3 1.06 
Notes:  
1. All variables are naturally logged.  
2. The unit of hours worked is per million. The value of gross value added and capital services are 
measured by per million 1995 euros (ECU). 
3. Only the NUTS 1 code is available in the U.K. 
Sources: GVA: the Cambridge Economics, ICT/NICT: the EU KLEMS and the EU LFS, 
CR/NCR/GCR/NGCR: the EU LFS. 
 
The following attempt, based on the region FE specification, confirmed the 
above prediction. As shown in model II, controlling for fixed effects over 143 regions 
is problematic and again, only largely biased results were produced. At this point, 
neither the assumption of the one-sector interregional factor allocation nor the 
assumption of constant returns to scale can be held.  
In response, this thesis only relied on cross-sectional variation (i.e. a pooled 
style) to estimate the aggregated production function. As can be seen in model III, 
year dummies are included for controlling jointly trending effects, such as common 
economic shocks, and country dummies are further added to capture the effect that 
countries of various sizes go into the panel at different time points. Now the results 




became acceptable, a one percent increase in ICT capital, creative labour and non-
creative labour services yield 0.231+0.017*CR37, 0.266+0.017*ICT and 0.179 percent 
increase in value added output. NICT capital services, however, remain insignificant. 
Table 4.5: The contribution of creative labour and ICT capital services 
Dependent variable: gross value added 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
























































Year dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes 












R-squared 0.92 0.83 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N. of cases 1458 1458 1458 1316 1316 
Notes:  
1. (I) Pooled OLS, (II) region FE, (III) country FE, (IV) based on model (III), ICT, NICT and CR were 
instrumented by their own one-period lagged value, (V) based on model (IV), robust variance was added.  
2. CR=creative labour services, NCR=non-creative labour services, ICT=ICT capital services, NICT=non-ICT 
capital services, ICT*CR=the interactive term between ICT capital and creative labour services. 
 3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors shown in parenthesis.  
 
Given the fact that regional level dummies were not included in model III, 
unobservable effects are not strictly controlled and so the model may still suffer 
endogeneity. To test endogeneity, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (see Woodridge, 2010) 
was adopted and the results are shown in Table 4.6. The results in the first column 
indicate that the coefficients of residuals from reduced forms of ICT capital, non-ICT 
capital and creative labour services were significant when they were added on to the 
original regression beside the non-creative class38. And the results were significantly 
                                                          
37 For the sake of simplicity, here we just use the terms CR and ICT to represent their different 
categories. 
38  The distinction among the possible forms of endogeneity is not always sharp (Woodridge, 2012). In 
this study, the labour input from non-creative services is not endogenous in the regional economic 




different if residuals from those three variables were involved, confirmed by the 
second stage test where the P-values (see behind the back slash signs in the first 
column) were all below 0.05. As a result, ICT, non-ICT, the creative class and the 
interactive term (ICT*CR)39 are considered as endogenous. 
Table 4.6: Tests of endogeneity for the independent variables 
                     





ICT capital services 0.72(0.000***)\0.000*** 0.85(0.001***) 
Non-ICT capital services 0.35(0.086**)\0.003*** 0.86(0.001***) 
The creative labour services -.0.22(0.075**)\0.03** 0.56(0.001***) 
Non-creative labour services -.0.038(0.78)\0.23 n/a 
Notes:  
1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
2. In the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test, the P-values behind the back slash signs are the results at the second stage 
of the test.  
3. Year and country dummies were included in all the tests. 
 
To handle this endogeneity problem, there is another way in addition to the 
data transformation based techniques such as the region FE model. Here, it is assumed 
that past values of regressors are significantly correlated with their current values but 
not the current error terms (Wooldridge, 2009)40. The inclusion of more than one-
period lagged values as instruments significantly reduces the sample size in this study; 
therefore, only one-period lagged values of regressors were taken as the possible 
instrumental variables. The second column within Table 4.6 shows that candidate 
instruments are not weak instruments, as their coefficients to endogenous variables in 
reduced forms are significantly large. 
With the above model specification, observations of one time period are 
dropped from the total sample. Furthermore, year dummies and country dummies 
                                                                                                                                                                      
system. This may imply that the changing economic situation is not a determinant in impacting the 
demand of non-creative (low skilled) workers across different European regions on average. 
39 If CR and ICT are endogenous, then ICT*CR appears to be endogenous too. 
40 As the model is just identified, the validity of instruments is not testable by some techniques such 
as the over-identification test. 




absorb a significant amount of the expected unobservable and heterogeneous effects, 
thus the value of R squared on average is high (roughly around 0.95). Now in model 
IV, a one percent increase in ICT capital or the creative labour services yields about 
0.287+0.016*CR or 0.303+0.016*ICT increases in output. This estimate appears to be 
consistent with the findings from previous studies, as ICT investment produces excess 
returns as compared to the predication from the growth accounting approach 
(O’Mahony and Vecchi ,2005; Boselli, 2010).  
However, non-ICT capital again has no significant impact on output variation 
as its coefficient is negative and insignificant. Also, the contribution of non-creative 
labour does not seem proportionate to its volume; the coefficient in this case is only 
0.165 while its scale is much larger than the creative class in terms of working hours 
(see Figure 3.1). Finally there is a significant positive interactive effect between ICT 
capital and the creative class, with a significant coefficient of 0.016.  
Potential issues of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were further tested; 
this is shown in Table 4.7. Here, it can be seen that the LR test (see Drukker, 2003) 
indicates a significant difference between heteroskedastic and homoskedastic GLS 
panel regressions. Autocorrelation was also identified by the Wooldridge Test (see 
Wooldridge, 2010). However, due to the sample size (1458) being selectively small as 
well as having a short time series, it can be argued that the results are not seriously 
biased due to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. Nevertheless, such an effect needs 
to be taken into account. In model V, the robust variance was introduced based on the 
setup in model IV. We see that the coefficients of all variables almost remain the 
same but the values of standard error increase. 




In conclusion, model V is adopted as the main econometric model for this 
study. Although regional/sector heterogeneity is not controlled for and potential 
endogeneity may still exist, this model produced plausible results according to the 
basic setup of production function theory.  
Table 4.7: Tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
                       
 
 
LR Test for Heteroskedasticity Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
Hypothesis  
H0: no difference between 
heteroskedastic and homoskedastic 
regressions 
 





Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
F(1, 141) = 121.712 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
The model was next extended to allow for the effect of both the creative class 
and human capital, and then the creative and non-creative workers were decomposed 
into three sub-categories: high-skilled creative workers, medium/low-skilled creative 
workers and non-creative workers41. Although it is difficult to tell whether creativity 
or education is more likely to contribute to the shaping of some types of workers (e.g. 
the creative graduates), this type of breakdown can further provide an opportunity to 
analyse not only the creative class but also the associated effect from higher education. 
Observing Table 4.8, model III shows that the contribution of ICT capital and 
creative graduates’ labour services are most significant, with coefficients of 0.382 and 
0.161 respectively. Once again, there is no direct evidence to show a significant 
impact on output level change from non-ICT capital and the coefficient of the non-
                                                          
41 Further decomposition the group of non-creative workers into the sub-groups of non-creative 
graduates and non-graduate non-creatives was not carried out. As far as the issue of multicollinearity 
is concerned, the size of coefficient for ICT and CR is largely driven by the way the sub-groups of the 
total employment were defined. However, with the setup in this section, the results are most close to 
economic realities.   




creative graduates is small, at 0.125. If the impact from non-creative workers is also 
taken into account, findings are consistent with Table 4.5, as the total contribution of 
the creative class (i.e. 0.161+0.013*ICT+0.125=0.286+0.013*ICT) appears to be 
greater than non-creative workers (0.193).  
Table 4.8: Gross value added output with further breakdowns of creative/non-
creative workers 
Dependent variable: gross value added output 
 (I) (II) (III) 












































Year dummies No Yes Yes 








R-squared 0.92 0.96 0.96 
N. of cases 1458 1458 1316 
Notes:  
1. All variables are log-transformed.  
2. (I) the original OLS regression, (II) country FE model, (III) 2SLS regression with robust variance, ICT, NICT 
and CR are instrumented by their one-period lagged values.  
3. The creative graduate is measured by creative workers who have a bachelor degree or above.  
4. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors shown in parenthesis. 
 
Finally, the summarised results for interactive terms between ICT capital 
services and working groups when measuring the different skilled workers are listed 
in Table 4.9. Also, ICT capital accumulation and labour services produced by skilled 
workers were averaged based on the available time periods and were then expressed 
in percentiles. 
We can see that a region with a higher level of ICT capital services or creative 
labour input can produce more units of output. For example, the region with 6.12 units 
of ICT capital services increased the total marginal effect of the creative class from an 




initial value of 0.303 to 0.40142. Within a 90 percentile region, such an effect was 
amplified to 0.450. In contrast, a higher level of creative class labour input also 
increased the efficiency of ICT capital from an initial value of 0.293 to 0.367 in a 
region where the creative class labour input is 4.60. 
In conclusion, for the first time econometric analysis has estimated the 
economic impact of creative workers together with ICT capital /non-ICT capital 
services on value added output at the regional level. In contrast to previous studies 
based on either the firm/industry level or national level, this regional study focuses on 
the role of geographic proximity in shaping successful economic performance; 
geographic proximity may not be the factor that causes growth. However, it is an 
important factor to shape the location of behaviour of economic agents and the 
linkage between them (Ascani et al., 2012). The findings are summarised as follows: 
The role of ICT/non-ICT capital  
Firstly, the estimation shows that in industrialised European economies, the 
accumulation in ICT capital services is likely to have a casual effect on value added 
output growth. At the regional level, this effect is much stronger than estimations at 
firm or industry levels, where the effects of ICT capital services are in a range from 
0.293 to 0.450 according to the categories of creative labour services. However, this 
may be plausible as the measure of capital service flows is sustainably different from 
the measure of capital stock. By looking at Figure 4.1 again, the aggregate value of 
ICT capital services appears to be very large if it is estimated by multiplying it’s per 
hour value by the total hours worked. As for the aggregate value of non-ICT capital 
                                                          
42 To estimate the marginal effect of creative labour services and ICT capital services, the perfect 
differential equation for the creative class can be expressed ∂Y
∂CR
= β1 + γICT  if Y=α + β1CR +
β2ICT + β3NCR + β4NICT + γ(ICT ∗ CR) + ε. In the same way, 
∂Y
∂ICT
= β2 + γCR . 




services, it is still higher, but on average such a gap is much smaller compared to the 
difference in their compensation shares. With this in mind, the estimation clearly 
captures the extent of this pattern.  
In addition, the size of the ICT coefficient may reflect “the presence of 
external values caused by networking or productivity spillovers that push up the 
social value of ICT capital over private return” (Venturini, 2007, p.19). In other 
words, high coefficients may indicate not only the impact of ICT on GVA but also the 
positive effects from spillovers when only country heterogeneity can be controlled in 
this study. As Cimoli et al. (2010, p.169-172) further summarised, the aggregate 
impact of ICT is always higher than the sectoral impact. This suggests that the 
existence of spillovers associated with ICT and country and sectoral heterogeneity 
plays a central role in explaining the pervasiveness of ICT in an economic system.  
Moreover, findings may capture the long-term effect of ICT capital in the 
regional economic system. Pesaran and Shin (1999) noted that pooling data is an 
acceptable technique that produces the long-term production function coefficients –
production functions across industries in different countries will converge to the same 
point in the long run, especially when two or more countries are very close in terms of 
technology use and the path of development. At this point, the coefficient estimation 
for ICT capital services is consistent with existing literature. For example, O’Mahony 
and Vecchi (2005) imply that ICT capital accumulation accounts for approximately 40 
percent of output growth in the long run.  
Finally, it is no surprise to see that the impact of non-ICT capital services 
inputs on output growth is insignificant (Vu, 2005) or negative (Venturini, 2007) in 
developed economies. This regional study once again reveals the similar pattern; 




through a larger sample size, non-ICT capital does not have a clear role in regional 
economic development in terms of the level change of value added output. This 
finding may be viewed as realistic as this study includes most of the developed and 
industrialised regions in Europe.  
The role of creative workers and the interaction with ICT  
The impact of skilled workers on regional economic growth is also readily 
evident. In terms of production, the impact of creative workers is much stronger than 
non-creative workers since their labour shares and income shares are smaller or 
similar in most of the target countries – this is another case of increasing returns to 
scale which implies the significant external values of the creative class.  
Furthermore, the highly educated creative workers make higher contributions 
than non-graduate creative workers to output growth in terms of labour input. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies and coincides with the on-going argument 
from Florida’s supporters, as well as Glaeser’s followers. On one hand, Florida’s 
proposition appears to be correct as contribution from the creative class is much 
higher than those of the creative have-nots. On the other hand, graduates are also an 
important source of growth, as non-graduates who work in creative professions 
contribute less to output growth than those who also have a university degree. 
Finally, the reciprocal role between ICT capital accumulation and creative 
workers is confirmed by the significantly positive sign of interactive terms. Greater 
accumulation of ICT capital will produce more units of output through the skilled 
worker’s labour services. Vice versa, the existence of more skilled workers also 
contributes to the efficiency of ICT capital application. These findings empirically 
support Autor et al.’s (1998) conclusion that the application of ICT capital is 




complementary to skilled workers who get involved in non-routine tasks, such as 
graduates, and this discussion is also extended from a new angle based on specific 
divisions in occupations. 




Table 4.9: The total marginal effects of ICT and creative workers on GVA by percentile 
 
Notes:  
1. The values of variables in this table were all log-transferred.  
2. ICT1 and ICT2 are the coefficients of ICT capital services corresponding to the last columns in Table 4.5 and Table 4.8. 
3. CR: labour services of the creative class. GCR: labour services of creative graduates.
                              10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Mean 
Values of ln(ICT)  6.12 6.60 6.81 7.34 7.55 7.72 8.05 8.35 8.89 7.64 
Values of ln (CR)  4.60 5.08 5.30 5.42 5.66 5.9 6.14 6.41 6.99 5.68 
Values of ln(GCR) 3.88 4.42 4.56 4.74 5.02 5.23 5.52 5.82 6.39 5.02 
ICT1:0.293+0.016* ln (CR) 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.43 
ICT2:0.382+0.013* ln (GCR) 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 
CR:0.303+0.016*ln(ICT) 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38 
GCR:0.161+0.013* ln(ICT) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 




The impact of creative workers and ICT on economic efficiency 
Empirical model 2, from a different perspective revealed the positive role of 
creative workers in the local economic system. This was different from the method 
that defined the residual from regression as TFP, as the regional TFP level in this 
study is obtained from the growth accounting calculation at the first stage (see section 
4.3.2). In comparison to econometric methods that pre-assume input elasticity is 
constant, the Growth Account method allows for variation in input elasticity across 
regions and over years, which produces a more accurate estimation.  
The logged contribution of TFP to GVA growth is initially converted back to 
the real growth rate and then is indexed based on the basic year (TFP=100). This 
empirical model based on the fixed effects model also includes control variables that 
are essential to explain the difference in regional productivity, such as R&D 
investment or the joint effect of skilled workers and ICT capital. 
Summary statistics are listed in Table 4.10. Due to most of the dependent and 
independent variables being expressed per worker term, the relative logged values are 
negative figures. Table 4.11 shows the pairwise correlations between independent 
variables entered into the regressions. Included is the full time period of observations 
regarding the very limited samples in each cross-section (around 143). The VIF test 
implies that the empirical model does not suffer from the problem of multicollinearity, 
evidenced by the fact that all the VIF scores are well below five. Although in this case 
the creative class and ICT capital variables are expressed in different ways, similar 
patterns are still captured in comparison to the previous analyses. In addition, with a 
significantly positive relationship between ICT capital and the creative class (0.520), 
the share of the creative class is also positively correlated with the share of migrant 




workers (0.373) and R&D expenditure per worker (0.316), while ICT capital services 
per worker is positively correlated with the R&D expenditure per worker (0.568) and 
the share of migrant workers (0.462).  
It seems, therefore, that creative workers, who mainly perform non-routine 
tasks, are benefited by R&D investment and also demand a highly open atmosphere. 
In an effort to complete non-routine tasks, more ICT applications may be necessary in 
the modern workplace and in turn produce a higher level of attached services.  
The model firstly only includes the creative class and human capital at a time, 
as they are sceptical to be highly corrected so that we can avoid the issue of 
multicollinearity. However, if the human capital and the creative class are supposed to 
capture different aspects of the worker, potential and actual skills, they should be 
included in the same regression model otherwise the result will again be biased due to 
the omitted variable problem. Table 4.12 reports the basic estimation of human 
capital and the creative class in column 1 (I) and 2 (I), showing the insignificant 
coefficients of -0.029 and -0.155 respectively. This finding is different from previous 
studies (Marrocu and Paci, 2012) as a different technique was used to estimate the 
TFP level; the growth accounting model not only controlled for the impacts of unitary 
labour and capital inputs but also the individual effects of both human capital and 
creative workers. As a result, it is believed that the TFP estimation in this study is 
more precise to reflect technological progress and efficiency with minimised 
measurement errors.  
 





Table 4.10: Summary statistics 
 Mean Max Min Sd 
Share of the creative class -1.13 -0.26 -2.12 0.36 
Share of creative graduates -1.87 -0.98 -3.18 0.38 
Share of non-graduate creatives -2.86 -1.52 -4.93 0.69 
Share of graduate non-creatives -2.86 -1.52 -4.93 0.69 
Share of graduates -1.53 -0.64 -2.86 0.42 
ICT capital services per worker -5.9043 -4.23 -7.73 0.58 
R&D expenditure per worker  -7.84 -3.87 -11.5 1.14 
Population density  6.08 7.07 0 0.99 
Share of foreign-born workers -2.92 -1.20 -4.60 0.80 





Table 4.11: Correlation test 
 
        
 
                                                          
43 The logged value of ICT capital services per worker is negative, as the measure unit is millions of 
euros. 
 Creative 




workers 1     1.44 
       
ICT 0.520*** 1    2.25 
 (0.000)      
R&D 0.316*** 0.568*** 1   2.81 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Density -0.080*** 0.0351 0.002 1  1.03 
 (0.002) (0.180) (0.940)    
Diversity 0.373*** 0.462*** 0.312*** -0.084*** 1 1.48 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)   
Notes: 1. In the last column, the result of the standard VIF test for multicollinearity is reported. 
            2. Diversity: share of migrant workers. Density: population density per square kilometre. 
            3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Sources: creative workers: the EU LFS, ICT: the EU KLEMS/ the EU LFS, density and diversity: the Eurostat 




So far, it has been argued that the estimation may lead to misleading 
conclusions if the issue of disaggregation of human capital and the creative class 
variables are overtaken. According to the creative class thesis, the functions of the 
creative class and human capital in a regional economic system need to be 
complementary, not competing. In an attempt to reduce problems in measurement, a 
further breakdown divided total skilled workers into three sub-groups: the graduate 
creatives, the non-graduate creatives and the non-creative graduates. Columns 4 (I) 
and 5 (I) show that the presence of highly educated creative workers or other sub-
categories are still not significant to explain the level change of TFP. 
Observing other controlled variables, a positive and robust effect from ICT 
capital and R&D expenditure to enhance local economic efficiency were found, 
showing the coefficients around 0.09 and 0.10 respectively. For the variables 
concerned with population density, it seems to be less important to favour the local 
efficiency enhancement in all models. This result could be plausible, as in most of the 
developed European countries, a knowledge-intensive economy is now more likely to 
link to innovation, skills and the application of technology, but only slightly relates to 
the externality of an agglomeration economy (Melo and Graham, 2009). 
Finally, a positive relation was not found between the share of migrant 
workers and TFP level. Many migrant workers, due to limited ability, a language 
barrier or other unfavourable factors may only participate in low-skilled jobs, which 
in turn negatively impact the regional economic efficiency. This result may reflect the 
fact that migrant workers’ participation rate is conceptually different from the so-
called tolerance, as ethnic diversity adversely impacted economic growth in the long 
term (Easterly, 2001).  However, it is plausible to think that the impact of ethnic 
diversity may be indirectly linked to productivity enhancement, as it is a good 




indicator in explaining the consumer preferences of the creative class; this will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
At this stage, the findings support the proposal indicated in the first section: 
the high variation in factor choices made by economic agents across different regions 
over time is not most probably linked to technology. In any of the above setups, the 
share of skilled workers is not significant enough to explain the level change of TFP. 
In addition, the measure of TFP needs further attention. Although several previous 
studies focus on the cross-sectional variation of factor shares in technological progress, 
oversight of the individual effects of relevant working sub-groups or other specific 
inputs could lead to biases. 
In an attempt to connect the contribution of skilled workers to regional 
economic systems, relative interactive terms between different sub-categories of 
workers and ICT capital were also included. The interactive terms not only explained 
the reciprocal process but also singled out a possible channel to enhance the economic 
efficiency. In model II the coefficients of skilled worker related variables were found 
to be significant in all columns. The coefficient of the creative graduates is 0.223 and 
for the whole creative class the figure increases to 0.623 as the standard error is also 
large. However, such a change is less dramatic for graduates, as the coefficient is 
0.151. It appears that the significant and positive outcome of the interactive terms 
confirmed the complementary process between the presence of skilled workers and 
the density of ICT capital. This effect is especially strong for the whole creative class 
(0.103), followed by the creative graduates (0.039) and all graduates (0.028). 
The significant negative values for graduate non-creatives in column 5 (II) 
seem to be implausible. However, this problem is likely due to multicollinearity; 




because of the overlapping components between graduates and the creative class it is 
possible to have contemporaneous movement for both; for example, the share of 
graduate creatives increases to the same degree as non-creative graduates. The later 
VIF test reveals this pattern, with a VIF score of 5.99, which implies the presence of 
multicollinearity. Nevertheless, this is not regarded as an inherent disadvantage in the 
analysis of sub-populations, as the sign and coefficient for the creative graduates are 
as expected.  
Why do the insignificant coefficients for skilled workers in each model turn to 
significant coefficients when interactive terms have been added on? The explanation 
is similar to the discussion on the production function analysis in the previous section. 
Observing equation 4.13, the original effect is 𝛽1. With the interaction term, the effect 
now becomes 𝛽1  + β3 ∗ ICT. Another way of saying this is that the slopes of the 
regression lines between the TFP level and share of the skilled workers count are 
different for the different categories of ICT capital services – β3  indicates how 
different these slopes are. Therefore, the marginal effects of the share of skilled 
workers to the TFP level change in association with the contribution from the selected 
categories of ICT capital accumulation are under discussion. 
Since skilled workers can contribute to economic performance through 
multiple channels, it is asserted that ICT is powerful. On one hand, the contribution of 
skilled workers, such as the creative class, graduates and the creative graduates, 
largely increases through its application and diffusion. In contrast, the presence of 
skilled workers also enhances the contribution of ICT capital per worker. The 
coefficients of ICT capital services per work increased from 0.096 to around 0.181 
across the different model specifications.   




Table 4.12: The impact of creative workers and ICT capital services on the TFP level change 
Dependent variable: TFP level      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





        




      


























Interactive terms           
ICT× Graduates  0.028*** 
(0.009) 
        
ICT× The creative class    0.103*** 
(0.020) 
       
ICT× Graduate creatives 
 
 






Control variables           




































































































R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.29 
N. of cases 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 
Notes: 1.All independent variables are expressed in per worker term and are log-transformed excluding population density. 2.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors shown in 
parenthesis. 3. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 




In conclusion, the second empirical model seems to confirm the conclusion 
based on the preliminary statistics analysis (see section 4.3.1), as ICT capital 
contributes to economic efficiency, but the contribution of skilled workers is also 
captured. Although the discrepancy remains unexplored regarding how the impact of 
skilled workers on the improvement of economic efficiency in panel data could be 
properly tested, ICT capital application appears to be a good channel in enhancing the 
performance of creative workers and graduates; with the joint effect from the level of 
ICT capital services accumulation, the marginal effect of skilled workers becomes 
very strong in explaining the temporal change of the TFP level. 
Therefore, findings are consistent with the production function analysis. The 
interactive relationship between skilled workers and ICT capital can produce positive 
effects on economic performance. It seems that the creative class, who have utilised 
skills, have a much stronger effect with ICT diffusion than graduates, whose degrees 
are only likely to represent their potential. It would be a mistake to say that graduates 
lack skills, but the utilisation rate of ICT for graduates in different occupations varies 
and in turn mitigates this positive effect on the average scope. In contrast, the creative 
class centres on many highly-skilled ICT occupations such as engineers, scientists, 
reporters or technicians, thus it may be not surprising to see better performance 
associated with ICT.  
This thesis supports the positive effect of ICT-skilled workers on economic 
performance. However, the creative class is a broad concept, which includes not only 
narratively defined ICT workers44 (e.g. Riley and Robinson, 2011) but also many 
other occupations with different economic functions. When this is broken down 
                                                          
44 To evaluate ICT-skills themselves, some research is focused at a very detailed level. For example, 
Riley and Robinson (2011) defined a list of occupations to represent ICT workers based on the 4-digit 
level ISCO codes in the major group 3. 




further, separating the effect from the creative class and human capital, only creative 
graduates, who work on actual creative job, have significant explanatory power to 
explain the regional economic efficiency. Therefore, it seems important to 
acknowledge that the effectiveness of graduates varies according to the creativity 
content of a graduate’s actual occupation. 
 
4.4 Conclusions  
 
Following hypotheses 4.1-4.3, it was decided to discuss the roles of creative 
workers, graduates and ICT from the production side. In Chapter 4, the economic 
impacts of the creative class was discussed and analysed using the Growth 
Accounting method, complemented by econometric analysis. Together with the 
findings from ICT, the conclusion is drawn as below: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: is the relationship between the creative class and the regional 
economic performance positive?  
In response to hypothesis 4.1, the growth of creative labour services appears to 
be an important source of output growth in many of the European regions in the last 
decade, but this is not universally so as in many other regions. According to the 
Growth Accounting method, economic growth is also determined by other factors and 
does not only rely on the polarised growth of the creative labour services. ICT capital 
investment, technological progress/efficiency or even traditional labour and capital 
inputs could significantly contribute to regional development. This fact cannot simply 




be explained by the different development levels throughout the regions in the 
targeted countries.  
Compared to Florida’s (2004) study about Europe, a different definition 
regarding the quality of the creative economy was proposed, challenging the 
philosophy of the creativity index. Despite its synthetic nature, it is too arbitrary to 
combine different Ts (talent, technology and tolerance) to predict the level of 
“creativity” in a common way, no matter how it is calculated or abstracted by weights 
or latent variables. It is undeniable that tolerance and technology are, to a great extent, 
related to the performance of the creative class in an economic system, but this pattern 
is more complicated, requiring several analyses at multiple levels. 
Therefore, observing the pure labour input from the creative class is a direct 
way to examine its contribution based on the concrete economic reality. The overall 
conclusion about Europe does not totally deviate from Florida’s, but there is a quite 
different understanding about the creative economy in Europe. In association with 
economic contributions from other inputs, there are too many issues that cannot be 
properly explained by Florida’s 3Ts and his previous European studies. In this case, 
hypothesis 4.1 can be only conditionally verified. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2: are creative worker’s skills complementary to the application of 
ICT, or vice versa? 
Bearing in mind the above points, the econometric analysis investigates 
hypothesis 4.2 regarding the role of the creative class, together with ICT, in the 
economic system. For the first time, this thesis estimated the level of ICT capital 




services at the regional level for the main European regions over time. The research 
also contributes to associating creative workers with other important inputs such as 
ICT capital services and human capital. The econometric analysis demonstrated that 
in the whole European context, the changes in regional creative labour and ICT 
capital services have stronger explanatory powers in explaining the growth in gross 
value added, compared to changes in levels of non-creative labour and non-ICT 
capital services. It is also interesting that the co-existence of the creative class and 
ICT capital can result in a greater change of output in Europe through a positive 
interactive effect, than through the contributions from each of these inputs separately.  
The further econometric analysis regarding the economic efficiency (TFP) 
clearly implies that the creative class has a greater impact on the change in regional 
TFP levels than graduates in association with the effect of ICT capital services in 
Europe. This finding that the presence of the creative class has a stronger effect than 
graduates in explaining productivity is consistent with several previous studies (e.g. 
Florida et al., 2008; Marrocu and Paci, 2012). In summary, it is believed that 
hypothesis 4.2 can be held. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: is the contribution from different creative sub-categories to the 
regional economic performance similar? 
In order to test hypothesis 4.3, the creative class and graduates were finally 
combined together. Later, the evidence coincides with the on-going argument between 
Florida’s supporters and Glaeser’s followers. Graduates who work in creative 
professions contribute more to output level than those who do not, while non-graduate 
creative workers have a lower contribution than those creative graduates. This is also 




confirmed in the second empirical model explaining TFP. Therefore, graduates and 
the creative class not only have different impacts on economic performance but also 
are supportive to each other and neither is dispensable. 
In conclusion, explicit interactions between ICT and the creative class have 
suggested that they are not choices but are integrated. With respect to this, it appears 
that understanding regarding the source of economic growth is no longer an isolated 
topic but needs to be seen in the context of broader based economic development. 
Therefore, a creative worker’s capacity has to be maximised through a suitable 
channel, such as through the integration of ICT. From another perspective, the 
creative class thesis also provides a new concept in human capital based ICT policy-
making. It appears that an appropriate socio-economic environment is essential for 
making economic progress in the knowledge based economy. Therefore, the 
promotion of the creative economy deserves consideration when exploring the 
















Appendix 4. A: Ranking of average ICT/NICT capital service growth rates  
Country Ranking Region code Region ICT growth 
NICT 
growth 
BE 1 16 Prov. Brabant Wallon 21.05 5.52 
BE 2 14 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant 18.08 3.42 
BE 3 19 Prov. Luxembourg  18.00 3.32 
BE 4 12 Prov. Limburg  17.36 3.29 
BE 5 20 Prov. Namur 17.28 2.80 
BE 6 13  Oost-Vlaanderen 17.06 2.99 
AT 7 5 Steiermark 17.04 2.32 
HU 10 140 Kozep-Magyarorszag 16.76 2.40 
FR 11 92 Corse 16.54 9.63 
BE 12 15 West-Vlaanderen 16.51 2.83 
AT 13 9 Vorarlberg 16.47 1.12 
BE 14 11 Prov. Antwerpen 16.32 2.66 
ES 15 69 Región de Murcia 16.21 6.91 
BE 16 10 Bruxelles / Brussels  16.01 1.78 
ES 31 56 Cantabria 14.43 5.37 
DE 32 34 Hamburg 14.28 5.89 
CZ 33 132 Praha 14.14 5.07 
ES 34 61 Comunidad de Madrid 14.10 6.12 
IT 83 96 Lombardia 10.57 2.51 
UK 96 114 Yorkshire  9.97 1.26 
DE 97 32 Berlin 9.93 2.74 
DE 136 46 Detmold 8.51 2.55 
DE 137 42 Weser-Ems 8.41 1.84 
FR 138 75 Centre (FR) 8.39 1.84 
FR 139 71 Île de France 8.32 2.04 
FR 140 74 Haute-Normandie 8.29 1.88 
FR 141 77 Bourgogne 8.19 2.13 
SE 142 131 Övre Norrland 8.10 4.60 
DE 143 49 Chemnitz 8.01 2.49 
SE 144 126 Småland med öarna 7.98 3.34 
DE 145 37 Kassel 7.89 1.37 
SE 146 129 Norra Mellansverige 7.67 5.28 
SE 147 128 Västsverige 7.53 4.73 
SE 148 130 Mellersta Norrland 6.13 4.04 
SE 149 125 Östra Mellansverige 6.12 3.62 
SE 150 127 Sydsverige 6.10 3.54 
SE 151 124 Stockholm 6.04 3.07 
Notes: 1. The average growth rates of ICT/NICT capital services are calculated for the period 1995-
2007 at the 1995 price level. 2. AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DE=Germany, FR=France, ES=Spain, 
IT=Italy, U.K.=the U.K., SE=Sweden, CZ=Czech Republic, HU=Hungary, FI=Finland. All figures are 









Appendix 4. B: Ranking of ICT capital services per worker  
Country Ranking Year Region code Region  
ICT services per 
worker 
BE 1 2007 14 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant 14438.7 
BE 2 2007 10 Rég. Bruxelles 14176.6 
BE 11 2007 19 Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 9956.49 
AT 12 2007 3 Wien 8991.82 
DE 13 2007 34 Hamburg 7931.94 
DE 14 2007 33 Bremen 7393.39 
DE 15 2007 25 Oberbayern 7353.6 
AT 16 2007 9 Vorarlberg 7292.26 
DE 17 2007 35 Darmstadt 7277.06 
DE 26 2007 51 Leipzig 6639.23 
DE 27 2007 44 Köln 6543.37 
UK 30 2007 117 East of England 6026.47 
DE 31 2007 40 Hannover 5938.48 
DE 32 2007 29 Mittelfranken 5921.21 
UK 33 2007 119 South East (UK) 5904.74 
SE 34 2007 124 Stockholm 5863.26 
FI 35 2007 151 Åland 5769.97 
UK 36 2007 118 London 5752.34 
FI 37 2007 148 Etelä-Suomi 5742.04 
UK 45 2007 113 North West (UK) 5118.32 
FI 46 2007 149 Länsi-Suomi 5112.46 
DE 47 2007 41 Lüneburg 5091.41 
UK 48 2007 116 West Midlands (UK) 5087.69 
DE 62 2007 46 Detmold 4755.86 
DE 63 2007 53 Thüringen 4746.33 
DE 64 2007 39 Braunschweig 4738.2 
SE 66 2007 125 Östra Mellansverige 4709.69 
ES 75 2007 61 Comunidad de Madrid 4522.94 
SE 78 2007 129 Norra Mellansverige 4416.15 
FR 91 2007 71 Île de France 3731.12 
IT 97 2007 96 Lombardia 3548.90 
HU 142 2007 146 Del-Alfold 2000.12 
HU 143 2007 143 Del-Dunantul 1975.78 
CZ 149 2007 139 Moravskoslezsko 1230.86 
CZ 150 2007 134 Jihozápad 1227.17 
CZ 151 2007 138 Strední Morava 1132.06 
Notes: 1. ICT capital per worker is expressed in Euro at 1995 price level. 2. AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, 
DE=Germany, FR=France, ES=Spain, IT=Italy, U.K.=the U.K., SE=Sweden, CZ= the Czech Republic, 
HU=Hungary, FI=Finland. 3. nonexhaustive list. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4. D: Average contributions of labour and capital inputs in GVA growth in the main European regions 
Belgium (1996-2007) 
Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Rég. Bruxelles - Cap.-
Brussels Hfdst. Gewest 0.009 -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.020 
Antwerpen 0.010 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.022 
Limburg (b) 0.011 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.025 
Oost-Vlaanderen 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.026 
Vlaams Brabant 0.015 -0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.031 
West-Vlaanderen 0.008 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.024 
Brabant Wallon 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.038 
Hainaut 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.016 
Liège 0.009 -0.002 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.017 
Luxembourg (b) 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.021 














Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Kozep-Magyarorszag 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.047 
Kozep-Dunantul 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.032 
Nyugat-Dunantul 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.029 
Del-Dunantul 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.019 
Eszak-Magyarorszag 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.027 
Eszak-Alfold 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.023 
Del-Alfold 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.016 
 
Sweden (1999-2006) 
Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Stockholm 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.016 0.032 
Östra Mellansverige 0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.005 0.029 0.032 
Småland med öarna 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.028 
Sydsverige -0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.032 0.030 
Västsverige 0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.007 0.026 0.034 
Norra Mellansverige 0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.012 -0.001 0.024 
Mellersta Norrland 0.003 -0.008 0.003 0.007 0.017 0.022 










Czech Republic (1998-2007) 
Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Praha 0.009 -0.005 0.005 0.015 0.032 0.056 
Stredni Cechy 0.004 -0.010 0.004 0.012 0.041 0.050 
Jihozapad 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.036 
Severozapad 0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.007 0.020 0.028 
Severovychod 0.001 -0.006 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.031 
Jihovychod 0.001 -0.006 0.006 0.013 0.026 0.039 
Stredni Morava 0.005 -0.007 0.006 0.013 0.015 0.033 




Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Itä-Suomi 0.000 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.024 0.032 
Etelä-Suomi 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.035 
Länsi-Suomi -0.001 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.024 0.036 
Pohjois-Suomi 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.029 0.042 










Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Stuttgart 0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.018 
Karlsruhe 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.004 0.016 
Freiburg 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.016 -0.016 0.016 
Tübingen 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.010 -0.005 0.022 
Oberbayern 0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.020 
Niederbayern 0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.015 0.020 
Oberplatz 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.017 -0.024 0.022 
Oberfranken 0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.011 
Mittelfranken -0.005 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.014 
Unterfranken -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.016 
Schwaben -0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.005 0.013 0.014 
Berlin 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.011 0.008 
Bremen -0.001 0.006 0.010 0.023 -0.020 0.018 
Hamburg 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.017 -0.035 0.006 
Darmstadt 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.013 
Gieβen -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.017 
Kassel 0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.014 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern -0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.014 
Braunschweig 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.019 
Hannover 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.012 -0.012 0.016 
Lüneburg -0.009 -0.012 0.004 0.000 0.030 0.014 
Weser-Ems 0.009 -0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.018 
Düsseldorf 0.014 0.003 0.009 0.015 -0.025 0.016 
Köln 0.003 -0.004 0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.012 
Münster 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.021 
Detmold -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.015 
Arnsberg -0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.002 0.016 0.015 
Saarland 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.026 
Chemnitz 0.007 -0.003 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.017 
Dresden 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.013 -0.010 0.017 
Leipzig -0.003 -0.010 0.005 0.008 0.021 0.022 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.008 -0.001 0.005 0.009 -0.013 0.008 
Thüringen -0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.020 

















Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Galicia 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.008 -0.013 0.027 
Principado de Asturias 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.025 
Cantabria 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.010 -0.013 0.035 
País Vasco 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.033 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra 0.015 0.011 0.003 0.009 -0.005 0.033 
La Rioja 0.012 0.021 0.003 0.010 -0.015 0.031 
Aragón 0.015 0.019 0.003 0.009 -0.017 0.030 
Comunidad de Madrid 0.024 0.017 0.004 0.010 -0.015 0.039 
Castilla y León 0.010 0.016 0.003 0.008 -0.014 0.023 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.018 0.025 0.003 0.012 -0.028 0.031 
Extremadura 0.016 0.011 0.003 0.009 -0.007 0.031 
Cataluña 0.013 0.023 0.003 0.010 -0.016 0.034 
Comunidad Valenciana 0.016 0.027 0.003 0.012 -0.021 0.037 
Illes Balears 0.016 0.034 0.003 0.011 -0.022 0.041 
Andalucía 0.014 0.023 0.003 0.012 -0.017 0.036 
Región de Murcia 0.016 0.031 0.004 0.015 -0.022 0.044 
Canarias 0.014 0.030 0.003 0.012 -0.022 0.037 





Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Île de France 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.023 
Champagne-Ardenne 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.013 
Picardie 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.008 0.011 
Haute-Normandie 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.015 
Centre 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.014 
Basse-Normandie 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.008 -0.014 0.016 
Bourgogne 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.014 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.018 
Lorraine 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.012 
Alsace 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.006 0.013 
Franche-Comté 0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.014 
Pays de la Loire 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.025 
Bretagne 0.010 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.018 0.028 
Poitou-Charentes 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.006 0.021 
Aquitaine 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.025 
Midi-Pyrénées 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.029 
Limousin 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.009 0.017 
Rhône-Alpes 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.024 
Auvergne 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.018 
Languedoc-Roussillon 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.029 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.026 
Corse 0.026 0.025 0.003 0.009 -0.029 0.034 





Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
Piemonte 0.012 -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.010 
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 0.001 -0.007 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.004 
Liguria 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.014 
Lombardia 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.014 
Veneto 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.017 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.015 
Emilia-Romagna 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.007 -0.011 0.016 
Toscana 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.016 
Umbria 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.007 -0.011 0.015 
Marche 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.007 0.021 
Lazio 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.018 
Abruzzo 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.008 0.012 
Molise 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.013 
Campania 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.015 
Puglia 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.012 
Basilicata 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.016 
Calabria 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.013 
Sicilia 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.012 
Sardegna 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.013 0.014 









Region CR NCR ICT NICT TFP GVA=CR+NCR+ICT+NICT+TFP 
North East England 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.026 
North West England 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.024 
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.026 
East Midlands 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.032 
West Midlands 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.024 
East of England 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.034 
Greater London 0.016 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.041 
South East England 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.017 0.034 
South West England 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.033 
Wales 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.026 
Scotland 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.008 -0.006 0.029 













Appendix 4. E: The difference in contribution point for each input  
Italy  
Period 1: 1995-2001, Period 2: 2002-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Piemonte -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 0.021* 
Valle d'Aosta/ -0.010 0.022* -0.002 0.006* -0.007 
Liguria 0.010* -0.002 -0.002 0.005* -0.022 
Lombardia -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.002* 0.002* 
Veneto -0.009 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.004* 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 0.005* -0.008 
Emilia-Romagna 0.003* 0.005* -0.002 0.007* -0.023 
Toscana 0.004* -0.010 -0.002 0.001* -0.002 
Umbria -0.015 0.001* -0.002 -0.001 0.006* 
Marche -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 0.001* 0.006* 
Lazio -0.009 0.003* -0.002 0.006* 0.005* 
Abruzzo -0.008 0.007* -0.002 0.002* -0.013 
Molise -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 0.004* 0.000 
Campania -0.017 0.008* -0.002 0.006* -0.009 
Puglia -0.013 0.010* -0.002 0.005* -0.017 
Basilicata 0.000 0.016* -0.001 0.005* -0.037 
Calabria 0.000 0.013* -0.002 0.002* -0.028 
Sicilia -0.007 0.006* -0.002 0.002* -0.010 
Sardegna -0.013 0.006* -0.001 0.009* -0.015 
 
Belgium 
Period 1: 1996-2001, Period 2: 2002-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Bruxelles- 0.005* 0.002* -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 
Antwerpen 0.000 0.017* -0.004 0.003* -0.016 
Limburg -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.002* 
Oost-Vlaanderen 0.008* 0.010* -0.003 0.000 -0.014 
Vlaams Brabant -0.036 0.009* -0.005 -0.005 0.016* 
West-Vlaanderen 0.011* 0.005* -0.003 0.001* -0.022 
Brabant Wallon 0.050* 0.016* -0.002 0.005* -0.092 
Hainaut 0.033* -0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.026 
Liège -0.001 -0.016 -0.003 -0.002 0.023* 
Luxembourg 0.020* 0.003* -0.003 0.000 -0.019 









Period 1: 1995-2001, Period 2: 2002-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Galicia 0.006* -0.014 -0.001 0.000* 0.019* 
Principado de Asturias 0.003* -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.021* 
Cantabria -0.015 -0.023 -0.002 -0.007 0.043* 
País Vasco -0.007 -0.025 -0.002 -0.003 0.031* 
Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra -0.003 -0.020 -0.002 -0.002 0.018* 
La Rioja 0.014* -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 
Aragón 0.001* -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.008* 
Comunidad de Madrid -0.006 -0.016 -0.002 -0.004 0.013* 
Castilla y León -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.001* 0.019* 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.004* 0.004* 0.000 0.005* -0.009 
Extremadura 0.001* -0.014 -0.001 0.003* 0.012* 
Cataluña -0.007 -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 0.017* 
Comunidad Valenciana -0.008 -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 0.017* 
Illes Balears -0.004 -0.037 -0.001 -0.003 0.016* 
Andalucía -0.001 -0.014 -0.001 -0.001 0.019* 
Región de Murcia -0.024 -0.010 -0.001 0.002* 0.026* 
Canarias 0.004* -0.028 -0.002 -0.004 0.008* 
 
Hungary 
Period 1: 1997-2002, Period 2: 2003-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Kozep-Magyarorszag 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.003* -0.015 
Kozep-Dunantul -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.002* 0.026* 
Nyugat-Dunantul -0.006 -0.011 0.000 0.000 0.003* 
Del-Dunantul -0.007 -0.015 0.001* 0.004* 0.002* 
Eszak-Magyarorszag -0.012 -0.011 0.000 0.005* 0.017* 
Eszak-Alfold -0.009 -0.014 0.000 0.005* 0.013* 













Period 1: 1999-2002, Period 2: 2003-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
North East England 0.008* -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.004* 
North West England 0.005* 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.003* -0.001 -0.004 0.002* -0.009 
East Midlands 0.004* -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
West Midlands 0.008* 0.001* -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 
East of England -0.002 0.001* -0.005 0.001* 0.002* 
Greater London 0.033* 0.014* -0.005 0.003* -0.042 
South East England 0.006* 0.014* -0.005 0.002* -0.027 
South West England 0.010* 0.009* -0.004 0.000 -0.024 
Wales -0.009 0.008* -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 
Scotland 0.004* 0.010* -0.006 0.006* -0.010 
Northern Ireland -0.005 0.003* -0.003 -0.003 0.009* 
 
Sweden  
Period 1: 1999-2003, Period 2: 2004-2006 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Stockholm 0.015* 0.000 0.001* -0.002 0.004* 
Östra Mellansverige 0.018* 0.004* 0.001* -0.001 -0.014 
Småland med öarna 0.001* 0.005* 0.001* 0.000 -0.005 
Sydsverige 0.013* 0.015* 0.002* -0.003 -0.016 
Västsverige -0.007 0.038* 0.002* 0.000 -0.029 
Norra Mellansverige 0.012* 0.005* 0.000 -0.006 0.006* 
Mellersta Norrland -0.012 0.027 0.001* 0.001* -0.005 
















Period 1: 1995-2001, Period 2: 2002-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Île de France -0.011 -0.015 -0.002 0.000 0.016* 
Champagne-Ardenne 0.007* -0.007 -0.001 0.004* -0.013 
Picardie -0.020 -0.019 -0.003 -0.005 0.039* 
Haute-Normandie 0.005* -0.003 -0.001 0.003* -0.011 
Centre 0.001* -0.019 -0.002 -0.001 0.014* 
Basse-Normandie 0.001* 0.003* 0.000 0.006* -0.011 
Bourgogne 0.005* 0.000 -0.001 0.005* -0.018 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais -0.003 -0.018 -0.002 -0.004 0.026* 
Lorraine -0.015 -0.027 -0.003 -0.009 0.050* 
Alsace -0.001 -0.021 -0.001 -0.003 0.015* 
Franche-Comté -0.018 -0.031 -0.003 -0.006 0.036* 
Pays de la Loire 0.006* -0.005 -0.001 0.008* -0.022 
Bretagne -0.025 -0.026 -0.002 -0.003 0.048* 
Poitou-Charentes 0.010* -0.005 0.000 0.007* -0.017 
Aquitaine 0.002* -0.022 -0.001 -0.001 0.012* 
Midi-Pyrénées -0.008 -0.016 -0.001 0.001* 0.022* 
Limousin 0.003* 0.001* 0.000 0.009* -0.019 
Rhône-Alpes -0.011 -0.005 -0.001 0.005* 0.004* 
Auvergne -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
Languedoc-Roussillon 0.007* 0.007* 0.001* 0.016* -0.036 
Alpes-Côte d'Azur -0.012 0.001* 0.000 0.007* -0.001 
Corse 0.035* 0.076* 0.005* 0.042* -0.161 
 
 
The Czech Republic 
Period 1: 1998-2003, Period 2: 2004-2007 
Region ∆CR ∆NCR ∆ICT ∆NICT ∆TFP 
Praha 0.008* -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 0.041* 
Stredni Cechy 0.031* 0.030* -0.003 0.014* -0.046 
Jihozapad 0.007* 0.010* -0.005 0.002* 0.007* 
Severozapad 0.048* 0.005* -0.004 0.000 -0.028 
Severovychod 0.015* 0.004* -0.001 0.005* 0.007* 
Jihovychod 0.023* 0.009* -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 
Stredni Morava 0.003* 0.012* 0.000 0.000 0.009* 
Moravskoslezsko 0.014* 0.021* 0.000 0.002* 0.021* 
 
Notes:  
1.* indicates the difference in contribution point for an input is positive.  
2. Given the issue of data inconsistency or unavailability, the whole time period is roughly divided into 
1995-2001 and 2002-2007   
3. The calculation of contribution point for each input to GVA growth is based on the Growth 
Accounting method. 
4.  ∆ICT = ICTt+1 − ICTt , where ∆ICT indicates the difference in contribution point over period t and 
period t+1 for  a region. The same calculation is performed on ∆CR, ∆NCR, ∆NICT and ∆TFP. 
5. Germany is not included in this study as the time period is short (i.e. 2002-2007). 




CHAPTER 5  
 




Based on hypotheses 5.1-5.3, this chapter aims to explore which factors 
explain the distribution of creative workers. The basic hypothesis is that creative 
workers are drawn by “people climate” factors of tolerance and openness, as well as 
factors such as universities and the quality of regional political institutions. Also, it is 
hypothesised that creative workers respond more strongly to the people climate in 
large metropolitan areas that have a critical mass, whereas other factors such as 
universities act as attractors in smaller areas The location of skilled workers is defined 
as their “locational quotient”, calculated by dividing the share of creative workers in 
each region by the average national share. For independent variables, similar 
locational quotients are derived for bohemians and migrant workers (to represent 
“people climate”), and for workers in universities. In addition, the relationship 
between the distribution of creative workers and the quality of political 
institution/local government performance is examined since the role of institutions has 
frequently been mentioned but not been empirically tested. Here, new data is used 
from the report measuring government quality and subnational variation (hereafter 
referred to EQI database) (Charron et al., 2014). 
Findings, in brief are as follows. Firstly, it appears that European creative 
workers generally move to places with tolerant and open milieus in line with Florida’s 
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suggestion. Particularly, the location of universities, the level of social opportunity 
and the institutional quality of local government seems important. 
Secondly, creative worker preferences appear to depend on the size of the 
region. In smaller regions, preferences are related to factors such as university 
locations and the quality of local government. By contrast, in bigger metropolitan 
regions, a tolerant and open society appears to be the primary concern. 
Thirdly, a further breakdown of the creative workers also indicates interesting 
patterns, with creative graduates, along with the creative core, appearing to have 
similar preferences regarding the desirability of good universities, social services and 
local government performance. In contrast, creative non-graduates and creative 
professionals appear mainly interested in a “bohemian climate”.  
Overall, the quality/performance of local government appears as a surprisingly 
good determinant of the distribution of creative workers. The positive relationship is 
especially evident within small-sized regions. The implication for local government 
policy trying to attract creative workers is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. 
 
5.2 Models  
 
To test hypothesis 5.1 to 5.3 that creative workers are attracted to regions with 
openness and tolerance two econometric models are used. The basic approach is the 
fixed effects model. A dynamic system GMM model is then explored, which allows 
for lagged adjustment and aims to reinforce the findings from the basic approach, but 
with a long-run perspective.  
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The macro level: the fixed effects model 
The basic empirical model is given below: 
 𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (5.1) 
In equation 5.1, LCR, LB, LO, LT, S, L and LEQI are abbreviations for the location 
index of creative workers, bohemians, migrant workers, university teachers, and the 
level of social provision, the share of workers in public sectors and the product of the 
EQI index and the share of workers in public sectors respectively.  
Fixed effects are represented by 𝛿𝑖  including both unobservable region-
specific characteristics and time-invariant observables (e.g. EQI). Also, dummy 
variables concerning time effects (𝜏𝑡) are included to account for macroeconomic 
shocks for all regions in each year. Finally, both dependent and independent variables 
are log-transformed. 
Within the theoretical framework in this study, the hypothesis is that the 
regional location of creative workers is determined by tolerance (the location of 
bohemians), openness (the location of migrant workers), the location of universities 
(the location of university teachers), the availability of social opportunities (the level 
of social provision), the short-term performance of local government (the share of 
employment in public sectors) and the overall quality of political institution in the 
region (the EQI index). 
Care was taken to avoid biases arising from possible data overlap between 
dependent and independent variables. To this end, bohemians, university teachers, 
creative migrant workers and those who work in actual social care and public 
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administration jobs (ISCO-88 occupation group 247) were removed from the total 
creative class. By the same token, university teachers were removed from the creative 
core, graduate bohemians, graduate creative migrant workers and university teachers 
from creative graduates and those similar non-graduates from non-graduate creative 
workers. Clearly many factors may influence the distribution of creative workers in 
addition to hypothesised factors. These extra factors include local historical 
background, landscape and temperature. However, as that these factors are time-
invariant, they will be swept out in the fixed effects model.  
 
The long-run perspective: the dynamic system GMM model 
The typical fixed effects model may suffer from the problem of model 
misspecification because it omits dynamic effects. Worker’s locational preferences 
are likely to be determined by their current and the past realisations of independent 
variables. Therefore, the basic model can be further extended to an autoregressive 
panel model such that 
 𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
 +𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽7𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽8𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (5.2) 
where the location of creative workers is not only determined by the current level of 
the people climate or the business climate, but is also pre-determined by the general 
urban environment in the past. Here the model follows Blundell and Bond (1998), and 
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does not impose implied common factor restrictions because dynamics may be 
thought of as an empirical approximation to some general adjustment process45.   
Based on this model specification, the empirical model may suffer dynamic 
panel bias (Nickell, 1981), as some of the lagged variables could be correlated with 
the fixed effects in error terms. For example, the economic recession in 2008 may 
have influenced the regional distribution of creative workers so that the shock appears 
in the error terms. This positive correction between a regressor and error violates the 
basic assumption necessary for the consistency of OLS estimation. 
The normal within group transformation, however, does not eliminate 
dynamic panel bias (Bond, 2002). In the process of demeaning, the lagged dependent 
variable becomes 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1∗ = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −
1
𝑇−1
(𝑦𝑖,2 + ⋯+ 𝑦𝑖,𝑇) while the error term becomes 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 −
1
𝑇−1
(𝜐𝑖,2 + ⋯+ 𝜐𝑖,𝑇) . Although the fixed effect 𝛿𝑖 has been removed 
from the error term 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  , the term in 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1∗  contemporaneously moves with the 
− 1
𝑇−1
 𝜐𝑖,𝑡−1 in 𝜐𝑖,𝑡∗ . Therefore, the regressor still correlates with the error term after 
transformation. 
In response to the above issue, Blundell-Bond’s (1998) system GMM 
estimator is a powerful tool in eliminating such a dynamic bias, which is a theoretical 
extension of Anderson-Hsiao’s (1981) difference and levels estimator, Arellano-
Bond’s (1991) DPD estimator and Arellano and Bover’s (1995) forward orthogonal 
deviations ( FOD) estimator. According to Roodman (2006), the main difference 
between this system GMM model and previous difference based models is the way of 
instrumenting. Generally speaking, where Arellano-Bond instruments differences 
                                                          
45 In other words, we assume the existence of the long-run effect. 
Chapter 5: The regional density of the creative class  
177 
 
with levels, Blundell-Bond instruments levels with differences. If variables are 
random-walk like, as is very possibly the case for this study, the system GMM 
estimator undoubtedly outperforms the difference GMM estimator as past changes are 
more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current changes. Also a new 
design of moment condition involves all available lagged variables as instruments 
while most of them will automatically be redundant if the necessary condition of valid 
instrument cannot be held.  
Finally, rewriting equation 5.2 in an error correction form yields 
 ∆𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = ∅(𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜃1𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝜃6𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 
−𝛽2∆𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽4∆𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽6∆𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽8∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽10∆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽12∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
(5.3) 




















∅ = −(1 − 𝛼) 
when  ∆𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , ∆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡are all equal to 0 at the 
equilibrium point in the long run. 
In conclusion, it is possible to construct more efficient estimators of the 
dynamic panel model. It is especially suitable for “small T, large N” panels with not 
strictly exogenous independent variables, unbalanced panel structure and 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation within observations (Roodman, 2006). However, 
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it is worth noting that the application of the model in this study relies on the nature of 
the dataset. For analysis in sub-groups such as small/medium/large regions, this 
model may not be applicable. 
 
5.3 Results and analysis  
 
Descriptive analysis 
The main goal of this chapter is to assess the influence of different amenities 
on the distribution of creative workers. It is informative to outline the overall level of 
these variables before considering their variation over time. Therefore, Figures 5.1 to 
5.6 summarise the main target variables in the reference year of 2010. Here, locational 
quotients and the index for social provision are re-calculated by dividing relative 
regional shares by an overall share for all the target regions (Europe=100) in order to 
make the description across different regions and countries comparable.  
By looking at Figure 5.1, there is an indication that the education and social 
care systems in western European and the Nordic counties employ more workers than 
the eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary. In particular, 
the U.K., Sweden, Germany and Finland have a high level of social provision. A 
similar pattern can be captured in a few regions in France; however, none of regions 
in Spain and Portugal show this pattern. From this picture, it seems as though capital 
is not necessarily favourable for gaining obvious advantages in accessing more public 
resources. This point is indicated by the fact that in the most populated and developed 
district in Île de France, France only 7.1 percent of the population work for the social 
care and education system, which is slightly below the European average of 7.3 
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percent. In Greater London, this figure is 9.5 percent, but again, this percentage is 
lower than some other regions of the U.K. such as South East England (11.0 percent) 
and South West England (10.2 percent). 
Given the issue of data constraints, the definition of openness is slightly 
different to Florida’s, and this study uses the share of migrants or foreign-born 
workers. In Figure 5.2 the distribution of migrant workers in the local labour market 
shows us a completely different picture compared to that for social provision. Migrant 
workers are more likely to locate at regions in France and Spain, where the relative 
shares of migrant workers is high overall. Furthermore, migrant workers also appear 
to gather around metropolises such as Greater London, Paris (Île de France), 
Stockholm, Madrid and Lisbon. On average, the density of migrant worker in the U.K. 
does not rank as top in Europe, even though the share of migrant workers in the 
capital district of Greater London is extremely high, at 34.2 percent. Similarly, in 
Paris and Stockholm, these ratios are 32.8 percent and 19.1 percent respectively.   
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of bohemians. As Florida argued, workers in 
artistic occupations are the bohemians who favour local amenities. Hence they 
indicate a region’s capacity to attract other creative workers. The findings reveal that 
the distribution of bohemian people is, to some extent, similar to the distribution of 
migrant workers. It is interesting to see that the U.K., Finland, Sweden and Germany 
have significantly higher proportions of bohemian populations that are distributed 
across regions evenly. In comparison to the European average ratio of 1.0 percent, all 
of regions in the U.K., Sweden and Finland and many of the regions in Germany 
show us a higher level. In the remaining regions, such a pattern is, however, not very 
clear as only a few regions can be identified as being rich in a bohemian climate, and 
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many regions in the Eastern European countries can only be 180haracterized as being 
extremely unfavourable, accounting for only 35.4 percent of the European average. 
The distribution of the bohemian population in response to economic scale 
seems straightforward in that in all of the capitals, the level of the bohemian 
population appears to be higher than the European average. For example, the most 
“bohemian” region is Greater London (2.8 percent over total employment), followed 
by other city regions like Île de France, Stockholm, Madrid, Lisbon, Athens, Praha, 
Berlin and Wien. Therefore, the distribution of bohemians in Europe seems to 
strongly support the favourable role of the metropolis as Florida (2008) has pointed 
out. 
Next the quality of regional political institutions is considered in Figure 5.4, 
based on Charron et al.’s (2014) study for target regions, using measures of 
government effectiveness, impartiality and honesty. Here, it is assumed that the 
quality of the political institutions across regions in Finland is constant since there is 
no regional information. In addition to the exclusive focus on the regional variation of 
the EQI, this thesis discusses if its level follows a similar pattern of change to other 
indicators mentioned above.  
Figure 5.4 shows a strong national division. In general, regions in the Nordic 
countries, such as in Sweden and Finland, have the highest scores for political 
institutions, followed by some western European regions such as Rég. Bruxelles-
Cap.-Brussels Hfdst. Gewest in Belgium (81.6), Burgenland in Austria (90.6), 
Thüringen in Germany (91.7) or the East Midlands and Scotland in the U.K. (88.9 and 
89.6 respectively). In contrast, the majority of regions in France, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece show lower values of the EQI and regions in the Eastern European countries 
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rank the lowest. It is intriguing to see that the quality of the political institutions is not 
always positively correlated with economic scale. Many metropolitan areas that are 
strongly appealing to the bohemian population or migrant workers do not have 
equivalently high scores, such as Greater London (72.3), Île de France (73.5) or 
Madrid (60.0). 
As far as the distribution of university teachers is concerned, the descriptive 
analysis at this stage could be inaccurate in some regions due to the data collection 
technique employed by the EU LFS. This survey based dataset, unlike the national 
accounts, has small numbers in some occupations. This is the reason why missing 
values were observed in some regions for a particular year. However, a plausible 
distribution pattern can still be portrayed as shown in Figure 5.5. The high shares of 
university teachers can be seen in the total employment in the U.K. (particularly in 
England) and in some regions in France, Spain and Sweden.  
Finally, the distribution of creative workers (see Figure 5.6) hints that the 
level of creative labour is overall higher in the U.K. and Nordic countries while being 
very low in many regions in Italy, Spain and Portugal as well as in the Eastern 
European countries. As is the case for migrant workers and bohemians, the majority 
of metropolises have a significantly higher proportion of their population working in 
creative jobs.  
In summary, the descriptive analysis in this section suggests that Florida’s 
arguments are suitable for the big region context, particularly the European mega-
regions (e.g. Greater London, Paris, Madrid, Berlin and Kozep-Magyarorszag 
(Budapest). Here a high share of bohemians, migrant workers and the location of 
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universities co-exist with a high share of creative workers. However, this tendency is 
much less obvious for the rest of the regions.  
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Note: Sjaelland in Denmark=100/ Bucuresti Ilfov in Romania=0
















Chapter 5: The regional density of the creative class  
188 
 















Regional analysis involves many issues as mentioned earlier, particularly for a 
longitudinal dataset. Hence, as described above, three analytical models are adopted 
with different perspectives to deliver robust results. The direct application of the raw 
data would be problematic as the variables were derived from different scales; for 
example, employment shares to represent social provision levels but an index for 
political institutions. As shown in Appendix 4.B, both dependent and independent 
variables to a certain degree have skewed and wide distributions. In response, a log-
transformation can be valuable both for making the patterns of the data more 
interpretable and for helping to meet the basic assumptions of inferential statistics. 
Admittedly, a problem with this approach is that it may result in small variance 
because the data variables are mainly based on population shares. However, in 
practice significant variation can nevertheless be observed. As can be seen in Table 
5.1, the value of the locational quotient of the creative class varies from 5.06 to 3.65 
and the standard deviation is 0.17. Some of the independent variables exhibit even 
more variation, for example, the locational quotient of bohemians varies between 5.92 
and 1.37. 
Table 5.2 shows correlations between the main variable in 2010 is taken as a 
reference for presenting the correlation test. As can be seen, there is a strong 
correlation between the location of the creative class and variables relating to people 
climate and regional social provision, with the location of bohemians having the most 
significant link.  
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
Moreover, the model does not suffer from multicollinearity as the majority of 
correlations between the independent variables are not large. Also, the diagnostic test 
indicates that all of the VIF scores are below five (see Table 5.3). In particular, as can 
be seen, the correlation of the bohemians variable with openness is only 0.17 and with 
university teachers only 0.27. It is also notable that a higher level of social provision 
is strongly correlated, 0.69, with a higher quality of political institutions. This finding, 
to a great extent, confirms the validity of the EQI index (Charron et al., 2014), since 
one of sub-components for the EQI index is how local residents evaluate the quality 
of local social welfare and education systems46.  
                                                          
46 A correlation exercise for other years in the sample was also run, giving similar results to 2010. 
Description Mean Max Min Sd 
Creative class 4.525 5.055 3.654 0.165 
Creative graduates 4.518 5.363 3.299 0.219 
Creative non-graduates 4.530 5.133 3.299 0.186 
The creative core 4.555 5.259 3.449 0.212 
Creative professionals 4.508 5.109 3.475 0.190 
Bohemians 4.281 5.916 1.368 0.551 
Openness 4.369 6.056 1.778 0.484 
University  4.396 6.309 1.353 0.604 
Social provision (%) -2.853 -0.768 -4.803 0.422 
Government performance (%) -2.364 -1.191 -3.294 0.364 
Interactive term LEQI -9.642 -3.581 -14.877 2.014 
Notes: 
1. All variables are log-transformed.  
2. The first eight variables are location quotient based. The levels of social provision and government 
performance are expressed by the percentage of employees in education and social welfare and public 
administration respectively.  
3. Taking the locational quotient of the creative class as an example, its antilog of mean value is 92.3, 
meaning that shares of creative workers across all target regions are below corresponding national shares 
(100) on average. 




Table 5.2: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 Year 2010 
 The Creative Class (CR) Bohemian (LB) Openness (LO) University (LT) Social provision (S) 
      
Bohemian (LB) 0.541*** 1    
 (0.000)     
      
Openness (LO) 0.197*** 0.166*** 1   
 (0.005) (0.000)    
      
University (LT) 0.382*** 0.270*** 0.0125 1  
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.886)   
      
Social provision (S) 0.323*** 0.162*** -0.0199 0.237** 1 
 (0.000) (0.279) (0.817) (0.025)  
      
EQI Index 0.152* 0.061 0.0716 0.048 0.691*** 
 (0.052) (0.442) (0.404) (0.557) (0.000) 
   Note: p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 




Table 5.3: Diagnostic test for multicollinearity 
Variable VIF scores 1/VIF scores 
Bohemian (LB) 1.43 0.69 
Openness (LO) 1.11 0.89 
University (LT) 1.11 0.89 
Social provision (S) 1.43 0.69 
EQI Index 1.38 0.72 
 
Fixed effects model 
It is clear that regional specific effects are important. Many of these effects, 
however, are not observable and could correlate with the independent variables. 
Therefore, the coefficient estimates will be biased due to endogeneity (i.e. a common 
omitted third factor determining both dependent and independent variables). In 
response, a fixed effects model is used to allow for regional fixed effects, to pick up 
unmeasured cultural, historical and geographic factors. It can be seen that the 
coefficients for the bohemian climate, university effects and the level of social 
provision are all positive and significant, though the elasticity for the social provision 
variable (the share of workers in education and social services industries) is largest at 
about 0.247. However, the impact of openness and the measure of political institutions 
is not significant.  
                                                          
47 Two reasons may be associated with the large coefficient of the level of social provision. Firstly, a 
considerable amount of creative workers who work in education and social services industries is not 
excluded from the total number of creative workers. However, the measure of creative workers 
would no longer be consistent to the nature of the creative class if this subcategory is further 
excluded (universities teachers, bohemians, workers in public administration and migrant creative 
workers have been excluded). Secondly, this variable is derived as share based in comparison to other 
locational quotients based on relative shares. Therefore, even though it has been log-transformed; 
the relative change of a share may yield a greater effect as a higher level of variations could be 
observed. In essence, the larger coefficient of the level of social provision could not imply that it is 
more important than other independent variables, but a simple reflection of the difference in 
measurement. As it is difficult to measure the concept of social provision in a temporal order based 
on any of the existing databases, this thesis focuses on how the size of the coefficient concerning this 
variable varies in the different model specifications, rather than focusing on comparing it to other 
locational quotients.  
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Country-specific time trends are also added to the FE specification. As can be 
seen in the last column in Table 5.4, university effects decrease to 0.014. Also a 
higher coefficient in the bohemian climate, the level of social provision and the 
measure of government performances can be observed. Once again, the impact of 
openness and the measure of political institutions remain insignificant.  
Endogeneity tests (see Table 5.5) do not reveal any problems after the 
removal of the fixed effects48, thus the fixed effects model appears robust. At this 
stage, it is possible to conclude that the locational preference of creative workers 
appears to be largely influenced by the bohemian climate, as Florida proposed. The 
importance of universities is also identified. Although the university elasticity is a bit 
lower than the people climate, the study directly links universities to the distribution 
of the creative class. This finding may indicate that the creative class indeed has some 
similar preferences as educated workers in general. While Florida tries to distinguish 
the creative class and human capital, what cannot be neglected is that a significant 
part of the creative class or human capital factors overlap since many creative people 
are highly educated. Although it is not possible to tell if these graduate creative 
workers are shaped more by creativity or education, they are, to some extent, 
behaving in a common way. 
                                                          
48 Theoretically, a model could still suffer endogeneity after the removal of the fixed effects, given the 
fact that some time-variant unexplainable factors in the error term could still correlate with 
independent variables. In this case, the IVFE model can be a solution. 
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      Table 5.4: Fixed effects specification 
       Dep var: ln (loc quotient creative workers) 





















Share of workers in 
















Within R^2 0.23 0.29 
N. of cases 2191 2191 
Notes:  
1. LQ indicates locational quotient indicator.  
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.5: Endogeneity test (a) 
Variable Chi-square value of C Statistic P-value 
Location of bohemians  0.173 0.6773 
Location of migrants 1.021 0.3122 
Location of universities 0.202 0.6535 
Social provision 0.363 0.5471 
Share of workers in public 
sectors 0.543 0.3690 
Interactive term (EQI*L) 1.739 0.1873 
Note: The endogeneity test was developed by Baum et al. (2007). The detail of this technique will be 
explained in the following section. 
 
It is interesting to consider whether there are different effects for peripheral 
(i.e. employment less than 300,000) and metropolitan regions (with employment over 
720,00049). Table 5.6 shows the estimated model for each group size. Although the 
whole sample cannot be divided into sub-categories of metropolises and peripherals 
due to data constraints, it is still plausible to assume that regions with larger 
workforces capture this pattern of difference. 
Starting with a fixed effects model, where year dummies are included to take 
account of common economic shock, Table 5.6 shows some difference in coefficients 
between the three groups of regions. The bohemian variable is strongly linked with 
the distribution of the creative class in large-sized regions (0.057), but is not 
significant in small-sized regions. More obviously, the impact of the openness 
variable has no significant effects in small-sized and midsized regions, but again its 
impact is very strong in large-sized regions, at 0.096. At the same time, the level of 
social provision has a significant impact in all three types of regions, with the 
strongest effect in large-sized regions. Finally, the effect of universities only has a 
                                                          
49 The average number of employees was calculated by the available time period for each region and 
then the regional hierarchy was defined in terms of this value in the 30th, 60th and 90th percentiles 
respectively. 
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significant impact in small-sized regions, suggesting the important role of universities 
in regional development policy. 
A further finding is that better quality political institutions appear to attract 
creative workers more strongly in small regions. As can be seen, the coefficients of L 
and the interactive term between L and the EQI index are only 0.049 and 0.007 in 
large regions, which further increase to 0.087 and 0.015 in smaller regions. Medium 
regions seem in between, as is perhaps appropriate, and the model generally performs 
worse, with a lower R2, 0.15, less than half the size of that for the other region 
categories. 
Since the inclusion of country-specific time trends is a plausible specification, 
there is no reason to restrict time trends as a constant across different countries. 
Therefore, next the analytical model is extended to allow for country-specific time 
trends. The results indicate a considerable difference within these two model 
specifications. As can be seen in the second column in each region category, the 
bohemian variable now gains significance in small-sized regions, with the positive 
coefficient, 0.023. At the same time, the elasticity of the level of social provision and 
universities slightly increases to 0.172 and 0.036, though the openness variable 
remains insignificant. In contract, the obvious changes can be observed in the measure 
of local governments, as this variable no longer has significant explanatory power. 
However, the relationship between L and the EQI index is still strong at 0.013.  




Table 5.6: The fixed effects model: a further investigation on region sizes 
Dep var: ln (loc quotient creative workers) 





























































































Dummies Country-specific time trends Time trends 
Country-specific 
time trends Time trends 
Country-specific 
time trends Time trends 
R^2 0.43 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.59 0.50 
N. of cases 588 588 868 868 735 735 
Notes:  
1. Small, medium and large regions are defined as regions with employment less than 325,000, greater than 325,000 while less than 770,000 and greater than 770,000 
respectively. 
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors shown in parenthesis. 
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A similar pattern can also be seen in large-sized regions. In addition to the 
slightly changed coefficients for bohemians, openness, universities and social 
provision, the coefficient of local government performance significantly increases to 
0.101, but the measure of local political institutions loses significance, though its 
coefficient is not largely changed. In the end, the results in midsized regions appear to 
be stable, as the majority of coefficients remain similar.  
In conclusion, the findings seem robust. Even though some coefficients are not 
consistent within two specifications, this is likely due to the lack of degrees of 
freedom (e.g. the number of observations for small-sized regions is only 588, while 
the corresponding number of dummies is more than 50). Thus, Florida’s thesis 
appears to be most valid in the big region (metropolitan) context, where creative 
workers are drawn by the people climate (the bohemian and openness variables). In 
small regions by contrast, the creative class seems instead to stick to a “conventional 
lifestyle”, caring especially about the quality of local institutions including local 
government and the social welfare system. 
 
The dynamic GMM model 
The thesis now turns to a specification allowing dynamic adjustment, using the 
system GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) as implemented in Stata (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, p.328-330). Flows of creative workers could be self-
determined (Faggian et al., 2011) in the sense that creative workers are drawn to 
places where there are already creative workers. This process would link the current 
dependent variable to its past realisation. Admittedly, the panel dataset has a relatively 
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short time dimension (T=15) relative to its regional dimension (N=193), but still it is 
possible to test for some dynamic effects. 
This is not the first time system GMM has been used to analyse the impact of 
the creative class. Möller and Tubadji (2009) used the system GMM model to discuss 
the creative class in Germany. This contribution supports the plausibility of this 
application in this case. To be specific, the model involves introducing one-period 
lagged dependent and independent variables into the regression, so here the sample 
size is reduced from 2191 to 1956.  
Table 5.7 presents the results, starting with a “naïve” form, the pooled OLS 
model. As can be seen, the location of creative workers is significantly related to its 
past realisation, showing a figure of 0.847. Also, the coefficients of current values of 
the location of bohemians, the location of university teachers, the level of social 
provision and the interaction term L*EQI are 0.033, 0.022, 0.193 and 0.025 
respectively. However, the current impacts of openness and government performance 
are not significant. The long-run effects will be discussed later, in connection with the 
preferred results in column V. 
Theoretically, the OLS estimator should lead to an upward bias that will be 
counteracted by an opposite bias with the FE estimator (Bond, 2002). As shown in the 
second column, the inclusion of regional dummies indeed reduces the coefficients of 
the lagged dependent variable from 0.847 to 0.451 and also the rest of the independent 
variables. The demeaning transformation cannot completely eliminate the problem of 
endogeneity from lagged dependent variables, so in response, the Anderson-Hsiao 
(1981) difference and levels GMM estimator is reported, which is a prelude to the 
later work by Arellano and Bond (1991). The basic principle for this approach is to 
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instrument differenced endogenous variables by their past lagged levels. The result 
then shows that the coefficient of lagged dependent variable is 0.478, which lies 
between 0.847 and 0.451.  
An alternative is Arellano and Bond’s difference GMM estimator. However, 
as shown in the fourth column in Table 5.7, it performs even less well. Here, the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is only 0.237, which is smaller than that 
for the fixed effects model. Other coefficients are also diminished, implying 
implausibly small elasticities. This result can be regarded as normal as this 
differencing transformation approach will not perform very well if the dependent 
variable behaves as a random-walk. In other words, past levels of the creative 
population’s preferences may convey little information about further changes in 
preferences. So finally, the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator will be addressed 
Since the system GMM model involves level equations (i.e. the fixed effects 
are not yet removed), it is always necessary to test the possible endogeneity for 
regressors. Beside the dynamic panel bias caused by the lagged dependent variable, 
there is no reason to assume that the rest of the independent variables are strictly 
exogenous. The endogeneity test employed here is based on the approach by Baum et 
al. (2007). In conditional homoscedasticity, this technique is mathematically equal to 
the Wu-Hausman F-test version of the endogeneity test but it is rather more robust 
regarding various violations. 
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Table 5.7: Model specification: a dynamic framework 
Dep var: ln(loc quotient creative workers) 
                  (I)Pooled- OLS (II)FE 
(III) Anderson-Hsiao 
difference and levels GMM 
(1981) 
(IV)Arellano-Bond 
difference GMM (1991) 


























































































































































Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummies No Yes No No No 
N. of cases 1956 1956 1752 1752 1956 
R^2 0.83 0.87 n/a n/a n/a 
Note: variables in model III are difference-transformed,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The lagged variables in differences are adopted as valid instruments since the 
difference transformation removes the fixed effects and the further lagging makes 
them exogenous to current error terms while still having impact on their current 
realisations. All suspect regressors will then be tested one by one. As shown in Table 
5.8, the C-statistic for the bohemians and social provision variables indicates that they 
cannot be treated as exogenous, as the Chi-square values are 12.9 and 5.7 respectively. 
With this in mind, the bohemians and social provision variables appear to be 
endogenous. 
In the last column, the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator seems to fit 
well with the thesis’ expectations: the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
inside the credible range of 0.451-0.847 at 0.824. The rest of the independent 
variables also have plausible magnitudes and signs. In response to the endogeneity 
test shown above, the location of bohemians and social provision are treated as 
endogenous, while taking location of migrant workers, location of universities, and 
quality of local government as exogenous. As a result, the long-run coefficient of 
bohemians is (0.031-0.020)/ (1-0.824) =0.06350, which shows a smaller impact on 
creative workers’ consumer preferences than the location of universities 0.022/ (1-
0.824) =0.125. The level of openness is again not significant in this regression, but the 
long-run effect of social provision is sizeable (0.202-0.181)/ (1-0.824) =0.119 which 
is, however, not as strong as the fixed affects estimator predicted (0.215). Finally, 
neither the local government performance nor its interaction with the EQI index has a 
positive long-run effect on average. Once again, this finding is consistent with the 
fixed affects model predicted, as only a good political institution appears to have a 
positive impact on the location of the creative class.  
                                                          
50 If Y(t)=aY(t-1) + b X(t) + cX(t-1), then ∂Y/∂X = (b+c)/(1-a). 
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In conclusion, column V’s model has a better analysis of causality, yet depicts 
a similar picture to the fixed effects model. Hence, it seems plausible to conclude that 
the location preferences of creative workers are to some extent influenced by the 
distribution of bohemians. Similarly, the location of universities and the amount of 
social provision also play an important role, suggesting that the creative class and 
graduates inevitably exhibits similar preferences. 
Table 5.8: Endogeneity test (b) 
Variable Chi-square values of C Statistic P-value 
Bt ,Bt-1 (location of bohemians) 12.852*** 0.0003 
Ot ,Ot-1 (location of migrants) 0.418 0.5181 
Tt ,Tt-1 (location of university) 2.238 0.1347 
St ,St-1 (social provision) 5.668*** 0.0173 
Lt ,Lt-1 (government performance) 2.007 0.1951 
Lt* LEQIt ,Lt-1* LEQIt-1(Interaction)  0.012 0.9113 
Note:  
1. The endogeneity test is, however, different from the previous one as the regional-specific effect is 
not yet removed. 
2. This endogeneity test was developed by Baum et al. (2007), which is calculated by the difference of 
two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments, where the 
suspect regressor(s) are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger set of 
instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. If a significant difference is 
identified, the suspect regressor(s) will be treated as endogenous. 
3. The stata command used here is ivreg2 with endog() option. 
 
Robustness Test: a reevaluation based on multiple dimensions          
This section intends to test further the robustness of the empirical model by 
taking up different sub-categories of the creative class. The first sub-category takes 
workers who are defined as being in the creative core, with a clearer role in the realm 
of creative innovation-related development paths (Kratke, 2010). They may also have 
different preferences (Ashiem and Hansen, 2009; Beckstead et al., 2008; Hansen et.al., 
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2009). The second type of breakdown has been recently discussed by Maroccu and 
Paci (2012), who combined both the creative class and human capital, putting forward 
the creative graduate concept.  
Table 5.9 shows that these less controversial groupings (creative graduates or 
the creative core) exhibit different location preferences to the whole creative class. 
Preferences for movement to places with a bohemian or open climate are not seen. 
However, the role of local government is more marked for the creative core, since its 
long-run coefficient for the interaction L*EQI is (0.013-0.011)/ (1-0.693) =0.007, 
which is significantly larger than for the other groupings. Also the location of 
universities (T) has stronger explanatory power, showing current coefficients of 0.018 
and 0.021. 
In contrast, a different pattern is shown for the categories of non-graduate 
creative workers and creative professionals. As can be seen in the second and the last 
columns, the impact of the bohemian index and the lagged impact of the openness 
index are evident here, but university and social provision appear unimportant. This 
result is plausible since these groups synthesise knowledge (rather than creating it), 




In this chapter, we seek to investigate the validity of Florida’s propositions 
regarding the people climate. Even though the promotion of the people climate is 
argued to be not a one-size-fits-all solution, the remedy for smaller regions to grow 
under the dominate milieu in the Creative Age has not been clearly proposed. With 
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this question in mind, this chapter has aimed to examine the preferences of the 
creative class. In response to hypotheses 5.1-5.3, the findings can be categorised as 
bellow: 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: is the effect of the people climate always positive across different 
regions? 
The main answer to hypothesis 5.1 proposed at the beginning, is that many of 
the relationships put forward by Florida (2002, 2008) are evident in the European 
context. This conclusion is consistent with previous studies of the U.S. and Canada 
(McGranhan and Wojan, 2007; Reese et al., 2010). The thesis controlled for regional 
heterogeneity and for possible endogeneity caused by omitted variables or 
simultaneity. The location of bohemians and the location of migrant workers were all 
found to be positively related to the location of the creative class, but this relationship 
are more likely to be relevant in large (metropolitan) regions (those with more than 
about 770,000 employees) and less so in smaller ones (with less than approximately 
320,000 employees).  
 
Hypothesis 5.2: is the business climate important? 
The level of social provision was also found to be a good proxy in determining 
the location of the creative class in all regional contexts. Therefore, hypothesis 5.2, to 
a certain degree, can be verified, as the basic aspects of socio-economic progress such 
as the quality of education and social welfare systems are still fundamental. However, 
it is most interesting that for the rest of business climate-related parameters, namely 
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the quality of the local political institutions and the location of universities, their 
positive roles are only evident in small regions. This finding has positive policy 
implications for local government in small areas, possibly using university 
development, for example, to attract the creative workers who are important for 
regional development.  
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Are the creative class’ consumer preferences different in each 
creative sub-category? 
Finally, it is believed that hypothesis 5.3 cannot be rejected. Even though the 
model does not fit all sub-categories within whole creative class equally well, results 
show the importance of the people climate (i.e. tolerance and openness) or the 
business climate (i.e. location of universities, social provision and good local 
government) in different contexts. The fact that the people climate is more important 
for the non-creative graduates and creative professionals, while the business climate is 
more important for creative graduates and the creative core, is consistent with Asheim 
and Hansen’s (2009) argument that creative workers with different knowledge bases 
should have different preferences for residential location. 
In conclusion, this study is likely to reveal causality, in response to the 
proverbial “chicken and egg” problem. It is not intended to discard the whole theory 
of the people climate, as the people climate indeed has strong explanatory power in 
explaining the distribution of the creative class in metropolitan areas. However, it may 
see counter intuitive that only the quality of local government is a good predictor in 
smaller regions. Some characteristics, although they have been mentioned but not 
greatly emphasized by Florida, appears to be very important. In this sense, small 
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economies have chances to become creative powerhouses if local policy makers 
correctly associate the preferences of the creative class with their unique advantages. 
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Table 5.9: Robustness test: the different definitions of creative workers 
 Creative graduates Creative non-graduates The Creative core Creative professionals 


































































































N. of cases 1955 1956 1956 1956 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (Z) -7.38/ (P)0.000 (Z) -4.18 / (P)0.001 (Z) -5.28 / (P)0.000 (Z) -5.28 / (P)0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (Z) 0.64/ (P) 0.523 (Z) -0.08 / (P) 0.939 (Z) 0.97/ (P) 0.331 (Z) 0.97/ (P) 0.331 
Notes: 1. Creative grads – the creative group (senior govt officials, managers, professionals, associate professionals and scientists) with a degree (note – excludes bohemians, univ teachers and 
migrants) (see also Table 4.1), 2.Creative core – same as creative group excluding senior govt officials, managers and associate professionals, 3.Creative professionals – senior govt officials, 
managers and associate professionals.




Appendix 5. A: The EQI scores of local governments 
Code Region EQI Code Region EQI 
AT11 Burgenland 90.62 FR53 Poitou-Charentes 78.32 
AT12 Niederöstrerreich 84.49 FR61 Aquitaine 79.44 
AT13 Wien 84.97 FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 70.18 
AT21 Kärnten 88.12 FR63 Limousin 77.42 
AT22 Steiermark 81.35 FR71 Rhone-Alpes 79.00 
AT31 Oberösterreich 82.63 FR72 Auvergne 73.85 
AT32 Salzburg 82.03 FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 73.28 
AT33 Tirol 87.66 FR82 Alpes-Cote d'Azur 66.28 
AT34 Voralberg 86.16 FR83 Corse 64.28 
BE1 Brussels 53.01 GR1 Voreia Ellada 31.34 
BE2 Vlaams Gewest 81.55 GR2 Kentriki Ellada 38.31 
BE3 Wallonie 60.89 GR3 Attica 55.90 
CZ01 Praha 41.64 GR4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti 41.72 
CZ02 Stredni Cechy 56.41 HU1 Közép-Magyarország 39.69 
CZ03 Jihozapad 61.09 HU2 Dunántúl 54.90 
CZ04 Severozapad 41.51 HU3 Észak és Alföld 52.30 
CZ05 Severovychod 58.90 ITC1 Piemonte 58.07 
CZ06 Jihovychod 51.69 ITC2 Valle d'Acosta 75.78 
CZ07 Stedni Morava 49.66 ITC3 Ligura 49.61 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko 53.42 ITC4 Lombardia 46.76 
DE1 Baden Wuttemberg 83.94 ITD1 Bolzano 78.74 
DE2 Bavaria 78.09 ITD2 Trento 72.35 
DE3 Berlin 83.94 ITD3 Veneto 50.57 
DE4 Brandenburg 83.89 ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 64.96 
DE5 Bremen 83.33 ITD5 Emilia-Romagna 53.20 
DE6 Hamburg 83.51 ITE1 Toscana 48.65 
DE7 Hessen 76.31 ITE2 Umbria 56.50 
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 83.25 ITE3 Marche 50.61 
DE9 Lower Saxony 82.99 ITE4 Lazio 33.06 
DEA North Rhine Westphalia 78.14 ITF1 Abruzzo 40.86 
DEB Rhineland-Palatinate 80.58 ITF2 Molise 33.73 
DEC Saarland 80.58 ITF3 Campania 10.18 
DED Saxony 86.44 ITF4 Puglia 22.87 
DEE Saxony-Anhalt 81.43 ITF5 Basilicata 33.24 
DEF Schleswig-Holstein 90.30 ITF6 Calabria 13.00 
DEG Thuringia 91.67 ITG1 Sicilia 20.85 
FR10 Ile-de-France 73.50 ITG2 Sardegna 41.33 
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 65.63 PT11 Norte 54.68 
FR22 Picardie 71.85 PT15 Algarve 66.21 
FR23 Haute-Normandie 64.29 PT16 Centro 61.05 
FR24 Centre 74.95 PT17 Lisboa 64.74 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 72.53 PT18 Alentejo 77.74 
FR26 Bourgogne 72.15 PT20 Autónoma dos Açores 72.82 
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 73.44 PT30 Autónoma da Madeira 67.76 
FR41 Lorraine 66.90 ES11 Galicia 74.66 
FR42 Alsace 71.93 ES12 Principado de Asturias 73.30 
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FR43 Franche-Comte 72.36 ES13 Cantabria 65.28 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 69.36 ES21 Pais Vasco 76.64 
FR52 Bretagne 84.30 ES22 Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra 
65.92 
ES23 La Rioja 67.45 ES70 Canarias (ES) 68.08 
ES24 Aragón 69.13 SE1 Östra Sverige 92.13 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 60.03 SE2 Södra Sverige 93.81 
ES41 Castilla y León 60.97 SE3 Norra Sverige 89.61 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 66.69 UKC Northeast England 81.81 
ES43 Extremadura 71.21 UKD Northwest England 84.44 
ES51 Cataluña 52.07 UKE Yorkshire-Humber 76.00 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 65.50 UKF East Midland England 88.91 
ES53 Illes Balears 64.53 UKG West Midland England 79.21 
ES61 Andalucia 57.84 UKH East of England 78.42 
ES62 Región de Murcia 68.34 UKI London 72.34 
UKJ South East England 85.36 FI Finland 92.17 
UKK South West England 85.55    
UKL Wales 79.35    
UKM Scotland 89.60    
UKN N. Ireland 82.12    
Notes:  
1. For Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Greece, the U.K. and Sweden, only NUTS 1 is available. For        
Finland, there is no information by regions. 
2. Source: Measuring the quality of government and subnational variations (Charron et al., 2014), 
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Appendix 5. B: Tests for normality 
 
(1) Locational quotient of creative workers 
   
(2) Interation term L*EQI 
   
(3) Locational quotient of migrant workers 
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(4) Locational quotient of university teachers 
   
(5) Share of workers in public administration  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF NEW CREATIVE WORKERS IN THE 
EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Following hypothesis 6.1, Chapter 6 focused on the relationship between 
creative individuals and the education system. The significantly positive impacts of 
the creative class and its sub-category (e.g. creative graduates) on regional 
development and growth were shown, but how are they rewarded by labour markets? 
A healthy and creativity-engendering economy should not only attract creative 
workers from outside, but should also act as a powerhouse in forging well-trained and 
educated individuals in the creative disciplines. Therefore, the national education 
system plays an important role in acting as a supplier to the labour market, constantly 
providing appropriate skills and qualifications that the creative economy requires.  
With regard to generating creative workers, to date there have only been a few 
empirical studies. Comunian et al. (2010) initially examined the labour market in the 
U.K. for bohemian graduates. Using micro-individual student data by the Higher 
Education Statistical Agency (HESA), bohemian graduates in the U.K. were believed 
to be unfairly rewarded in the year 2006 in terms of the level of salary and type of 
jobs offered to them. However, the scope is limited to bohemian graduates in the U.K., 
which leaves space for further research. 
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In this thesis, labour markets and education systems in seven European 
countries will be examined. Given that little comparative research has been 
undertaken on the scale of the creative economy across Europe (Carr, 2009), the EU 
LFS database provides an opportunity to link the main European creative economies 
together, such as the U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy and France. In addition, the 
Netherlands and Denmark are also included, as their economies have frequently been 
described as “creative” (Stam et al., 2008). 
Compared to many pieces of research that focus on the narrative concept of 
the “creative industry” (DCMS, 1998), the creative occupations, which represent 
labour demand in the labour market, can be often embedded in other sectors. 
Therefore, creative occupations can be included in both the creative industries and the 
non-creative industries (Higgs et al., 2007). An analysis for graduates with arts, 
design, media or other creative education backgrounds might suit the scope of the 
creative industry. When the scale is further expanded to the whole creative class, this 
concept cannot cover the large number of workers who also have important creative 
skills that cannot be defined as “artistic”. Therefore, not only bohemians but also the 
rest of the creative workers are included in this study (see Figure 6.1). As in previous 
chapters, new creative workers are defined as bohemians, the creative core and 
creative professionals. 
Finally, the definition of education in this study is a broad concept, which 
includes not only those graduates with a university or tertiary degree but also non-
graduates. This attempt is responsive to the argument between the human capital 
theory and the creative class theory as a large number of creative workers do not have 
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a university degree (Florida, 2013; Mellander, 2009). However, artists are argued to 
be better educated (Menger, 1999) and for some traditional occupations such as HE 
and secondary education teachers, scientists, lawyers and medical practitioners, a 
university degree is regarded as a “stepping stone” onto a career ladder (Elias and 
Purcell, 2004). Given that most of these occupations are also categorised as creative 
occupations, this thesis is interested in analysing the job outcomes of both creative 
graduates and creative non-graduates across different countries.            
 
6.2 Models  
 
After having defined qualifications and creative occupations in section 3.4, the 







Labour supply Labour demand 
 




Chapter 6: The performance of new creative workers in the European labour market  
216 
 
Firstly, the simple descriptive statistics are presented to measure the situation 
of newly graduated students regarding both supply and demand in the labour market. 
An important setup here is that only individuals who have jobs in the current year are 
focused upon. In other words, only the relationship between the supply of labour 
(graduates/non-graduates) and the demand of labour (creative/non-creative 
occupations) is addressed, without consideration of unemployment as the EU LFS 
dataset contains insufficient information to analyse this pattern. Therefore, for 
graduates and non-graduate workers who were students and pupils from the last 
academic year, the only job outcome for them is if their occupations are now creative 
or non-creative based on Florida’s definition. 
Then a multinomial logit model identifies what factors affect the probability of 
obtaining a creative job for new workers. Formally  




                  Pr(Y = 1|X) = e
xβ1
exβ0+exβ1
          (6.1) 
In equation 6.1, outcomes 1 and 0 recorded in y represent the job outcomes in 
terms of creative and non-creative occupations respectively. A set of coefficient  β1  
and β0 is estimated, corresponding to each outcome. However, this model is 
unidentified as it has more than one solution β1 and  β0  and leads to the same 
probability if Y=1 and Y=0. To solve this problem, 𝛽0 has to be set at zero (Stata 
User’s Guide, 2013). Therefore, the remaining coefficients 𝛽1  will measure the 
relative change to the Y=0 group. In this case, the set of equations in 6.1 can be 
further expressed as 
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Pr(Y = 0|X) = 1
exβ1+1
  
                         Pr(Y = 1|X) = e
xβ1
exβ1+1
               (6.2) 
In this case, the relative probability of getting a creative job (Y=1) to the basic 
outcome of getting a non-creative job is: 
                                      Pr(Y=1|X)
Pr(Y=0|X)
= exβ1              (6.3)   
Thus, the exponentiated value βi is defined as the risk-relative ratio (RRR) for one-
unit change in the corresponding variable Xi, which represents the different personal 
and course characteristics in this study. 
At this stage, the definition of creative jobs is only a general concept. As the 
aim is to measure the effect of different characteristics on the outcome of creative jobs, 
all creative occupations will not be separated into sub-categories. However, the 
general education/training background of the whole creative class is still expected to 
reveal the differences in the education system and labour market across the target 
countries. 
Finally, the heterogeneity across the different creative occupations is 
highlighted. Personal and course characteristics can result in different job outcomes 
regarding the nature of creative occupations that require quite different skills and 
qualifications. In this respect, the second multinomial logit model is further used to 
examine how course and personal characteristics influence the probability of getting a 
bohemian, creative core or creative professional job. The following model is 
estimated as: 
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Pr(Y = 0|X) = 1
exβ1+exβ2+exβ3+1
  








                                     Pr(Y = 3|X) = e
xβ3
exβ1+exβ2+exβ3+1
                         (6.4) 
In equation 6.4, outcomes 0, 1, 2 and 3 recorded in y represent the job 
outcomes in terms of non-creative, bohemian, creative core and creative professional 
occupations respectively. The deduction in calculating the risk-relative ratio for each 
sub-category is the same as equation 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
6.3 Results and discussion 
 
6.3.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
Supply of graduates in the European labour market 
If creative graduates/non-graduates can be decomposed by education 
backgrounds, then the comparison between the number of students who have a 
qualification and the number of them who actually get creative jobs will identify a 
“mismatch”. This method can be useful as the mismatch between labour demand and 
labour supply could reveal important characteristics of the education system and 
labour market. However, compared to census based datasets such as HESA or DLHE 
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in the U.K., the estimated results, according to the EU LFS, at the micro level may be 
less accurate. For example, Comunian et al. (2010) reported that over half bohemian 
graduates (50.6 percent) found a job in creative industries or in a creative occupation 
in non-creative industries in the U.K. in the period 2006-2007, while this figure is 
44.7 percent in this case. The reason is twofold: on the one hand, the definition of 
education background in the EU LFS is vague compared to the 4-digit JACS (i.e. 
Joint Academic Coding System) code accessible in the HESA dataset. Therefore, the 
EU LFS subject code 200 (humanities, languages and arts) omitted some important 
subject areas such as media publishing and crafts. On the other hand, survey data also 
lacks accuracy at a very detailed level.  
To observe the supply of graduates in the labour market requires the data from 
Eurostat. As can be seen in Appendix 6.A, the number of graduates evidently 
increased in the period 2000-2007 for the majority of subjects. The only exceptional 
case is France, where the pattern of this overall growth is not very clear, such as in the 
subject fields of science, mathematics and computing (-8.6 percent), humanities and 
arts (-10.1 percent) and social sciences, business and law (-0.1 percent). In contrast, 
Italy experienced a faster average growth in most subjects compared to the rest of the 
countries, such as teacher training and education science (27.4 percent), humanities 
and arts (10.8 percent) or social sciences, business and law (8.5 percent). 
Turning to the share of graduates by subject, figures reveal that graduates with 
a background in social science, business and law account for the largest average share 
across all the target countries. For the other subjects, it is not possible to draw a 
universal conclusion as the ranking varies. However, the share of graduates with a 
health and welfare background or with an engineering, manufacturing and 
construction background is generally larger than those who have a background in 
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science, mathematics and computing, humanities and arts or teacher training and 
education science. In comparison, the smallest number of graduates is allocated to the 
subject agriculture, veterinary and services, which is defined as “other subjects” in 
this thesis.  
It is interesting to observe the significant variation in some subjects, which is 
consistent with the nature of an economy. For example, in the U.K. and the 
Netherlands, where the education industry is an important sector, the share of 
graduates with teacher training and education science is very high, showing figures of 
16.5 percent and 10.2 percent respectively. For the countries where the overall EQI 
source is higher (the overall quality of local government, see Chapter 4), there is a 
greater demand for graduates in the health and welfare sector. For instance, the share 
of health and welfare graduates is relatively larger in Denmark (24.6 percent), 
Germany (23.9 percent), the Netherlands (19.0 percent) and the U.K. (17.3 percent), 
compared to Italy (14.9 percent), Spain (13.1 percent) and France (10.5 percent). 
In conclusion, the patterns and trends for European graduates were 
systematically evaluated in the seven countries. In this context, it is important to 
understand and monitor the size and the shape of higher education. Beside the various 
trends based on the detailed breakdown of data, there is a general growth trajectory. 
This result implies a strong supply of graduates in the European labour market, while 
some countries saw faster growth, such as the U.K., the Netherlands and Italy. At this 
stage, the analysis provides useful information and reference material to understand 
the impact of higher education.  
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Demand for creative workers in the European labour market  
The last section gave sight of the growth of higher education in the target 
countries. Now the focus is on the demand for graduates as well as non-graduates in 
order to distinguish the impact of higher education. Due to the data constraint, the 
dataset from the Eurostat is no longer suitable as there is no information about the 
detailed breakdown of occupations. Instead, the EU LFS dataset is adopted to 
continue the investigation. Again the average of the results is taken based on the 
available time periods for each country. As shown in Table 6.1, it is readily evident 
that the Netherlands and Denmark have the highest shares of new graduates/non-
graduates that actually have creative jobs, which account for 1.9 and 1.4 percent of 
the total average workforce respectively. For western European economies, this figure 
is 1.04 percent in Germany, followed by France (0.8 percent), the U.K. (0.7 percent), 
Spain (0.7 percent) and Italy (0.4 percent). Turning to the role of university degrees, 
the Netherlands and Denmark still have the highest shares of new creative workers 
who have a university degree, showing the figures of 0.9 percent and 0.8 percent 
respectively. In comparison, there is over 0.5 percent of new graduates who have 
creative jobs in the U.K., France and Spain. However, this pattern is less evident in 
Italy and Germany, as the number of new creative graduates almost accounts for the 
same share as those creative non-graduates. 
The above discussion confirmed that higher education is in fact a signal to 
indicate the ability of new workers to get a creative job in the labour market. It is not 
surprising to see that a large share of new creative workers have university degrees, 
which is much higher than the average share of total new workers who have a 
university degree. For example, the total number of new graduates only account for 
0.9 percent of the total workforce in the U.K., while 2.5 percent of new workers do 
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not have a university degree. This finding may support the argument that the concept 
of the creative class and human capital is largely overlapping, and it also highlights 
the importance of the higher education system in shaping creative workers in the long 
term. However, as Florida argued, the creative occupations measure utilised skills 
rather than potential skills such as graduates; therefore, the higher level of the creative 
job outcomes cannot simply be explained by the higher level of human capital. The 
situation in Germany and Italy has already shown that almost half of non-graduates 

















Table 6.1: Demand for creative workers  
 The U.K. France Spain Italy Germany The Netherlands Denmark 
 Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share 
Total workforce 27139629 100% 23823060 100% 16661549 100% 21696648 100% 37428520 100% 8103937 100% 2706812 100% 
Decomposed based on education            
Workers with a university degree 8599671 32% 6403627 27% 5056154 30% 2965141 14% 9856865 26% 2377803 29% 772970 29% 
Workers without a university degree 18539958 68% 17419433 73% 11605395 70% 18731507 86% 27571656 74% 5726134 71% 1933841 71% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Decomposed based on education and situation            
New workers with a university degree 250468 0.92% 238794 1.00% 149955 0.90% 66759 0.31% 199380 0.53% 117263 1.45% 33643 1.24% 
New workers without a university degree 665468 2.45% 374712 1.57% 208746 1.25% 241805 1.11% 1058202 2.83% 583674 7.20% 155858 5.76% 
Total   3.37%  2.58%  2.15%  1.42%  3.36%  8.65%  7.00% 
Decomposed based education, situation and occupation          
New creative workers with a university 
degree 
142411 0.52% 133842 0.56% 86884 0.52% 44123 0.20% 148264 0.40% 73096 0.90% 21635 0.80% 
New creative workers without a university 
degree 
53655 0.20% 55951 0.23% 25179 0.15% 50414 0.23% 237153 0.63% 84480 1.04% 14849 0.55% 
Total   0.72%  0.80%  0.67%  0.44%  1.03%  1.94%  1.35% 
Note: All shares in this table are calculated based the average number of total workforce in each country. For example, in the U.K., the share of new workers with a university degrees 
=250468/27139629=0.92%. 
 
Source: The European Labour Force Survey 
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Creative occupations and education backgrounds  
Next, the relationship between the number of creative occupations taken up by 
new graduates and their education backgrounds is addressed. As is clear from Table 
6.2, it seems that new graduates who have an education, engineering, and health and 
welfare based background are more likely to become creative workers in the U.K., 
Denmark and the Netherlands. This inclination is particularly obvious in the U.K., as 
87.4 percent of new graduates with qualifications related to education actually get 
creative jobs as well as 68.8 percent of new graduates with qualifications related to 
engineering and health and welfare-led subjects. In comparison, new graduates with 
qualifications related to science, social science, bohemian subjects and other subjects 
have a lesser chance of gaining a creative occupation. However, the employment 
structure across different subjects is less polarised in France and Spain as the 
difference between the shares of new creative workers with a degree related to 
education and science and the shares of the remaining subjects are not very significant. 
Germany is a unique case because there is a high probability of getting 
creative jobs through all subjects. In addition to the high probability of getting 
creative jobs for new graduates who have education, bohemian, science and 
engineering, and health and welfare related backgrounds, 77.1 percent of new 
graduates with social science, business and law related backgrounds have creative 
jobs. Finally, the high share of creative graduates based in science, engineering, and 
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health and welfare and other subjects is evident for Italy, while the difference in 
shares for the rest of the subjects is not significant. 
Overall, graduates with bohemian, social science and other backgrounds have 
less adaptability compared to science graduates in the labour market. This mismatch 
may have an implication regarding the nature of higher education in these disciplines, 
as some of the creative skills have a wide application in the knowledge economy. 
Moreover, the high share of graduates with an engineering and health and welfare 
background are likely to be creative workers. It is not surprising that for those creative 
occupations such as 214 (architects, engineers and related professionals) and 222 
(health professionals (except nursing)), the award of a relative university degree is a 
prerequisite similarly to HE, secondary education teachers and scientists. However, 
this pattern may also be indicative of the rapid structure change of the higher 
education system in Europe as more graduate jobs have been created in the health and 
welfare sector (i.e. creative professional jobs); many of these occupations were 
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Table 6.2: Education backgrounds and creative occupations 
Country Education background Graduates who get a creative job 
The U.K. 
Education-led subjects 87.35% 
Bohemian-led subjects 44.73% 
Social science-led subjects 42.95% 
Science-led subjects 58.71% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects  68.82% 
Others 39.76% 
France 
Education-led subjects n/a 
Bohemian-led subjects 46.21% 
Social science-led subjects 42.55% 
Science-led subjects 56.06% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects 67.69% 
Others 40.48% 
Germany 
Education-led subjects 65.18% 
Bohemian-led subjects 56.52% 
Social science-led subjects 77.11% 
Science-led subjects 87.12% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects 81.57% 
Others 53.28% 
Spain 
Education-led subjects 58.70% 
Bohemian-led subjects 52.03% 
Social science-led subjects 63.00% 
Science-led subjects 62.21% 




Education-led subjects 73.04% 
Bohemian-led subjects 38.23% 
Social science-led subjects 54.45% 
Science-led subjects 55.86% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects 67.27% 
Others 53.64% 
Italy 
Education-led subjects 45.33% 
Bohemian-led subjects 44.01% 
Social science-led subjects 53.32% 
Science-led subjects 69.66% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects 77.56% 
Others 83.88% 
Denmark 
Education-led subjects 84.91% 
Bohemian-led subjects 45.45% 
Social science-led subjects 66.81% 
Science-led subjects 72.18% 
Engineering and health welfare-led subjects 70.67% 
Others 46.67% 
Note: Insufficient observations can be used to measure the match/mismatch between education-led 
subjects and creative occupations in France.  
Source: The European Labour Force Survey  
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Creative sub-categories and education backgrounds 
Further attention now turns to new graduates who already had creative jobs, 
focusing on the bohemians, creative core and creative professionals and the results are 
summarised as follows.  
Bohemian graduates 
When creative graduates (i.e. new graduates who have creative jobs) with a 
bohemian background are aligned with bohemian occupations, it is clear that there is a 
very large mismatch across all of the target countries. Germany has the highest share 
of creative workers who have bohemian backgrounds and are actually working in 
bohemian occupations, accounting for 43.6 percent of the total number of new 
creative graduates in this discipline. In comparison, the rest of the countries have 
much lower shares, showing the figures of 29.5 percent in Italy, 27.2 percent in the 
Netherlands, 24.2 percent in the U.K., 18.6 percent in Denmark and only 12.6 and 9.1 
percent in Spain and France respectively. At this stage, there might be various 
explanations behind this mismatch. 
Firstly, as suggested by Throsby (1994), the very low figures in the targeted 
countries may imply that the age-earning profile is steeper for bohemians such as 
artists than other occupations, as the high growth of employment in bohemian 
workers generates the probability of rents for older and more established artists. In 
contrast, young bohemian graduates with little experience are less likely to be perfect 
substitutes. 
Secondly, these results may suggest that the abilities required by a successful 
artistic career cannot easily be taught by regular education. Given the fact that the 
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majority of bohemian workers spend a high proportion of their working hours in 
performing artist-related tasks, artistically creative jobs may demand more on-the-job 
experience. 
Finally, many studies have already revealed the significant salary disadvantage 
for artists (Filer, 1986; Throsby, 1994; Oakley et al., 2008), a fact which may explain 
that a high number of new bohemian graduates are willing to take non-bohemian jobs 
to avoid earning risks. With regard to this, the labour markets in Germany or the U.K. 
may be much more secure for bohemian graduates, while it is not the case in France 
and Spain. 
Creative core graduates  
In order to analyse the mismatch between the demand for the creative core and 
the supply of relevant qualifications, the creative core is categorised into two main 
sub-groups: university teachers and scientists. Given the fact that a precise match is 
not possible based on the nature of the EU LFS51, this attempt, to a great extent, 
aligns the education background of education and science with the corresponding 
occupations. Therefore, it is assumed that a high share of new graduates with an 
education background could find creative core jobs and so could those who have a 
science-led background. 
In general, new creative graduates with an education background are generally 
less mismatched to the corresponding creative core jobs, compared to those with 
science backgrounds. The U.K. has the highest share, showing that 90.6 percent of 
new creative graduates who took education subjects can find a creative core job. This 
figure is also high in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. The exception is 
                                                          
51 Only a few observations of new creative workers in each subject area (LFS subject code).  
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Italy, where only 18.9 percent of new graduates can be identified. Turning to the 
science-led subjects, Table 6.3 indicates that the share of new creative core graduates 
with science-led backgrounds over the total number of new creative graduates with 
the same background is comparatively low. Germany has the highest share with 79.0 
percent, followed by Denmark, the U.K., Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and France. 
The nature of the traditional occupations52 may be linked to the creative core 
occupations, such as HE and secondary education teachers, as a university degree is 
an imperative (Elias and Purcell, 2004). Also, it may not be surprising to see that in 
some countries such as the U.K., where the education industry is an important sector 
of the national economy, there is high demand for new graduates with education-
related backgrounds in the labour market (OECD, 2012). Therefore, it is realistic that 
a large share of relevant new graduates can be observed across all the target countries.  
The higher share of new creative graduates with science-led subjects is 
observable. Even though its share of creative jobs is less than the share of graduates 
who have a degree related to education, engineering, and health and welfare in several 
target countries, its role seems to be important. This may be a simple reflection that 
the science base is increasingly concentrated in universities, R&D institutions and 
other public/private sectors among the OECD countries. Therefore, as the other 
important component of the traditional occupations and the creative class, policy 
initiatives designed to foster an innovation based economy demand more graduates 
with science-led backgrounds.   
                                                          
52 Elias and Purcell (2004) defined a classification of occupations for graduate labour market, which 
contains traditional graduate occupation, modern graduate occupation, new graduate occupation and 
niche graduate occupations. 
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However, the significant mismatch for new science graduates as well as new 
education graduates in Italy and France may be indicative of the pattern of 
“oversupply” (Brown, 2003). In the case of the U.K. over the last two decades, Smith 
and White (2011) state that “there seem to be too many people studying sciences for 
the labour market to cope with, or perhaps graduates are no longer of sufficient 
quality”. The findings in this section are consistent with this point of view. The 
occupation category (the creative core) includes a wider population of both teachers 
and scientists. The high mismatch rate implies a situation in which a large number of 
science graduates may be unable to access employment that values relative graduate 
skills.   
Creative professionals 
If the creative class is measured as a whole, the share of social science 
graduates who have a creative job is generally lower than those who have a 
background related to science (see Table 6.3). Also a background of engineering and 
health and welfare seems to be an important factor in determining creative job 
outcomes. However, focusing on each creative occupation sub-category alone, the 
results demonstrate a different pattern.   
For those countries where the mismatch between new science graduates and 
creative core occupations is comparatively large, such as Italy, France and the U.K., 
the share of new creative professionals with social science qualifications over the total 
number of new creative graduates with the same backgrounds is significantly higher. 
For example, these figures are 67.3 percent (compared to 52.0 percent) in France, 72.8 
percent (compared to 58.8 percent) in Italy and 80.2 percent (compared to 55.3 
percent) in the U.K. In contrast, new social science graduates have lower adaptability 
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in getting creative professional jobs in Denmark (64.6 percent compared to 75.0 
percent), the Netherlands (59.8 percent compared to 62.7 percent) and Germany (73.4 
percent compared to 79.0 percent). These differences in mismatch rate between two 
subjects are not very significant. The exception is in Spain, where the gap with social 
science graduates is over 20 percent higher than science graduates in getting jobs 
related to their qualifications (40.0 percent compared to 64.4 percent). 
These results, to a certain degree, imply that graduates in social science 
subjects offer a wide range of skills that are valuable to employers. In the U.K., 
Cooper and Wilsdon (2013) found that the proportion of social science graduates in 
employment is higher than for graduates of STEM subjects (i.e. science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) or arts and humanities. Also a greater proportion of 
social science graduates become managers, directors or senior officers (i.e. 
occupations which are commensurate with qualifications) than other groups of 
graduates in the 3.5 years since they graduated. With respect to this, it is not 
surprising that social science graduates also have a higher or similar probability of 
getting relevant creative jobs in the majority of the target countries, as the concept of 
creative professionals is largely commensurate with their social science based 
qualifications.  
As far as engineering and health and welfare in higher education are 
concerned, the data constraint impedes the separate investigation of the impact of 
engineering or health and welfare subjects. Therefore, the analysis could not identify 
the precise match/mismatch between one education background and corresponding 
occupations but rather the pattern of how new graduates with creative skills in this 
discipline could be distributed across different creative occupation categories. The 
results match the expectation. On one hand, most of the new creative graduates found 
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creative jobs in the creative core and creative professional categories, while few of 
them could be bohemian workers. On the other hand, the highly polarised match rate 
in any of these two categories is not observable in the majority of countries. Apart 
from the nature of engineering and health science related occupations in the creative 
core, this finding further verifies the predication from the last section as many of the 
creative professional occupations, which were dominated by non-graduates, may start 
to demand more relative qualifications from higher education. For example, 68.1 
percent of engineering and health and welfare graduates found a creative professional 
job in France. Even though the analysis left space for further research, this high match 
rate is a likely cause for this reason. 
In conclusion, a series of descriptive statistics on the demand and supply of the 
creative labour market across the seven European countries have been presented. No 
matter that the focus is on all the creative graduates or its sub-categories, a significant 
mismatch brings a complexity of understanding regarding the role of education in 
shaping the creative class. Higher education seems to play an important role as a 
much higher proportion of new creative workers have a university degree. However, 
many new creative graduates did not find jobs that are commensurate with their 
knowledge, skills and qualifications. In general, new bohemian graduates are less 
likely to find creative jobs, compared to new graduates in the remaining subjects. 
Observing the specific sub-categories of new creative workers alone, education 
science and social science graduates are more likely to find equivalent creative jobs, 
compared to others who have backgrounds in science, bohemian subjects and other 
subjects.  
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Table 6.3: Higher education with different creative occupations 
Country Background Bohemians Creative core Creative professionals 
France 
education 0.00% n/a 0.00% 
bohemian 9.07% 62.32% 28.62% 
social science 5.88% 26.83% 67.29% 
science 0.76% 52.04% 47.20% 
engineering/health  0.00% 31.87% 68.13% 
others 0.00% 41.89% 58.11% 
Germany 
education 0.00% 82.89% 17.11% 
bohemian 43.60% 37.99% 18.41% 
social science 2.46% 24.14% 73.39% 
science 0.00% 79.04% 20.96% 
engineering/health 0.00% 70.25% 29.75% 
others 0.00% 62.81% 37.19% 
Spain 
education 9.30% 71.93% 18.77% 
bohemian 12.58% 26.10% 61.31% 
social science 0.53% 59.44% 40.03% 
science 3.65% 64.39% 31.96% 
engineering/health 13.67% 49.04% 37.29% 
others 0.69% 32.25% 67.05% 
The 
Netherlands 
education 3.59% 78.61% 17.80% 
bohemian 27.19% 40.35% 32.46% 
social science 8.86% 31.35% 59.79% 
science 5.14% 62.68% 32.18% 
engineering/health 6.72% 53.77% 39.51% 
others 3.05% 31.02% 65.94% 
Italy 
education 18.95% 33.76% 47.29% 
bohemian 29.45% 33.62% 36.92% 
social science 4.24% 22.95% 72.81% 
science 4.06% 58.77% 37.17% 
engineering/health 0.00% 43.52% 56.48% 
others 7.01% 43.53% 49.46% 
Denmark 
education 0.82% 88.03% 11.15% 
bohemian 18.64% 40.44% 40.92% 
social science 13.65% 21.71% 64.64% 
science 0.80% 74.97% 24.23% 
engineering/health 1.69% 42.82% 55.49% 
others 3.33% 49.18% 47.48% 
The U.K. 
education 1.57% 90.62% 7.80% 
bohemian 24.24% 40.15% 35.61% 
social science 1.15% 18.67% 80.18% 
science 6.92% 55.33% 37.75% 
engineering/health 4.70% 44.30% 51.00% 
others 28.14% 23.66% 48.19% 
Source: The European Labour Force Survey 
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6.3.2 Econometric analysis  
 
Basic setup 
Based on the descriptive statistics on how supply and demand matched, this 
section investigates what type of individuals is more likely to become creative 
workers by econometric exercises. However, not all of the independent variables are 
accessible or accurate in the EU LFS dataset. For example, the variables of ethnicity 
(variable “countryb”) only contain few observations for new workers in Spain, so its 
inclusion will result in failure of the calculation by the maximum likelihood method. 
In the case of Italy, there is a similar issue as this variable is only available from 2005 
onwards. For Germany, even though this variable was used as the indictor for 
representing the level of openness in Chapter 5, because only German residence and 
no-response residence are the available categories it is not included, as a significant 
bias may exist in comparison to the analysis at the aggregate level. Finally, in order to 
evaluate the impact of metropolitan areas on creative job outcomes, metropolitan 
regions are distinguished from other regions in the regression. In Italy, Lazio and 
Piemonte are defined as metropolitan regions and in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
the variable is dropped due to unavailable data.  
 
Model I: how can students become creative workers? 
The analysis begins with the whole creative class, and higher education and 
education background are separately included in two regressions. The results are 
presented in relative risk ratio. A ratio above one means that a relevant variable 
positively affects the outcome of getting a corresponding creative job compared to the 
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base category (i.e. non-creative occupations). As can be seen in the first column in 
Model I in Appendix 6.B, the difference in gender appears to have a significant 
impact on the outcome of creative jobs. Male graduates are more likely to enter a job 
in creative occupations than female graduates in the U.K., France, Italy, Germany and 
Denmark, but the reverse is seen in Spain and the Netherlands. As for age, graduates 
in the age band 22-27 have a higher probability of becoming creative workers than 
those in the age band 17-22. This result may imply an effect similar to higher 
education, as the majority of graduates in the age band 22-27 are composed of college 
graduates, while younger ones are more likely to be non-graduates from secondary 
education or vocational education. There are strong indications that new creative 
workers prefer to be self-employed or have full-time jobs in the majority of the target 
countries.  
Looking at the role of higher education, it seems that its positive effect on 
creative job outcomes is significant in all of the target countries, where the highest 
coefficient is observed in Spain (6.6353) followed by Denmark (4.48), Italy (4.35), 
Germany (4.20), the U.K. (3.32), France (3.31) and the Netherlands (2.75). In 
addition, new creative workers are more likely to migrate towards metropolitan areas 
with the exception of Italy. This is not surprising given the fact that metropolitan 
regions provide greater opportunities for new graduates to develop their personal 
careers (Faggian and McCann, 2009). 
As far as course characteristics are concerned (see the second column in 
Model I in Appendix 6.B), the results appear to be consistent with the findings in the 
descriptive analysis when measuring the creative class as a whole. With the exception 
                                                          
53  For example, new workers with a university degree increase the change of getting creative jobs by 
563 percent in Spain.  
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of Italy, new workers with education, science and engineering, and health and welfare 
backgrounds have a higher positive effect on the probability of entering a creative job 
than other subjects. 
In conclusion, the discussion based on the multinomial logit model highlights 
an important aspect to the creative class thesis which Florida cannot avoid – it is true 
that the formation of creative skills may rely on on-the-job experience or amenities, 
but since the outset, higher education has played a critical role in shaping new 
creative workers. However, the variety of positive coefficients in different subjects is 
difficult to interpret at this stage. For example, smaller coefficients from bohemian-
led subjects may imply either a much wider application of creative skills to other non-
bohemian creative jobs or a weaker effect of the relevant higher education in shaping 
creative workers. Therefore, the discrepancy between different occupation groups and 
higher education requires further decomposition of the whole creative class, as 
addressed in the next section. 
 
Model II: a specific analysis by different groups of creative workers 
This section proposes a breakdown of all the creative occupations into three 
categories: bohemians, the creative core and creative professionals (see Model II for 
each country in Appendix 6.B). Also, we focus on the interpretation for independent 
variables regarding their abilities to distinguish between pairs of group and 
contributions which they make to changing the odds of being in one dependent 
variable group. For instance, having a background in arts and languages increases the 
chance of being a bohemian worker by approximately 139.4 percent while a 
background of engineering or health and welfare decreases this chance by 41.2 
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percent in the U.K. In addition, the component of bohemian occupations is dropped in 
France as very limited observations of new bohemian workers in the sample results in 
calculation failure by the maximum likelihood function. Finally, the important results 
are summarised as follows: 
Personal characteristics 
Age: the probability of getting creative jobs increases with age in the majority 
of the target countries. This is a finding similar to the probit model.  
Ethnic background: new workers from an ethnic minority are less likely to 
find creative jobs with a few exceptions. In Denmark, being a new worker who was 
born in a foreign country increases the chance of getting bohemian, creative core and 
creative professional jobs by 14.9 percent, 50.2 percent and 27.7 percent respectively. 
In Italy, being a non-native born worker increases the chance of getting creative 
professional jobs by 46.2 percent. 
Self-employment: there is a clear indication that new creative workers are 
more likely to be self-employed and it is particularly obvious in the bohemian 
category; for example, the RRR of being a self-employed is well over 12 and 18 
respectively compared to getting a full-time job in the U.K. and Germany. However, 
this phenomenon is not considered to be due to the nature of the creative class but as a 
realistic situation for new workers in the labour market. As mentioned earlier, new 
workers may need a long period to integrate their skills and qualifications with on-
the-job experience; thus, they are less likely to be perfect substitutions for older 
workers. As a result, there is a large number of new creative workers becoming self-
employed due to the unavailability of regular jobs. Particularly for new bohemian 
workers, it could be more that the nature of the jobs requires self-employment. Many 
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creative sectors such as the TV and film industry hire on a contract basis rather than 
providing permanent employment. Artists often see themselves as self-employed if 
they are frequently moving between contracts (O’Connar, 2000). 
Full time/part time: new bohemian workers in Spain and Italy have a higher 
probability of doing part-time bohemian jobs, while new workers who are defined as 
the creative core and creative professionals are less likely to do so. Also, being a part-
time worker increases the chance of getting a creative core job by 9.8 percent in Spain. 
In association with the discussion about self-employment, this finding, from a 
different perspective, again can be seen to confirm the insecure position of bohemian 
students in the labour market.   
Higher education 
The positive effect from higher education is readily evident in the majority of 
the creative sub-categories across countries. In general, the strongest effect captured is 
among creative core occupations, then creative professional and bohemian jobs. For 
example, in the U.K., having a university degree increases the chance of getting a 
creative core job by around 410 percent, a creative professional job by around 180 
percent and a bohemian job by around 147 percent. This finding again supports the 
important role of higher education and further reveals that higher education seems to 
be more important in shaping creative workers in relation to the concept of the 








A comparison across backgrounds in a category  
Based on the descriptive statistics, how qualifications and knowledge match to 
creative jobs based on econometric exercises needs to be addressed. As far as the 
different education backgrounds in each occupation category are concerned, it seems 
that in many countries, creative job outcomes are responsive to qualifications and 
skills. In addition to the case of the U.K., holding a qualification in arts and languages 
significantly increases the chance of getting bohemian jobs in the Netherlands, Italy 
and Germany, while there is no significant difference in creative job outcomes in 
Denmark. The only exception is Spain, where new workers with this background are 
more likely to get jobs in other creative occupation categories. Such consistency 
between a qualification and a job outcome is more indicative in the sub-category of 
the creative core. Holding a prestigious science-led (excluding education science) 
qualifications and getting a creative core job is straightforward in all of the target 
countries except Italy. For instance, the RRR for science-led subjects leading to a 
creative core job is well over 10, compared to 3.31 (humanities, arts and language) 
and 2.93 (social science, business and law) in the Netherlands. Also, as another 
important background in shaping creative core workers, being educated by education-
science led subjects increases the chance of getting equivalent jobs. Such an effect is 
very dominant in the U.K., the Netherlands and Denmark, showing RRR values of 
51.40, 16.15 and 27.49 respectively.  
Finally, the discussion on creative professional jobs may be difficult as the 
required skills may vary considerably across workplaces as mentioned earlier. 
Therefore, it is difficult to capture the dominant advantages from the background of 
Chapter 6: The performance of new creative workers in the European labour market  
240 
 
social scientists; instead, several subjects can be meaningful to explain the job 
outcome of creative professionals (e.g. engineering, and health and welfare subjects). 
However, being educated in social science-led subjects still has a strong explanatory 
power in many countries. The strongest effect is observed in Germany, where being 
educated in social science-led subjects increases the chance of getting creative 
professional jobs by around 700 percent. 
A comparison across categories for a background  
The impact of each education/training background through different sub-
categories of the creative class is also examined. Here the perspective is different 
from the above section; the aim is to ascertain how a new worker with an 
education/training background could find different jobs in the labour market rather 
than evaluating the impacts of different subjects in getting the same type of jobs. It is 
worth mentioning that the findings may be slightly different from the descriptive 
statistics regarding this pattern, as the measure of education/training background 
inevitably includes both graduates and non-graduates.  
The results again indicate that in many cases, holding a relevant qualification 
gives a better chance of getting a corresponding job. Particularly for new workers 
with education-science, social science and science backgrounds, this pattern is 
straightforward in the majority of countries. For example, holding a qualification 
related to social science subjects increases the chance of getting a creative 
professional job by 225 percent in Denmark, while doing so decreases the chance of 
getting a creative core job by 1.6 percent and increases the chance of getting a 
bohemian job by only 24.6 percent. Similarly with a qualification related to science, 
the chance of getting a creative core job is increased by 413 percent, which is much 
Chapter 6: The performance of new creative workers in the European labour market  
241 
 
higher than getting a bohemian job (increased by 96.9 percent) or a creative 
professional job (163 percent). 
However, the boundary among occupations that require skills and use 
education/training is not very clear for new workers with a bohemian background. 
Even though holding a qualification related to bohemian subjects is more likely to get 
a bohemian job compared to remaining subjects, the horizontal comparison portrays a 
different picture. Only in Germany and Italy, do new workers with this background 
have obviously more chances of getting a bohemian job, while they are also likely to 
get a creative core or creative professional jobs in the rest of the countries.   
 
6.4 Conclusions  
 
Based on hypothesis 6.1, this chapter verified some well-known situations 
regarding new graduates of arts, STEMs (i.e. science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics) and social science in the European labour market, but from a very 
different perspective; the concept of the creative economy has already been integrated 
with the role of the education system. 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: is the education system in the European labour market efficient in 
shaping creative workers? 
Despite the fact that various personal characteristics may determine an 
individual’s job outcome in the labour market, education backgrounds are generally 
consistent with corresponding creative job outcomes in Europe. It seems that higher 
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education indeed has a significant impact on the formation of the creative class, 
regardless of whether the creative class is evaluated as a whole or based on separate 
categories. Even though this study is constrained by sample size, the length of time 
period and the level of breakdown in subjects or occupations, the above conclusions 
have been confirmed through multiple analytical techniques. 
In other words, it is believed that hypothesis 6.1 can be verified, as widening 
access to education and particularly higher education generally matches policy 
markers’ expectations in the target European countries. The education system in 
Europe appears to be considerably specialised compared to the more general 
education programmes in the U.S.; the former ensures highly specialised skills 
training for specific tasks, while the latter implies a greater adaptability in response to 
changes in the economic situation (Machin and McNally, 2007). However, the 
existence of the significant mismatch between qualifications and occupations is still a 
serious problem. The application of the creative class thesis has given local 
government a renewed challenge: “how might a given volume of support best be 
raised and distributed among competing revenues of expenditure?” (Throsby, 1994, 
p.25). Rather than focusing on one sector alone (e.g. cultural industries), now the 
question is how to efficiently integrate resources in response to the demand from the 
creative economy.  
Therefore, the policy implications from this study are two-fold. On one hand, 
the reform of the education system, although it has been the subject of lively 
discussion in recent decades, has not been clearly linked up with the missions of the 
creative economy in Europe. If promotion of the creative economy is a valuable 
option for local policy makers, then there is a need to focus on the efficiency of the 
education system regarding the three sub-categories of creative workers in parallel. 
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On the other hand, several explanations have been provided to explain the mismatch, 
but without further investigation it is difficult to conclude whether this phenomenon is 
caused by an over-supply of graduates or a shortage of skilled workers. However, 
such an unidentified causality does not impede the proposal of a meaningful policy 
recommendation: graduates need to be directed into subject areas where relevant 
demand is high in the labour market.  
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Share 4.74% Share 5.54% Share 4.65% 
 
 













































































































































Share 8.34% Share 3.78% Share 4.81% 
 




1. Number: the average number of graduates by education/training fields in the period 2000-2007.  
2. Growth rate: the average growth rate of graduates by fields in the period 2000-2007. 
3. Share: the average share for each field is calculated by dividing its average number of graduates by the average 
total number of graduates for each country.  
4.* The number of graduates with a background in services is 1,215 in 2000; however, this figure was dramatically 
increased to 9,849 in 2001 in Italy.  
5. The sum of shares for all education/training fields in each country does not precisely equal one – this is due to the 
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Appendix 6.B: the multinomial logit model (relative risk ratio)  
 





















Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 0.921*** 1.133*** 0.929*** 0.778*** 0.628*** 0.841*** 1.238*** 1.530*** 
Age  1.176*** 1.292*** 1.292*** 1.394*** 1.231*** 1.352*** 1.142*** 1.240*** 
Non-native born   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Self-employment  2.925*** 3.561*** 31.174*** 18.867*** 2.211*** 2.714*** 2.055*** 2.351*** 
Part time 0.442*** 0.332*** 0.488*** 0.215*** 0.590*** 0.374*** 0.361*** 0.310*** 
Higher education 4.203***  3.357***  9.569***  2.353***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   4.057***  0.000  5.412***  2.280*** 
Humanities, arts and language   2.407***  10.962***  1.613***  1.876*** 
Social science, business and law  3.429***  0.873***  1.215***  7.999*** 
Science (exclude education science)  10.820***  0.000  11.394***  10.087*** 
Engineering and health welfare  4.034***  0.489***  3.646***  5.222*** 
Location         
Berlin 0.953*** 1.219*** 1.662*** 1.712*** 0.807*** 1.205*** 1.035*** 1.166*** 
Time effects n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Constant 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
Number of observations 204786 179694 204786 179694 
Log pseudo-likelihood -114571.63 -103982.69 -203454.19   -174039.64 
LR:𝜒2 50647.32 36158.42 72079.00 74486.80 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.189 0.148 0.150 0.176 
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Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 0.804*** 0.882*** 0.579*** 0.641*** 0.640*** 0.628*** 0.990 1.140*** 
Age  1.239*** 1.409*** 1.189*** 1.334*** 1.365*** 1.603*** 1.189*** 1.335*** 
Non-native born   1.158*** 1.339*** 0.959 1.149*** 1.179*** 1.502*** 1.183*** 1.277*** 
Self-employment  5.955*** 6.243*** 3.400*** 3.963*** 3.337*** 3.211*** 8.350*** 8.840*** 
Part time 0.549*** 0.451*** 1.010 0.679*** 0.481*** 0.344*** 0.530*** 0.484*** 
Higher education 4.484***  2.663***  5.467***  4.281***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   10.774***  0.669***  27.494***  2.927*** 
Humanities, arts and language   1.438***  1.265***  1.852***  1.308*** 
Social science, business and law  2.118***  1.246***  0.984***  3.251*** 
Science (exclude education science)  3.105***  1.969***  5.128***  2.630*** 
Engineering and health welfare  2.164***  0.249***  2.280***  2.889*** 
Location         
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Time effects         
Year 2004 0.586*** 0.556*** 0.599*** 0.562*** 0.725*** 0.654*** 0.526*** 0.511*** 
Year 2005 0.525*** 0.585*** 0.717*** 0.784*** 0.648*** 0.735*** 0.440*** 0.484*** 
Year 2006 0.621*** 0.627*** 0.536*** 0.515*** 0.696*** 0.652*** 0.606*** 0.639*** 
Year 2007 0.726*** 0.748*** 0.699*** 0.732*** 0.965 0.962 0.629*** 0.651*** 
Constant 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 
Number of observations 398858 398858 385149 398858 
Log pseudo-likelihood -189757.31 -198438.44    -302356.75 -304016.52 
LR:𝜒2 123850.15 106487.88 138154.62 134835.08 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.246 0.212 0.182 0.186 
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Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 1.138*** 1.222*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.870*** 0.939*** 1.455*** 1.754*** 
Age  1.179*** 1.247*** 1.147*** 1.169*** 1.210*** 1.375*** 1.210*** 1.253*** 
Non-native born   0.758*** 0.706*** 0.609*** 0.580*** 0.870*** 0.752*** 0.702*** 0.729*** 
Self-employment  5.285*** 5.295*** 13.344*** 11.358*** 5.548*** 5.590*** 3.706*** 3.964*** 
Part time 0.318*** 0.242*** 1.154*** 0.879*** 0.326*** 0.175*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 
Higher education 2.750***  2.134***  8.571***  1.455***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   2.896***  1.890***  16.147***  1.098*** 
Humanities, arts and language   1.901***  3.798***  3.305***  1.076*** 
Social science, business and law  1.928***  1.386***  2.930***  1.832*** 
Science (exclude education science)  3.318***  1.314***  10.609***  2.448*** 
Engineering and health welfare  2.929***  1.271***  5.562***  2.778*** 
Location         
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Time effects         
Year 2007 1.272*** 1.271*** 1.595*** 1.568*** 1.169*** 1.208*** 1.256*** 1.249*** 
Constant 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 
Number of observations 834041 834041 834041 834041 
Log pseudo-likelihood -431452.01 -438821.5   -651731.18 -649774.56 
LR:𝜒2 178831.57 164092.59 223681.96 227595.20 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.172 0.156 0.135 0.149 
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Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 0.984*** 1.141*** 2.424*** n/a 0.905*** 1.057*** 1.012*** 1.143*** 
Age  1.128*** 1.224*** 0.855*** n/a 1.224*** 1.343*** 1.084*** 1.173*** 
Non-native born   0.490*** 0.416*** 0.000 n/a 0.474*** 0.404*** 0.495*** 0.468*** 
Self-employment  2.411*** 2.819*** 21.142*** n/a 0.418*** 0.870*** 3.994*** 0.410*** 
Part time 0.525*** 0.520*** 0.154*** n/a 1.300*** 0.364*** 0.257*** 3.362*** 
Higher education 3.315***  8.768*** n/a 3.659***  3.058***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   0.000***  n/a  0.000  1.722*** 
Humanities, arts and language   2.023***  n/a  2.292***  1.320*** 
Social science, business and law  1.529***  n/a  0.887***  1.815*** 
Science (exclude education science)  3.832***  n/a  4.853***  2.923*** 
Engineering and health welfare  2.176***    1.918***  2.333*** 
Location         
Île de France 2.586*** 2.798*** 4.599*** n/a 2.006*** 2.214*** 3.019*** 3.090*** 
Time effects         
Year 2007 0.888*** 0.939*** 2.131*** n/a 0.890*** 0.940*** 0.856*** 0.872*** 
Constant 0.019*** 0.003*** 0.033*** n/a 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.033*** 0.005*** 
Number of observations 873167 873167 873167 877314 
Log pseudo-likelihood -474748.66 -488767.79 -677894.66 -651771.2 
LR:𝜒2 172907.08 144868.82 223587.20 199697.07 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.150 0.129 0.141 0.133 
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Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 1.183*** 1.436*** 0.956*** 0.797*** 1.050*** 1.395*** 1.354*** 1.618*** 
Age  1.124*** 1.218*** 1.031*** 1.094*** 1.196*** 1.329*** 1.087*** 1.163*** 
Non-European ethnicity   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Self-employment  1.582*** 1.541*** 1.361*** 1.162*** 1.672*** 1.756*** 1.541*** 1.473*** 
Part time 0.937*** 0.971*** 2.153*** 1.975*** 1.085*** 1.098*** 0.716*** 0.754*** 
Higher education 6.624***  5.713***  78.530***  4.078***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training  2.312***  1.602***  4.001***  1.059*** 
Humanities, arts and language   1.555***  1.488***  0.865***  2.248*** 
Social science, business and law  3.245***  0.105***  3.830***  4.062*** 
Science (exclude education science)  3.230***  0.169***  4.145***  3.463*** 
Engineering and health welfare  2.243***  0.498***  2.844***  2.340*** 
Location         
Madrid 1.400*** 1.496*** 2.297*** 2.759*** 1.543*** 1.663*** 1.166*** 1.212*** 
Time effects         
Year 2005 1.043 1.005 0.619*** 0.641*** 1.213*** 1.115*** 0.990 0.972 
Year 2006 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.751*** 0.780*** 0.727*** 0.707*** 1.111*** 1.118*** 
Year 2007 1.134*** 1.142*** 0.706*** 0.748*** 1.127*** 1.075*** 1.251*** 1.295*** 
Constant 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 
Number of observations 857402 857402 857402 857402 
Log pseudo-likelihood -524212.57 -544636.73 -888362.7 -886139.08 
LR:𝜒2 140081.07 99232.74 182091.68 186538.92 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.118 0.100 0.100 0.101 
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Model I  Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 0.772*** 0.778*** 0.671*** 0.666*** 0.705*** 0.660*** 0.837*** 0.871*** 
Age  1.212*** 1.262*** 1.153*** 1.230*** 1.323*** 1.369*** 1.171*** 1.214*** 
Non-native born   0.681*** 0.651*** 0.582*** 0.567*** 0.748*** 0.824*** 0.658*** 0.587*** 
Self-employment  4.147*** 4.348*** 12.929*** 12.189*** 1.802*** 1.951*** 3.017*** 3.295*** 
Part time 0.231*** 0.194*** 0.589*** 0.416*** 0.193*** 0.167*** 0.190*** 0.165*** 
Higher education 3.320***  2.467***  5.098***  2.802***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   14.005***  1.932***  51.404***  2.108*** 
Humanities, arts and language  1.743***  2.394***  2.643***  1.229*** 
Social science  1.512***  0.109***  0.955  2.276*** 
Science (exclude education science)  2.744***  1.108***  5.427***  2.034*** 
Engineering and health welfare  2.239***  0.598***  3.552***  2.235*** 
Location         
Greater London 1.642*** 1.685*** 1.448*** 1.372*** 1.309*** 1.405*** 1.942*** 1.964*** 
Time effects         
Year 2005 0.958*** 1.013 1.107*** 1.132*** 0.775*** 0.841*** 1.036*** 1.081*** 
Year 2006 1.025 1.042*** 1.057 1.067 1.034 1.107 1.010 1.001 
Year 2007 1.039*** 1.082*** 1.527*** 1.610*** 1.046 1.154*** 0.926*** 0.933*** 
Constant 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
Number of observations 3103438 2831653 3103438 2831653 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1052677.9 -1000545 -1580955.1 -1462517.6 
LR:𝜒2 934534.77 877983.47 1030645.71 1077105.96 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.307 0.305 0.246 0.269 
 
 
Chapter 6: The performance of new creative workers in the European labour market  
253 
 
Notes: 5. in the first column in each table, the creative class was measured as a whole.2. Drop observations with age above 27 in all countries. 3. Bohemian group is 
excluded due to insufficient observations in France. 4. The variable “educfild” is only accessible in 2003 in Germany. 5. Standard errors are not reported due to lack of 
space. 





















Model I Model II 
Personal characteristics          
Female 0.682*** 1.074*** 0.591*** 0.694*** 0.659 1.482*** 0.719*** 1.082*** 
Age  1.096*** 1.202*** 1.008 1.058*** 1.317 1.585*** 1.084*** 1.164*** 
Non-native born   1.264*** 1.205*** 0.582*** 0.598*** 0.989 0.794*** 1.495*** 1.462*** 
Self-employment  2.990*** 3.216*** 3.620*** 3.577*** 3.263 3.634*** 2.781*** 3.001*** 
Part time 0.588*** 0.493*** 1.971*** 1.417*** 0.649 0.428*** 0.432*** 0.396*** 
Higher education 4.346***  2.999***  15.230  3.241***  
Course characteristics          
Education science and teaching training   0.854***  1.214***  1.032  0.781*** 
Humanities, arts and language   1.141***  2.239***  1.246***  0.874*** 
Social science, business and law  1.570***  0.560***  1.504***  1.922*** 
Science (exclude education science)  1.764***  1.954***  2.844***  1.539*** 
Engineering and health welfare  3.233***  1.509***  7.880***  3.074*** 
Location         
Lazio+ Piemonte 0.801*** 0.749*** 0.996 0.885*** 0.814*** 0.719*** 0.755*** 0.728*** 
Time effects         
Year 2005 1.045*** 1.150*** 1.534*** 1.570*** 0.949*** 1.119*** 0.965*** 1.067*** 
Year 2006 0.991*** 1.068*** 1.054*** 1.086*** 0.774*** 0.868*** 1.043 1.129*** 
Year 2007 0.910*** 1.025*** 1.010 1.055 0.829*** 1.000 0.912*** 1.029*** 
Constant 0.043*** 0.004*** 0.024*** 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.046*** 0.006*** 
Number of observations 1138187 1135503 1138187 1135503 
Log pseudo-likelihood -601387.15 -622783.92 -899096.25 -914481.76   
LR:𝜒2 247311.47 201991.70 345521.23 311864.95 
Pseudo 𝐶2 0.171 0.140 0.161 0.145 








In line with the hypotheses in section 2.3.2-2.3.4, the findings of Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 are separately concluded in Chapter 7. In general, this thesis has reviewed the 
grand creative class thesis in response to critical voices in three broad aspects: (1) the 
economic impact of workers with creative skills, (2) the relationship between creative 
workers and technology and (3) the specialised preferences of creative workers in 
different sized regions. Finally, the role of education in shaping new creative workers 
in the European labour market is also briefly discussed. 
 
7.1 From a growth accounting perspective: a full-scale measurement 
of the impact of creative labour and ICT capital services in Europe 
 
The focus of economic development 
Focusing on hypothesis 4.1, the results of growth accounting shows that the 
growth of creative labour services appears to have been an important source of output 
growth in many of the European regions in the last decade, but this is not universally 
so as in many other regions. Therefore, this hypothesis can be only partially verified 
and the unclear role of the creative class across regions and countries constrained this 
research in drawing a universal conclusion. Instead this thesis proposed a new 
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classification when measuring the development level of the creative economy in each 
country (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: The quality of the creative economy (the degree of contribution)    
Type of economy Definition 
The paradigmatic creative economy 
The creative class’s contribution to GVA 
growth is higher than non-creative workers in 
the majority of regions. 
The technology-driven economy 
The creative class’s contribution to GVA 
growth is significant in the majority of 
regions. However, either its contribution or 
the non-creative workers’, is not a 
determinant in explaining GVA growth. 
The traditional economy 
The creative class’s contribution to GVA 
growth is only greater than non-creative 
workers’ in some regions. 
The economy in transition 
The creative class’s contribution to GVA is 
not a determinant in explaining GVA growth 
in the majority of regions. 
 
The paradigmatic creative economy 
Generally speaking, the western developed European countries are more likely 
to enjoy economic advantage from the growth of creative labour services. This is 
particularly true in the U.K., France and Belgium, where the contributions of creative 
workers are significant and much higher than non-creative workers in the majority of 
regions. Based on strict neo-classical assumptions, this finding favours and visualises 
Florida’s proposition just like the American cities that are at the top of the creative 
index list, where local economic development is heavily reliant upon the creative 
labour service flows and where great benefits have already been enjoyed as a result. 
The technology-driven economy 
Sweden and Finland have very different economic systems. The growth of 
creative or non-creative labour services is indeed significant in explaining GVA 
growth in many regions such as Stockholm or Pohjois-Suomi, but compared to the 
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contributions from the growth of ICT capital services and TFP, labour’s contribution 
in explaining GVA growth is small. As these countries are high on Florida’s creativity 
index list, it may see counter intuitive that they do not receive the proportional benefit 
from creative labour services. However, it is not possible to conclude that the Nordic 
economies are non-creative, but instead that the influence of the creative class, or any 
other types of labour, could be multifaceted. Even if the creative labour contribution 
is minor, a judgement on the role of the creative class in this case cannot be made 
quickly. The Growth Accounting method may only capture one aspect of the matter. 
The traditional economy 
It is difficult to conclude whether labour or capital inputs matter the most in 
Germany, Spain and Italy, given the extent to which they have differing development 
models. For example, although the time series is short in the German case, the 
obvious contributions from non-creative labour and non-ICT capital services can be 
ascertained. In Spain and Italy, non-creative workers’ contribution is higher than that 
of the creative class in many regions, although they are both important. These results 
only portrayed a very vague picture when trying to discern the primary driver of 
regional growth. It could be suggested that Germany is more likely to develop a 
balanced economy and still focus on a heavy manufacturing industry. Italy has a great 
share of service industries such as tourism and traditional manufacturing such as 
luxury products. For Spain, a significant catch-up effect was observed in terms of all 
inputs and it is still at the stage of economic transition. However, the growth of 
creative labour services is not a dominant force in explaining output growth in any of 
these countries. 
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The economy in transition 
As the data was not sufficient to cover all of the less developed European 
countries, the discussion for Hungary and the Czech Republic can be considered to be 
typical cases. It is not clear what type of economic model they belong to since the 
former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. After a period of temporary stagnation, it 
seems that these once planned economies are getting back on track to grow efficiently, 
but they are still at a stage of economic transition. The national economy relies on 
traditional labour and capital inputs in the majority of regions in Hungary. In contrast, 
the Czech Republic is more likely to follow the path of creative and technology-
related realms; however, the overall scale is much less than for developed European 
countries. It is difficult to conclude that the Eastern European countries have 
successfully transformed to creativity or knowledge-intensive economies, but some of 
them have great potential. 
 
The development rate of the creative economy 
Next, the contribution of the creative class was compared for the two periods 
(approximately 1995-2001 and 2002-2007) and again the target countries 54  were 
categorised into three types of economy (see Table 7.2).  
 
The creative engines 
The contribution of creative labour services was increasing significantly in the 
majority of regions in the U.K., France, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Therefore, it 
                                                          
54 Finland and Germany are not included in this analysis due data constraints.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
258 
 
seems that these countries were the leaders in attracting creative workers and 
effectively motivating them to contribute to regional economic development.  
The creative sprawls  
The increasing contribution from creative labour services was only captured in 
some of the regions in Spain and Belgium. It could be said that the influence of the 
creative class in these countries is not as significant as the creative engines in recent 
years whereas the creative power had indeed expanded. Germany was not included in 
the analysis due to the times series being too short, but it may belong to this group. 
Table 7.2 The quality of the creative economy (the development rate)    
Type of economy Definition 
The creative engines The creative class’s contribution is increasing in the majority of regions. 
The creative sprawls The increasing contribution from the creative class is only observable in some regions. 
The creative dilemmas 
The increasing contribution from the creative 
class is not observable in the majority of 
regions. 
 
The creative dilemmas 
This last group contains those countries which received obvious benefits from 
the creative workers in the past, but such a positive contribution is now decreasing, 
despite the employment rate of the creative class still growing. The most typical case 
is Hungary where there has been a negative growth tendency in the contribution from 
creative workers in all regions. It was not possible to carry out this analysis for other 
countries which embodied similar political and economic systems such as Romania or 
Bulgaria, as the dataset was unavailable. However, the situations there could be the 
same or even worse. It is quite doubtful that most of the traditional planned 
economies have the know-how to promote the creative economy effectively. 
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Finally, the development rate was used as an indicator to define the vitality of 
the creative economy in each country and to compare these findings to the 
corresponding contribution degrees (see Table 6.3). As these two scenarios largely 
overlapped (i.e. a higher contribution degree is likely to be associated with a higher 
development rate), the conclusion appears to contradict Florida’s prognosis regarding 
Europe (Florida and Tinagli, 2004; Florida, 2014). If the U.K. is losing its ground, 
why does the creative class become more important in contributing output growth? If 
France really is a creative laggard, why are the contribution degree and the 
development rate both high in the majority of regions? Why do those creative leaders 
such as Sweden and Finland have the highest share of creative workers while most 
economic growth comes from TFP and ICT capital services? Therefore, it seems that 
Florida’s creative parameters have little explanatory power and are disconnected from 
economic reality (Malanga, 2004; Montgomery, 2005). 
 
The real situation of the creative economy in Europe 
In the creative class thesis, the 3T indexes and the overall creativity index aim 
to reflect the true prosperity of a local economy, as the measure of output growth such 
as GDP or GVA is asserted to only be a crude conception of Industrial Age growth 
(Florida, 2013, p.397). How can we measure social progress or the overall welfare of 
a society? Here it is correct that the measure of output growth may be a unilateral 
standard and is not accurately associated with economic and social progress (Clark 
and Senik, 2011). However, have Florida’s empirical analyses avoided this problem? 
In fact, he and his supporters frequently tried to link creative indexes to GDP growth 
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in order to confirm the influential role of the creative class (Florida and Tinagli, 2004; 
Florida el al., 2008; Florida, 2013, 2014).   
The measure of output growth is not flawless, but its importance cannot be 
avoided too. Any one of the indexes proposed by Florida is only an isolated reflection 
of the situation for the variable itself – we do not know how this variable can 
contribute to an economy unless we further link it to economic realities such as output 
growth. With respect to this, the Growth Accounting method, to a great extent, 
integrates the concept of the creative class (i.e. creative occupations) with several 
essential aspects of economic progress (e.g. output growth and the expansion of 
higher education). Admittedly, there have been methodological challenges in defining 
total hours worked, revenue share or capital services at regional level, but the findings 
in this research still provide many useful materials and references for us to understand 
the real impact of creative workers.  
This thesis challenges the philosophy of the creativity index. Despite its 
synthetic nature, it is too arbitrary to combine different Ts (talent, technology and 
tolerance) to predict the level of “creativity” in a common way, no matter how it can 
be calculated by weights or latent variables. It is undeniable that tolerance and 
technology are, to a great extent, related to the performance of the creative class in an 
economic system, but this pattern is more complicated, requiring several analyses at 
multiple levels. 
In summary, the creative class has been growing fast in Europe since the mid-
1990s, but at different rates at the regional level. Such an uneven development level 
across regions will definitely leave room to flow creative talents – this is a great 
opportunity for everyone to spur the creative economy. In the meantime, ICT, or even 
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non-ICT capital, is a crucial element to also grow regional economy. Is the singular 
measure of the creative class, following either this or Florida’s method, really a better 
indicator to explain the so-called “true prosperity”? The evidences based on the 
Growth Accounting method have implied that choices between promoting the creative 
economy and promoting the ICT-driven economy may distort policy decisions. 
Therefore; instead of analysing these factors separately, the analysis can be integrated. 
 




       Table 7.3: The multi-dimensional measure of the creative economy’s performance 
.        Note: Germany and Finland are not included in the analysis regarding the development rate due to the times series being too short. 
 




Technology   







Belgium Yes No No No No Yes No 
Germany No No Yes No n/a n/a n/a 
The Czech Republic No No No Yes Yes No No 
Spain No No Yes No No Yes No 
France Yes No No No Yes No No 
Italy No No Yes No No No Yes 
Hungary No No No Yes No No Yes 
Sweden No Yes No No Yes No No 
Finland No Yes No No n/a n/a n/a 
The U.K. Yes No No No Yes No No 
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7.2 Econometric models: linking the role of the creative class to 
urban economic realities  
 
In association with the findings above, it appears that creative economics 
theories should shift the attention from the conventional one factor-led growth model 
to a more diversified one concerning the efficiency improvement. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4.2, which analyses the relationship between the creative class and ICT, 
has been constructed. The econometric analysis at this stage investigates the role of 
the creative class in the economic system. In other words, the aim of this section is to 
explore the relationship between 2Ts (i.e. talent and technology). Florida stated that 
the least controversial of the Ts is technology, which is always the driving force for 
growth. Then the creative class remains positively correlated with various measures of 
innovation and technology (Florida, 2013, p.229). However, there are some issues in 
the way in which he defined innovation and technology. Whether using the share of 
working population in high-tech industries or patents per capita, the verification of 
Florida’s prognosis regarding this nature of the creative class is not convincing. This 
is the one of reasons why ICT capital is replaced to measure the impact of technology 
For the first time, this thesis estimated the level of ICT capital services at the 
regional level for the main European regions over time. Even though the estimation 
still relies on several assumptions, this attempt contributes to the regional study 
regarding either the creative class thesis or other types of economic theories. This 
study also contributes to associating creative workers with other important inputs such 
as ICT capital services and human capital. The econometric analysis demonstrated 
that in the whole European context, the changes in regional creative labour and ICT 
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capital services have stronger explanatory powers in explaining the growth in gross 
value added, compared to the changes in non-creative labour and non-ICT capital 
services. It is also interesting that the co-existence of the creative class and ICT 
capital can result in a greater change of output in Europe through a positive interactive 
effect rather than through the contributions from each of these inputs separately. 
Therefore, both the application of ICT and the influx of labour input from the 
creative class seem to be very important sources of regional economic growth. This 
finding is generally consistent with the conclusion from the creative class thesis and 
other literature (Florida, 2002, 2005, 2013; Clifton, 2008; Stolarick and Currid-Halket, 
2013, etc.). Also, the evidently positive coefficient between creative labour services 
and ICT capital services imply that ICT is a good catalyst to link skills and regional 
economic systems. Such a joint role of ICT with the creative class confirmed what 
Florida expected, but takes it to a deeper level – for the first time, the relationship 
between technology and the creative class was visualised and detailed as opposed to 
Florida’s loose set of figures from pairwise correlation tests.  
In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the function of the 
creative class in the regional economic system, the discussion is further extended to 
the debate over the creative class and human capital. As human capital is defined as 
“the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to 
produce economic value” (Sheffrin, 2003), neither potential skills nor utilised skills 
can be excluded from this broad definition. There are various ways to measure human 
capital such as by school enrolment rate (Barro, 1990), by years of schoolings (Nehru 
et al., 1993), by the ratio of skilled adults over total adults (Romer, 1994) or by the 
returns that an individual obtained throughout human capital investment (Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Therefore, it is hard to conclude that the creative class is a 
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concept distinguishable from the broad sense of human capital. This argument is all 
about which variable could explain economic performance better: the share of the 
creative class or the share of graduates. 
Nevertheless, such a comparison, although it has been tested by many 
previous studies, can still provide very useful information about the creative class and 
graduates. In order to test hypothesis 4.3, the econometric analysis has been linked to 
both their individual roles and joint effects in the regional economic system. The 
result clearly implies that the creative class has a greater impact on the change in 
regional TFP level than graduates in association with the effect of ICT capital services 
in Europe. This is a consistent finding with several previous studies, that the presence 
of the creative class has a stronger effect than graduates in explaining productivity 
(Florida et al., 2008; Marrocu and Paci, 2012). However, this thesis’ model 
specification, the definition of productivity as well as the econometric technique is 
much more rigorous. With respect to this, the creative class is believed to have a 
unique position in the economic system and it is a useful measure of skills to explain 
economic performance.  
Once the creative class and graduates were combined together, the evidence 
coincides with the on-going argument between Florida’s supporters and Glaeser’s 
followers. Graduates who work in creative professions contribute more to output level 
than those who do not while non-graduate creative workers have a lower contribution 
than those creative graduates. This is also confirmed in the second empirical model 
explaining TFP. Therefore, graduates and the creative class not only have different 
impacts on economic performance but are also supportive to each other and neither is 
dispensable.  
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In a nutshell, rigorous methods have been used to better examine the influence 
of the creative class, situated in urban/ economic realities and theories. As made clear, 
this thesis aimed to demonstrate the limitations of looking at creative workers alone; 
instead, the preferred theoretical framework used here has taken into account many of 
the criticisms of the creative class thesis that have emerged over the last decade. It is 
proposed that understanding towards the source of economic growth is no longer an 
isolated topic but needs to be seen in the context of broader-based economic 
development. Therefore, creative workers’ capacity has to be maximised through a 
suitable channel such as through the integration of ICT. The challenge is related to the 
absolute level of “the creative stock” but is also concerned with how creativity is 
stimulated through an effective economic system.  
From another perspective, the creative class thesis also provides a new thought 
regarding human capital-based ICT policy making. As more and more developed 
nations have shifted attention from emphasising the simplistic production of ICT 
goods to efficiency gains, human capital development seems to be inextricably linked 
with technology capacity building. It not only contributes to building up technical 
knowledge and capabilities, but also helps us to cope with the rapidly changing social 
and economic realities (Singh, 2009, p.146). It is important then, to understand how 
technological progress and human capital development relate to and enrich each other 
(Nissanke, 2006). This thesis has presented solid evidence to support this point of 
view and further clarified how these two policy areas can be highly coordinated. It 
appears that an appropriate socio-economic environment is essential for making 
economic progress in the knowledge-based economy. Although many ICT policies in 
enhancing efficiency have been well-discussed (e.g. organisational structure 
adjustment, full involvement of government or advocacy of skills-based human 
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capital development), the promotion of the creative economy deserves consideration. 
As long as a sufficient number of creative workers efficiently contribute to local 
economic development, we have a chance to fully explore the potential of ICT. 
 
7.3 The regional density of the creative class  
 
Over the last decade, the notion of creative cities/regions has gained 
considerable influence over urban development strategies. The mainstream “creative 
capital” theory emphasises the importance of high-tech, cultural diversity and tolerant 
amenity. In the European context, it appears that Florida’s measure of milieus favours 
large-sized regions too, while only leaving few options to smaller regions. Without 
the diversified economic base, non-metropolitan regions are likely to be marginalised. 
Then they could confront more challenges in identifying themselves under the 
dominant milieu in the Creative Age. 
The creative class thesis also potentially omitted the responsibility of local 
governments for constructing social welfare systems. Instead, too much focus is on 
consumer preferences, regardless of the varying natures of local economic systems. 
As long as the creative class thesis has been confirmed as a meaningful concept to 
explain economic growth, will the non-metropolitan regions automatically fail in 
attracting creative talent? This thesis aimed to show that they still have potential to 
avoid the simplistic application of the creative class thesis mainly based on the 
experience from large cities/regions.  
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Hypothesis 5.1 aims to verify if the findings in this thesis is consistent with 
previous studies, as the effect of the people climate is assumed to be significant in 
shaping creative labour flows in Europe and such an effect varies across different 
group sizes of regions. Overall, it is not intended that Florida’s propositions are fully 
rejected. Although stubborn problems such as gentrification, marginalisation or 
uneven income distribution inevitably coexist with regional economic development in 
creative disciplines, the findings based on the dynamic GMM imply that the 
parameters of the creative debate have substantial influence in shaping the flow of 
creative talent in the majority of European regions. Therefore, the call for enhancing 
selected amenities still deserves policy consideration.  
However, Florida’s theory has to be modified. In response to hypothesis 5.2, 
several changes to the existing “creative parameters” were made and alternative 
development paths outlined. On one hand, either the level of rich amenities or cultural 
diversity has to be explained together with the regional baseline of public services 
(Andersen et al., 2010, p. 236). If Florida’s remedy is the icing on the cake, then the 
basic aspects of socio-economic progress such as the quality of education and social 
welfare systems are still fundamental. On the other hand, many more creative 
activities appear to be evident among the best performing regions in the EQI in 
comparison to being among the worst. The theory behind this is that with a good QoG 
(quality of government), a country can achieve successful economic and social 
progress (Holmberg et al., 2009, p.135). The conclusion here agrees with several 
previous studies regarding this relationship (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2000); however, 
another line of thought has been added to the current debate: better local government 
could aid the prosperity of the creative economy in a specific context (i.e. small-sized 
regions). Although there have been methodological challenges in measuring this time-
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invariant variable in a temporal order, fixed effects regressions have revealed this 
pattern. 
The EQI index reflects the perceptions of creative populations towards their 
local communities. The positive relationship between the locational preferences of 
creative workers and the quality of political institutions empirically confirms several 
assertions in the scholarly literature. The promotion of the creative economy should 
never deviate from the core values of a society: “democratic values, social solidarity 
and the capacity for réjouissance” (Scott, 2014, p.573). The creative class also shows 
a strong preference for individuality and self-expression and is reluctant to conform to 
traditional norms and institutional directives (Florida, 2013, p.56). If these arguments 
are linked to urban realities, members of the creative class should prefer to live in a 
place where “ collective action is easier as the bonds of familiarity and trust 
facilitate consensus and collaboration” (Bradford, 2004, p.9) and the political 
activism is strong (Lewis and Donald, 2010, p.49). 
In response, the capacity of a good local government appears to meet these 
demands from creative workers. A high quality government can efficiently formulate 
and implement policies, while attention and respect will also be paid to local residents’ 
state and action for the institutions that govern social and economic inter-actions 
among them (Kaufmann et al., 1999). This statement speaks of the importance of a 
broader role of local government in the Creative Age. Even in big regions, where 
Florida’s milieus may have the dominant power to explain the locational preferences 
of creative workers, policy makers should never overlook the power of urban 
democracy.  
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Yet those overall policy recommendations may be not sufficient to understand 
the real role of the creative class according to various urban realities. Regional 
hierarchy brings complexity to understanding the dynamics of creative city regions. 
For non-metropolitan regions, how can they grow together with their large neighbours? 
Here, it is believed that small-sized city regions still have pre-existing advantages. On 
one hand, Charron et al. (2014) state that on average large-sized city regions have 
lower QoG scores compared to smaller-sized city regions in Europe. With larger 
economic scale, more complex social networks and critical mass infrastructures, a big 
region may have a greater capacity to address economic and social challenges, but on 
the downside, some inherent disadvantages are seemingly inevitable too, such as 
social inequalities, corruption and administrative inefficiency. While these patterns 
determine the level of social sustainability, small-sized regions in Europe appear to 
successfully help creative workers to create some of the identities that reflect their 
creativity, which are not tolerance and openness but individuality and social 
responsibility. On the other hand, a small-sized region also has potential to become an 
innovation hub. The presence of a university substantially contributes to community 
economic health (Sands and Reese, 2013). As a certain amount of creative employees 
are scientists, university teachers and university-affiliated hospital staff, the co-
existence of universities and other types of research institutions in small-sized regions 
may potentially create more job opportunities and then attract new creative workers in 
the same discipline or even other creative workers. At this point, the group of small-
sized European regions again outperforms its counterpart in attracting creative talent.  
It is difficult to include all indicators regarding the concept of social 
sustainability and livability, but this thesis’ point of view regarding the development 
path in small-sized European city regions is similar to the Canadian experience 
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(Lewis and Donald, 2010). Through good choices, non-metropolitan areas can still 
have a chance to be a part of the creative economy. Openness and tolerance are indeed 
important for the creative class, but it seems that the creative class exhibit different 
priorities when measuring places with different economic and social natures. The 
creative class may not always demand immediate access to rich amenities. Instead, it 
is highly probable that small city regions meet its demands too where consumption 
and entertainment can be found from nearby metropolises. Therefore, it is crucial for 
policy makers to re-conceive development strategy for small-sized city regions in 
order to define and promote their unique identities.  
Unfortunately, neither the creative class thesis nor the concept of social 
sustainability could well explain the flow of creative talent in midsized city regions. 
On one hand, cultural amenity only has weak power in explaining the location of 
creative employment and the latter is not related to diversity. On the other hand, only 
the short-term performance of local government is related to the location of creative 
employment, but as the core variable to define one of the creative class’ identities, the 
complementary impact of QoG has not being captured. Therefore, it is most difficult 
to draw a clear conclusion about the specialised preferences of the creative class in 
midsized European regions.  
However, such a dilemma in forming an “identity” in midsized European 
regions could be due to various reasons. Firstly, several studies have pointed out 
serious problems about using the creative class thesis as a conceptual framework to 
explain both regional economic growth and creative workers’ behaviours in the 
context of midsized city regions (Reese et al., 2010; Sands and Reese, 2013). As long 
as the research described a similar pattern in Europe, the concern has also been 
expressed regarding the application of the “overall approach”. The creative class 
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thesis appears to only be feasible in specific contexts. Secondly, the nature of 
midsized city regions could be an important aspect in understanding this situation. 
Between two polarities (i.e. large-sized and small-sized city regions), midsized city 
regions are less likely to obtain greater advances in either the high level of social 
sustainability or the high level of rich amenities. Therefore, the locational preferences 
of creative workers could still be determined by traditional factors such as average 
wage levels, job opportunities, geographical locations etc. These indicators, however, 
are difficult to measure at the regional level in Europe due to data constraints or 
because they have been removed through the data transformation process (e.g. the 
demeaning in the fixed effects model). Finally, this outcome is likely to be caused by 
the method for classifying the regional hierarchy in the study. Can a re-definition of 
midsized city regions yield different results? Possibly. Midsized city regions could 
have different characteristics which cannot be generally summarised under a rough 
classification. But again, this issue cannot easily be solved based on the EU LFS so 
further research in database development is required. 
In the end, hypothesis 5.3 has been tested.  Even though the main research 
question in Chapter 5 is about the modification of Florida’s advocacies regarding the 
people climate, the analysis at this stage provides useful information to understand the 
creative class’s consumer preferences. The result confirms that even for different 
groups of creative workers, their consumer preferences are not the same in a place.  
Further studies could be necessary, as data constraints in the EU LFS impede us to 
precisely measure this difference for creative workers by regions and further by 
working groups. However, it is believed that Florida’s one-size-fits-all solution again 
has been proven to be implausible. 
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This thesis, for the first time, puts many essential aspects of social and 
economic progress into the same theoretical framework. Based on advanced 
econometric models, the foregoing analysis suggested answers to the hypothesis 
proposed in section 2.3.3. While many interesting points have been raised regarding 
the promotion of the creative economy, it has to be accepted that this study is limited 
to defining the size of city regions or the insufficient number of observations. Also, 
the construction of variables to represent the aspects of the creative class thesis could 
be subjective. However, the findings are believed to contribute to the on-going debate 
over regional/urban development policies. In a nutshell, the relationship between 
different European cities and regions should not be competitive, instead both large-
sized and smaller-sized city regions need to be socially and geographically networked. 
They all have chances to become creative powerhouses if local policy makers 
correctly associate the preferences of the creative class with their unique advantages. 
 
7.4 Education and creative workers 
 
In response to hypothesis 6.1, Chapter 6 aims to test the efficiency of the 
education system in shaping creative workers in the European labour market. A 
snapshot of the situation for new creative workers in the labour market across seven 
European countries was provided, but it must be accepted that the application of the 
EU LFS dataset has its own limitations. First of all, the discussion cannot be extended 
to the wage effect of education due to lack of available data, while the time period of 
2003-2007 may be not indicative of recent circumstances from 2007 onwards. 
Secondly, a survey based dataset always has considerable biases. One of the most 
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typical examples is that the scale of graduates or new workers can only be indirectly 
estimated through the assumption. Also in either probit or multinomial logit models, 
the size of coefficients for a particular variable is likely to be driven by the sample 
selection technique in each country. In response to these issues, this is the reason why 
this study adopted multiple analytical techniques based on various sources. By 
combining pieces of evidence from descriptive statistics as well as econometric 
analysis, it is still possible to draw a meaningful conclusion. 
This study, for the first time, examined the possible relationship between 
education and the creative class across different European countries. Since Florida 
defined the creative class as highly skilled and well-educated individuals, the power 
of education is inevitably linked to the advocacy of the creative economy. Overall, 
higher education seems to be a crucial factor in determine creative job outcomes. 
Having a university degree is a great advantage in the long term – it increases 
innovation, wealth and productivity. University also teaches students how to learn and 
how to prepare for the labour market as employability has been incorporated into 
university curricula to help prepare students for the labour market (Redmond, 2013). 
Therefore, a successful economy or society depends on the wider participation of 
higher education, and it is not surprising that graduates generally outperformed non-
graduates in terms of probability in getting creative jobs. 
Nevertheless, the sub-categories of the creative class have quite different 
reactions regarding the effect from different education/training backgrounds. In order 
to visualise these patterns, probabilities of getting bohemian, creative core and 
creative professional jobs by different backgrounds for each country are ranked 
(highest probability=5/lowest probability=1). When an average value of rankings for 
each background is taken across the target countries (see Figure 7.1), it is clear that 
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education schemes in developed European nations, to a great extent, match labour 
market needs. The findings show that new workers are generally assimilated into 
proper jobs with different rates, depending on the type of education/training they once 
participated in. More importantly, evidence has been found to suggest the way in 
which creative jobs can be structured. New workers with arts and humanities 
backgrounds are more likely to become bohemians, holding a qualification of science 
or education-science increases the chance of getting creative core jobs and in order to 
have a creative professional job, the background of social science and 
engineering/health and welfare appears to be necessary.   
However, this taxonomy of definition regarding the match between skills and 
qualifications is all about how they can be coded but is not precisely related to what is 
happening in the labour market; new creative workers also have a high probability 
(highest probability=3/lowest probability=1) of finding jobs that are not 
commensurate with their qualifications (see Figure 7.2). This is particularly evident 
for those who are holding qualifications related to arts/humanities, social science and 
engineering/health and welfare. 
There is no doubt about the importance of education schemes and even more 
jobs require a university qualification than ever before, but the real challenge is that if 
higher education is a good proxy for potential ability and productivity, then how can 
such potential capacity be translated into a utilised skill? This is still a difficult 
question to answer. With respect to this, creative jobs do not have a clear boundary 
among occupations that require and use higher education.  
Finally, it may be difficult to propose direct policy recommendations that 
could easily solve the issues identified in this thesis – there is a clear methodological 
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challenge in defining new graduates as well as issues in the interpretation of results on 
education background. However, it is still necessary for policy makers to think about 
the following suggestions regarding the promotion of creative economy.   
– The creative economy, as Florida suggested, is receiving benefits from the 
widening participation of higher education in Europe. Together with evidence 
from other literature (e.g. the increasing supply of graduates does not result in the 
phenomenon of oversupply (Wasmer et al., 2007)), there is no reason to stop 
expanding the tertiary education sector in the target European countries. 
– The evidence in this study suggests that the field of study matters in shaping 
creative workers, but a significant mismatch rate also co-exists. The possible 
solutions are firstly the adjustment of the wage system to accurately capture 
important aspects of the value of degrees, and secondly the differentiation of 
tuition fees and scholarships for different subjects in order to meet the real 
demand in the labour market. For example, providing high quality bursary and 
occupational guidance will encourage more individuals to participate in humanity 
and arts subjects. 
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– It may be more realistic to accept the fact that such a “mismatch” between 
occupations and qualifications could exist for a long time. Qualifications are only 
useful for a short period for many new graduates in the labour market. Initial 
educational attainment alone cannot meet the high demands of the dynamic 
labour market in the 21st century; lifelong re-skilling and re-training in line with 
on-the-job experiences are required. Therefore, attention must be drawn to the 
balance between further training and tertiary education. This is a helpful 
suggestion for many creative workers who do not have a university degree. Here, 
governments can play an important role in providing better training opportunities. 
 
7.5 Postscript: the future of the creative economy 
 
In retrospect, one subject was actually focused on throughout the whole thesis: 
how we can correctly interpret the impact of the creative economy in European 
regions. This thesis has argued that geography still matters for economic development. 
In this sense, forces that stimulate growth are still associated with specific regional 
characteristics and they cannot easily be moved into different contexts (Ascani et al., 
2012). Among many existing theories that advocate the importance of the 
regional/local economy (e.g. Storper, 1995), Florida’s theory proposes a new line of 
thought to the current debate, as for the first time, a region’s future prosperity is 
highly coordinated with the changing nature of skilled workers.   
However, how can we ensure that the benefits of the creative economy can be 
widely shared? How can we ensure that low-skilled local residents can be treated 
equally with the highly-skilled, such as the creative class? Urban inequality is always 
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a complex problem for all countries in the world; thus, it is too harsh to criticise 
Florida for not solving this problem when no one else has either (Callahan, 2013). 
Even though the effect of this creativity-engendering strategy is not a universal uplift, 
it is still irrational to stop investing in skills or simply blocking the flow of well-
educated and skilled people and jobs between cities and regions. Instead, it may be 
more pragmatic for policy makers to think about how the downside of creative class 
urbanism could be offset, while maximising the capacity of the creative economy.  
Based on this assertion, this thesis, to a great extent, explored the future 
development path of the creative economy in European regions. Firstly, it is argued 
that the creative class is a useful concept that is different from the measure of human 
capital in terms of graduates. Florida’s advocacy of generating creative 
competitiveness across cities and regions by building up selected amenities may be 
arguable, but the creative class is substantially contributing to regional economic 
growth. Secondly, technology is complementary to creative skills. If we look around 
the world, technology has already changed the world of work. However, skills to 
analyse can be easily computerised unlike skills to create. Unless future technology 
can simulate the human brain, creativity, as is emphasised throughout this thesis, 
cannot be substituted by computers. Where does this leave us? At least it can be 
confirmed that the creative class thesis is situated in urban reality as the creative class 
has been playing a crucial role in association with technology in the economic system. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the relationship between economic growth and political 
institution was not repeated as it has been discussed at length in much previous 
research. Instead, the perspective was shifted to several essential aspects of economic 
and social progress regarding the identities of the creative class. The “overall 
approach” is challenged, mainly based on the experience of large-sized city regions. It 
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has seen a need for local policy makers to link their unique advantages to the different 
preferences of the creative class. The emphasis on consumption and entertainment 
based amenities could be a feasible policy option in attracting creative talent in large-
sized city regions while in smaller-sized city regions, good local government can still 
help the creative class to develop identities that reflect creativity. Finally, where does 
the creative class come from? The emergence of creativity is indeed a complex social 
phenomenon and such a process is less likely to be routinised through an education 
system. However, does formal education really have no impact in shaping creative 
workers? The results indicate that education background has an evident impact on 
creative job outcomes, while the mismatch between occupations and qualifications is 
significant too. As long as Europe is facing a similar challenge as the U.S. (Florida, 
2003b), there is a need for basic education reform policy to be highly coordinated 
with the real situation for new creative workers in the labour market.     
In the new century, the social and economic sciences belong to 
multidisciplinary and overlapping disciplines. Maybe there has been too much debate 
about graduates versus the creative class, cities verses suburbs and justice versus 
inequality. Since we all accept that skills matter to growth, let’s focus on what the 
knowledge/creative economy really requires. Acknowledging that development is a 
localised process dependent on various economic and social forces is important. From 
a policy-making perspective, the thesis has suggested new ideas for us to cope with 
real challenges in the upcoming Creative/Knowledge Age. 
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7.6 Limitations of the research  
 
In line with other studies, this research has limitations. Although this research 
integrated the concept of the creative class with other development theories for the 
first time, the biggest challenge is still the data constraint. Firstly, ISCO-88 3-digit 
occupation codes and NUTS 2 codes in the EU LFS are only available for some 
countries, thus many European economies have not been included. Having more 
detailed data, such as the 4-digit ISCO codes or NUTS 3 codes, is always expected in 
this research. However, even though such an individual database exists in the U.K., 
Germany and the Netherlands, observations from two or three advanced countries is 
very likely to overestimate the impact of creative workers for the whole of Europe, 
given the fact that none of the datasets in the other target countries could match this 
accuracy. 
Secondly, the time period is from 1995-2007 for most of the countries. The 
period from 2008 onwards is not included for two reasons. On one hand, the 
economic crisis in Europe from 2008 dramatically changed the creative economy; 
thus, putting both normal and abnormal periods together to interpret the average 
influence of the creative economy could produce misleading results. On the other 
hand, the continuous updating of the NUTS, ISCO and NACE codes in the EU LFS 
impedes us in merging yearly data in a consistent way after 2007. For example, from 
2009 onwards, the European commission adopted NACE 2.1 standards rather than 
NACE 1/1.1 from previous years. Since 2011, the ISCO-88 occupation codes have 
been replaced by new ICSO-00 codes.  
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Finally, some of Florida’s variables that are commensurate with the American 
exercise cannot be completely duplicated. One of the issues is that it is difficult to 
estimate gay/lesbian populations across different European countries from any of the 
existing datasets. Even if the share of non-native born workers over the total number 
of workers was used as the substitution, the concept of the “cool” community that 
Florida advocated could not accurately be measured in this study. Also, the estimation 
of input shares and ICT capital services at the regional level relies on assumptions. 
Such an attempt will undoubtedly result in biases, but in Europe regional accounts 
lack information in these aspects.   
 
7.7 Promising ideas for further research  
 
From the findings in this thesis, a number of promising ideas for further 
research can be introduced. Firstly, not all of Florida’s proposals have been tested, 
such as the “job follows people” assumption or the social externality from the creative 
class on the services class or the other “undervalued” population. Is the high-tech 
population really important for local economy in any case? How can we define the so-
called “undervalued class” and how can we measure the relationship between 
meritocratic urbanism and social inequality? Secondly, it would be interesting to look 
at the spillover effect of the creative class at the city level in Europe –investigating the 
impact of the creative economy in addition to the regional analysis would be another 
angle. For example, how could a big metropolis, which is favoured by Florida’s 
proposition, leverage the economic growth of surrounding areas? Therefore, further 
research could be integrated with spatial econometric models. Finally, although the 
effect of the political institution in relation to the value of creative workers has 
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already been examined, it is still not clear what the role of local government is in 
promoting the creative economy. Does a local government have enough autonomic 
power to implement specialised strategies in favour of its own creative economy? Or 
is the involvement of local authorities important at all? Answering these questions is 
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